<p><pre><code> All software using a GPGME version prior to 2.3.0 either as shared</code></pre>
libary, DLL, or statically linked is affected. Examples of software
using GPGME are<p><pre><code> - Gpg4win
- GnuPG Desktop
- GnuPG VS-Desktop
- Most mail clients
- Many XMPP clients
- Samba
- Flatpack
</code></pre>
I assume this is in "gpgme" and doesn't affect apt etc? Can someone confirm?
Reportedly fixed by Red Hat 5 years ago based on the output from conventional tools, but missed by upstream: <a href="https://gitlab.com/redhat/centos-stream/rpms/gpgme/-/blob/c9s/gpgme-1.15.1-covscan.patch?ref_type=heads#L290-339" rel="nofollow">https://gitlab.com/redhat/centos-stream/rpms/gpgme/-/blob/c9...</a>
A little more details:
<a href="https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/11/21/1" rel="nofollow">https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/11/21/1</a>
Hurray for endless distro forks
<p><pre><code> This vulnerability was discovered by Johan Carlsson and we were informed by GitLab on 2026-11-12.
Initially we set 2026-11-25 for a coordinated disclosure;
due to the new Ruby2Shell bug GitLab had to update earlier
and thus we also disclosed the GPGME bug on 2026-11-20.
</code></pre>
I guess pretty important for GitLab since it supports signed commits, code execution in that path is pretty bad.<p>You can find the GitLab Omnibus related patch here: <a href="https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/omnibus-gitlab/-/commit/279ac3357875ad6a163cf1aa06e7f24babdf6333" rel="nofollow">https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/omnibus-gitlab/-/commit/279ac3...</a>
It's a double free bug, not an RCE chain. Are these vulnerability reports intentionally overstated?
Yes, the actual post just implies possibility<p>> Exploiting this bug to mount an Remote Code Execution attack (RCE) can't
be ruled out.
Today's LLMs can often escalate to RCE, so it makes sense to assume the worst.
It makes sense to assume the worst, then try to achieve it. And only if you achieve it so you tag it as such. You can't announce vulnerabilities to the world based on vibes of what it might do....<p>"Yeah this is a classic double free. We can't think of a way to transform it into a RCE or something like that, we've also failed at having LLMs do it so far. but in the current climate it could happen so we humbly ask the tag of most dangerous vulnerability please. Not just this disclaimer. We want 9.9 CVE that says RCE!!"<p>This is ridiculous.
Sending somebody a signed message and trigger a double free is a prime example for RCE
What are practical attack vectors for Linux workstations and servers?<p>The masses of internet users don't know what GPG is. I'd caim the majority of software developers don't have a GPG key and never explicitly verify any signature.<p>But packages of many distros are verified using GPG. Is the vulnerable component involved or not?
> But packages of many distros are verified using GPG. Is the vulnerable component involved or not?<p>Debian uses it last time I was on a Debian system And I think all Debian based distros that don't modify apt will essentially use GPG to verify the packages as well.<p>I think it's one of the those programs that pop up in a lot of different things. Personally I use it a fair amount and even use the Symmetric encryption features for some files and for personal password management.<p>I do think developer are moving away from it thought I agree (and for various reasons that are good).
Potentially package update/installation? A lot of people use gpg without knowing it.<p>It's specifically in 'GPGME' though, so more limited scope I think.
It’s used a lot in commercial for code signing. We use it with Thales HSMs (there are other things in the middle)
Arch Linux uses gpgme to verify downloaded packages (and optionally, package databases) for example.
PGP mail?
The vulnerability is in GpgME (the library), not GnuTLS (the library).
Editorialized submission title to be better bait.<p>The correct title is: GnuPG Security Advisory for GPGME
"We are pleased to announce..."
so essentially look at the key before? (and hope your program does not have another RCE...)
Luckily nobody uses it!
more or less than 0 impacted systems?
This is a reminder that Seqouia-PGP exists, and its 'sq' CLI is way more intuitive.