I found the Machine Gods interview with Meredith Whittaker really interesting. She specifically talked about this issue of AI apps having too much access on users’ devices and that Signal is struggling to prevent these apps from getting access to users’ Signal chats. And that even if you don’t have an AI app installed, your contact could and thereby still leaks your chat.<p>Good to see they’re making some progress towards addressing this issue and that they are “cautiously optimistic that some major OS providers, like Google and Apple, are engaging with us on how these systems should better interface with privacy-sensitive apps like Signal.”
Link to this episode: <a href="https://podcastindex.org/podcast/8037119?episode=62418525150" rel="nofollow">https://podcastindex.org/podcast/8037119?episode=62418525150</a>
Your chats can <i>always</i> be leaked by the other participant, whether intentionally or unintentionally, in all chat apps, for all of the history of the written word.
Yes but ostensibly that is a deliberate action whereas people who are letting AI run amok on their stuff aren’t always aware of what exactly it is doing.<p>It’s like iCloud. If I send a photo of my kids to my parents, that could wind up on their iClouds. At that point whatever Apple does with that is out of my hands. I can clearly explain this to them if needed. But with AI there’s a lot more opacity, plus the average person does not understand permissions or look at TOS to see how their stuff is used.
Ideally you would want the allow Siri AI toggle to be “Yes”, “Local models only” and “No”.
Time for a Signal OS or a Signal phone?
To you and the commenter who mentioned GrapheneOS (which I think is amazing), isn't a big problem here that you would need both parties on this privacy OS (whether graphene or a new signal OS)? Maybe a signal feature to say whether the other party is on an os that doesn't screen-scan, but if iOS and android continue to, that's a super small sliver of convos (that don't have at least 1 party on there). Seems like the signal mission is to offer privacy to the masses, and having an indicator whether it's "actually" private or not undermines that.
I'd rather they remain focussed on their core product. Look at Mozilla, they continue to start random new projects that keep failing, while their one actually important product fell further and further behind, losing most of its market share in the process.
Just install it on Graphene. You don't need a new OS and they should each focus on their core competencies.
Or team up with Grapheneos. This space is fragmented enough and some unity would help to promote the privacy cause.
An OS that rejected non determinism could really find a niche. Anyone over the age of 35 hates it when their phone changes its behavior, or moves a checkbox from one submenu to another, let alone having a chatbot taking actions on your behalf.<p>Just give me tech that works the same every time.
If it goes as well as Firefox OS, maybe not the best idea.<p>But a pager-style device is certainly doable if there is a market for it, and probably the best in terms of security. The question is whether or not Signal (the company) accepts it on their network. Normally, they don't allow third party clients.
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If this is true, does it not throw some water on the coals of Apple's "We're so secure" stance? Why the F would any app have access to my signal messages?
As I understand it, the issue on iOS is Siri’s access to screen content. It's useful to be able to e.g. read Hacker News in Safari and be able to say, “Hey Siri, what do these three obscure acronyms in the comment at the top of my screen stand for?” Unfortunately, when iOS 27 was first released, there was no way to exclude an app like Signal from this feature. So if you had Signal open and you triggered Siri to ask an unrelated question, you could inadvertently send a screenshot of your Signal chat to the cloud.<p>Thankfully, Signal pushed and Apple responded pretty quickly. Now we can tighten up our settings via:<p><pre><code> Settings > Siri > Excluded Apps</code></pre>
Really should be:<p><pre><code> Settings > Siri > App Access Permissions
</code></pre>
With the option to "always ask," or "always allow," or "never allow."
As long as there's an easy way to get to it that doesn't involve digging through settings. The whole "[app] wants to paste from your clipboard" prompt is so god damn annoying.
This is one of those obvious situations where <i>should</i> and <i>reality</i> are not any where close to each other. Of course, Apple will want the default to be open and every thing whitelisted so "it just works". When someone wants their new shiny to be accepted, they will never go for the everything must be specifically allowed by user as the default.
The way they ought to do it is like this: The app specifies the default (which is "allowed" if they don't specify, but then Signal can specify otherwise), the user can then change it either way, and the app is given no means to tell if the user has changed it (so evil corp can't inhibit the user from doing what they want).
Yes, this. I'm fine with default being "no", as long as it can be flipped to yes (at least per-app, for <i>any</i> app), and the apps having no say or knowledge of it if the user decides to opt-in.
Yeah, unfortunately the guy who really championed privacy at Apple, passed away. Jobs would have been furious if AI had access to his chats without his permission.
Apple’s been good (not perfect, but good) on privacy post-Jobs. PCC, PAT, and AVP’s bias toward privacy at the expense of utility come to mind.
Hate to be that guy, but why would that option be Siri, or even Signal, specific?<p>If the goal is to ensure security and privacy of a chat screen or an excel window full of bank balances, wouldn't you want to prevent <i>any</i> app, on <i>any</i> OS from getting screen access?<p>Serious question.<p>I mean is there a way to prevent all background processes from taking screen shots while, say, Signal or something else private is in use? Across linux, Windows, MacOS, Android, ios etc? I feel like users should be able to set every OS to operate that way.<p>BTW, I get and understand the failure state that occurs when the person you're talking to is a moron and is running Claude YOLO or something while you're chatting with them. I'm only talking about ensuring security on your own end.
I'm going to take a guess. But we'd have to guess unless we are the actual Apple designers. But I'd wager that the thing is that Apple doesn't see themselves as part of the user's threat model. So them being able to see your content is not a privacy issue. There's reason to act that way, after all, they have control of the hardware and core software and that is a high level of access. Even for fully open source systems you still have to have lots of trust.<p><pre><code> > Across linux
</code></pre>
Yes, but you do need to go to great lengths to do this. The reason is because there's so many things that subtly can extract data. If you want to prevent a system that can take screenshots, then you have to disable screenshots entirely. You have to disable screenreaders. That's all possible, but does interfere with user experience, all because you're concerned about someone potentially hijacking that system. Truthfully that's not in most users' threat models. Similarly you'd have to disable all USB ports and capabilities because a USB device can control your system (see rubber ducky). And many more. To give you a small example, go install noscript into your browser (or install the tor or mullvad browser and put on the strict security settings and browse the internet). It increases privacy and security, but it does come at a big UX cost.
If i am not mistaken a user must approve screen access for any apps. By default they don’t have that. What signal asks for is to exclude their windows from the screenshots these other apps make.
I reject the assumption that users trying to exercise their right to compute and end-user automation are morons, and truly believe the feature set you're proposing is <i>user hostile</i>.<p>The most secure computing system is an inert rock. It's also not very useful.
Apple priorities are: 1-profits, 2-convenience, 3-security, 4-privacy. Same as most mainstream companies like Google and Microsoft. The difference is that there is less of a conflict between 1 and 4 in Apple than in the others because they make most of they money from hardware sales.<p>AI agents sure are convenient. By looking at your messages they can tell you that there is an accident on the road to the airport your flight is departing from and that you should consider leaving early. So it gets prioritized over privacy.<p>For people who are against that tradeoff, Apple can make your device less convenient (lockdown mode), I guess that's an advantage over competitors.
<p><pre><code> > Why the F would any app have access to my signal messages?
</code></pre>
How do you think those toast notifications work? That has to integrate with the iOS system, which needs to be able to read (at least part of) the message. While that's default behavior, you can disable, but that requires you not being able to preview your messages. Though different levels of security/privacy for different preferences and threat models. So pick your own.
Aren’t they implying that the users on the other side of your chats explicitly grant that access to their ai agent?
I expect the risk vector would primarily be related to OS-level AI tools being given to see whats being rendered on screen and interact with it. Signal can encrypt at rest and between devices, it can't encrypt when actually rendering text to the UI tree.
> I expect the risk vector would primarily be related to OS-level AI tools being given to see whats being rendered on screen and interact with it. Signal can encrypt at rest and between devices, it can't encrypt when actually rendering text to the UI tree.<p>Yeah, it is likely this.<p>A decade ago I worked for a company that provided secure communications apps (email, IMs, etc) for both Android and iOS and (as one of the Android developers) I remember pointing out to higher-ups that it was trivial to write an app on Android that would tie into the accessibility APIs Android provided to bypass all of our app's network and storage security (the accessibility APIs would allow you to automatically read the text out of any standard OS text controls of any installed app while running as a background service to provide alternative means of presenting the data, like text to speech, etc).<p>But instead of providing accessibility, an attacker app could just take all that data and silently upload it somewhere.<p>This did mean the attacker would have to physically access the phone one time to install the accessibility logger service (or they'd have to phish a user to install it themselves), but after that initial install they could forever bypass the security on our app with absolutely no way for the user to know data was being exfiled unless they are the type that is meticulously auditing which apps are installed on their phone.<p>Destroying accessibility is unfair to people who need it, but I recommended we add a feature to our app that would default to notifying the user with a clear warning whenever another running app had accessibility read access.<p>My recommendation never got followed, at least for the remainder of my time at that company (they got bought up by Blackberry about a year later and the office I was working in got shut down).
Maybe signal can change how they render text on the screen. Nothings perfect, but maybe render it themselves?
Screenshots tend to capture a black rectangle instead of the screen area rendered using a hardware overlay.[0] Perhaps Signal could use that. Although there are likely ways to circumvent it.<p>[0] <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_overlay#Screen_shots" rel="nofollow">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_overlay#Screen_shots</a>
Like render all your chats as Captcha text so the AI can't read it?
You wouldn't, but someone you're talking to has connected the desktop app to their signal account, and is also using Claude in YOLO mode.
Would like to know more about it. Where are those AI apps with access to user chats? I'd like to have one, would save me some time on copy-pasting Whatsapp messages to Claude.
I wish they would go one step further and alert every user of such a system that it contains spyware, and then recommend alternatives like GrapheneOS or Linux for desktop computers. Relying on Apps that meant to remain private to prevent screenshots from being taken won’t work in the long run. Users need to regain control over their operating system.
> <i>Users need to regain control over their operating system.</i><p>GrapheneOS is not a direction in that, you're just trading one megacorp for different not-yet-megacorp. Both have security-first manifest, which means both insist on making the devices secured <i>from their owners</i>.
That is very inaccurate. GrapheneOS is open source and people are more than welcome to make their own custom builds. Although we don't support rooting, many do. That's up to them.
Sure, but apps will not run because the build will fail attestation.<p>Instead of making a stance against this stupid anti-competitive practice, you decided you want to play along, relying on the goodwill of the community to push app developers to allowlist <i>you</i>.
What do you mean "the build will fail attestation"? Do you mean Play Integrity, because what you said there isn't clear.<p>> Instead of making a stance against this stupid anti-competitive practice, you decided you want to play along<p>Again, not sure what you're talking about, but if you are talking about Play Integrity, then that couldn't be farther from the truth. We've been talking about this issue for a long time now, calling Google out on it, and even talking with regulators.<p>> relying on the goodwill of the community to push app developers to allowlist you<p>This also doesn't make any sense. Apps don't have to allowlist GrapheneOS for them to work.
In the case of GrapheneOS, this is justified by its security model and is not intended to work against the user but rather to protect them. In addition, the source code is freely available, and it is very easy to create your own versions.
GrapheneOS is a non-profit organization.
IMO Graphene ties a good line between appliance and totally hackable.<p>They allow you to isolate google-apps - great.<p>They don't allow root - meh, I guess, but I'm not really trying to do real work on a phone (or I'll just use termux).<p>The fact you can't change the lowest levels of the operating system might be annoying if you're and Android developer (idk) but as a user its not so bad.<p>The great thing is they are open source. If a group of like minded people wanted to distrubute GrapheneOS but hackable I'm sure they could if they had the expertise and resources.<p>And if GrapheneOS somehow becomes malicious I'm sure someone will fork them and form a like minded community around different values.
> They don't allow root<p>That's not really true. We don't _support_ rooting and discourage it, but people definitely do root GrapheneOS. There are also guides on how to do it, etc. I've even seen people do some other weird stuff by making changes to the official images and re-signing them.
With Graphene, at least, you can build your own image and strip out restrictions you disagree with. For example, you can restore root or excise enraging limitations like the ability to screenshot your own apps. The Graphene developers probably don't condone such modifications for various reasons, but you don't have to agree with them.
Regaining control would also allow overruling the kinds of restrictions that these apps put in (which to be clear, I think is a good thing).
Most modern malware is ram resident only, and it resists forensic analysis to hide the payload RCE.<p>The issue is telecoms are some of the most devious monopolists you will ever encounter. They literally helped change laws, add certification barriers, assist 3 letter organization campaigns on US citizens, and self-sign firmware images... blacklisting 3rd party OS on hardware though imei anti-theft systems.<p>Starlink is successful because they pulled off a miracle business deal getting these telecoms to cooperate with Direct Connect satellite VoLTE services. =3
I get where you are coming from but this would just come across as patronizing. Nothing says "user control" less than an app nagging you to reinstall your entire operating system. Sometimes (especially if you want privacy to be commonplace) you have to meet users where they are at.
ooops, you are now norton antivirus
Signal doesn't even officially support GrapheneOS... they are not on their app store and the APK download has a big "dangerous, don't do it!" sign<p><a href="https://signal.org/android/apk/" rel="nofollow">https://signal.org/android/apk/</a>
> Signal doesn't even officially support GrapheneOS...<p>It doesn't have to, signal runs on AOSP and doesn't enforce the fake "security" theater Play Integrity scam.<p>So why should it "officially support" GOS?<p>> they are not on their app store<p>Why should Signal be in GrapheneOS app store? Their app store is <i>intentionally</i> so minimal, there's no good reason do add the unrelated, optional app if Signal doesn't restrict installations from Play Store or Aurora.<p>Signal can work on being added to Accrestent if they want to be promoted, but that's unlikely given that Signal has a ~hard reliance of GCM for notifications (and apparent refusal to adapt Unified Push as an option).<p>Signal is aiming for being a mainstream, not niches like GrapheneOS, I'm afraid.
Signal works just fine on GrapheneOS. They don't have to officially support it for it to work.
You can use obtainium to stay up to date via their apks. For most people downlowding via play store to get automatic updates is probably more secure as gapps are preinstalled and obtainium while excellent is not in the mainstream (yet, I guess).
What do you mean? GrapheneOS recommends using their sandboxed Play Store to download apps, and Signal recommends downloading their app from Play Store.<p>The GrapheneOS store has less than 20 apps and does not include third-party ones, just system apps.
This is incorrect on both counts.<p>A Graphene user should install from the play store.<p>So they do support Graphene and do not warn people not to install Signal on Graphene.<p>If you don't want to use the play store, not even anonymized via the Aurora store, then you have a special case, and this special case apk exists just for you.
I would appreciate if Signal published the findings of their 'forensics investigation' so that other app developers with fewer resources could profit. If it were something like a living document (wiki or repo), there could even be collaboration, where others share their findings.
I am not sure why signal doesn't allow crypto payment (like monero) for their account creation when not using a phone number. To register you either need a phone number or payment method which can both identify you.
Privacy and anonymity are different things.
It's very difficult to have one without the other.
Nah if they are "serious" they offer both. It's a scam until proven otherwise.
But not distinct things, privacy being a subset of anonymity.<p>By the way here are three wishes for a magic lamp:<p>1. People stop acting like it matters whether privacy and anonymity are different things.<p>2. People stop acting like it matters if "Wayland is a protocol".<p>3. People stop acting like using all your RAM ASAP is not wasting it.
Probably because that would open up the platform to a flood of spam bots.
Spammers operate out of countries where they have no fear of legal consequences, so all Signal has to do to deter them from the crypto option is make it more expensive than bulk phone numbers are.
It still costs money. I don't see why money in a different form would cause more spam. If it did, they could raise the price if they're getting more spam.<p>I think it would be unlikely that any spam is going to come from the paid accounts. When phone numbers are way cheaper.<p>Frankly, the paid accounts are overpriced. But, anyone that wants to pay with money instead of phone numbers is going to be fine supporting Signal anyway.<p>The best argument for Monero is that the overlap of people that want to pay with a KYC payment method and that would pay in the first place instead of a phone number is very small.
Yeah it is shocking to me that they won't take Monero<p>Both for account creation, as you mention, and for donations. I see they do take some crypto for donations now, which is good. But not the most obvious one!<p>Take my money guys!
Last I heard, that was coming at a later date
Should be buyable desktop only with volume licenses.
If you want real security and anonymity, with support for multiple and temporary identities, use SimpleX. Recommended by Whonix, which is recommended by Edward Snowden.<p>Signal is for pretend-security.
>Signal is for pretend-security.<p>No. Signal is for content privacy by code and metadata privacy by policy and also code but weaker.<p>If you didn't notice, SimpleX had way less users and way worse UX.<p>Being built for different things doesn't make it pretend security. You're completely correct that it's not for anonymity. You're completely wrong that it's not secure.
Signal's metadata policy is to collect and permanently store in the cloud your name, photo, phone number, and a list of your contacts. That's not privacy. It stores that data in a notoriously insecure enclave. It protects all of your data from others with nothing more than a pin which can be brute forced/guessed.<p>It's also their policy to refuse to update their privacy policy which is currently lying to users about the sensitive data they collect and store.<p>There are better ways to secure your content and meta data from more trustworthy companies.
My take: Drains the shit out of batteries too. Also, AI screen readers don't care. If it's on the screen, it can read it.
> Signal is for pretend-security.<p>Can we please stop it with this?
The 501c3 named Signal is effectively running a giant honeypot, or in simpler terms a "scam".<p>In real-world practice, the 501c3 named Signal and Amazon Web Services that its servers run on can see the metadata of which users messaged which other users at what time.<p>This is why they haven't given the users the option to invite other users with a string (or "token" or whatever) so the inviting user can be messaged without a PSTN number or Google id being demanded from the invitee.<p>If you're trying to buy some good shit on the street or meet up at "da show" with urbanite degenerates, Signal is great.<p>Serious people, infosec pros, execs, etc stopped using Signal about two years ago -- at least that's what I saw from my corner of the world.
The fact that signal collects and keeps a record of your contacts in the cloud (while lying about that in their privacy policy) is enough to make them too untrustworthy to use for anything serious.
So what do “serious” people use? I have a pretty easy life so I don’t bother straying away from the easy to use apps, but I’m still curious what the l33t hax0rs use.
Last time I wanted private communication I went with Jami. It's a bit primitive looking, but it worked, and jami didn't collect and store any of my data in the cloud like signal does.
> So what do “serious” people use?<p>Most likely a decentralized service such as a fork of Signal that uses their own infrastructure, or (self-hosted) Matrix, or XMPP.
Among the high net worth audience there are a handful of commercially supported forks of the Signal software in use. Others are using a supported fork of Element X which is deemed "polished" among by the less literate of users.<p>"Signal" in the previous comment referred to the service hosted by the 501c3 named Signal, not the body of open source software named Signal ; these are overlapping but different things.<p>FOSS quietly shines in the private (as in, among private entities).<p>Organizations that are universally recognizable as working on "serious" things have coalesced around Matrix and Element X or other Matrix clients (some not FOSS), instead of services hosted by third parties (such as Slack). Different audience but an example of modern literacy.<p>"Small" users such as "l33t hax0rs" which I read as "age range of teenager to college freshman", often set up their own XMPP servers and use OMEMO. Perhaps these users are not organized around something "serious", but their choice to have self-respect and gain literacy to act it out is something that can be taken seriously.<p>To answer your question more directly: anything with decent technical merit that either doesn't require a 3rd party or the 3rd party can be specifically chosen.<p>I recently wrote on this topic, not so much the technical pieces but the vibe-perspective<p><pre><code> https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50417774</code></pre>
rocket.chat/install
this is always my problem with it - it seems like lots of people shit on Signal, but never say what either they use or what they recommend (and why)<p>it comes across like more of a ploy to get you to scare people away and get them to use other, less secure, messengers
The frustrating thing about this is now you can't take screenshots of a Signal chat on Windows. Yes, you can use screenshotting to get around retention or whatever, but that's a basic feature.<p>Another similar thing recently was I was trying to help a woman send a document to her lawyer, and for whatever reason I couldn't figure out how to share it with him via text or whatsapp. Somehow I was able to share it to my own phone via whatsapp, and from there I made a group text in Whatsapp with me and her lawyer to share the document.<p>With AI agents I think we're similarly getting into territory where it's not so clear-cut as Signal is making things out to be. I share the knee-jerk "keep your agents out of my stuff!" reaction but I don't think that's a sustainable/pragmatic choice. It might be correct as a principle but if it locks you out of the operating system, it's not Signal's job to disable key OS features on the grounds that the OS is insecure - at a certain point Signal might as well just wipe the hard drive, but that's not Signal's role. Signal is there to enable people to send messages, not stop them from doing so.
> The frustrating thing about this is now you can't take screenshots of a Signal chat on Windows.<p>I find this surprising. What mechanism enforces this? This kind of restriction, AFAIK, is only possible on Android and iOS because users do not control the system (no "root" on user builds). On Linux, I certainly can screenshot Signal or any other "app" because the whole OS is under my control.
Apps on the major platforms can opt specific windows into ‘do not allow screen capture or recording’: originally used for protected DVD content, it’s now also able to be used for secure credential entry dialogs or for Signal. The only defense against Linux will be tying device attestation status into Signal, so that I can see when someone I trust binds an untrustable client to our conversation. Linux is not necessarily an untrustworthy Signal platform, but as it stands today it is, as you point out, incapable of such protections and therefore <i>ineligible</i> for evaluating whether I can trust your client platform, and thus untrustable. (Unless you’re using a sealed Linux distro like Bazzite, in which case at least then one could reasonably determine <i>whether</i> your Signal instance is secured against local capture or not.)<p>ps. Yes, trust is an onion, blah blah HDMI decoder boxes, etc, but I’m limiting the problem space to ‘software solutions only’, matching the problem space that the vast majority of AI device scanning of Signal content occurs in.
> The only defense against Linux will be tying device attestation status into Signal.<p>I would stop using Signal if it required "attestation," which my GrapheneOS phone does not have anyway.
The whole "don't trust the user's device" is almost even more problematic than it is for the DVD case. At least with the DVD case this is all by design getting in the user's way. This ends up being Signal stopping the user from doing something they want to do, on the grounds that Signal knows best (but the user is just forced to use a different app, eliminating the benefit.)
It's also possible on Windows (SetWindowDisplayAffinity). What you call a restriction that takes control away from the user's control is actually an important security feature and Wayland will hopefully implement it (with user control I'm sure).<p>It's not even hard to imagine why this is useful. Imagine you're sharing/streaming your screen and your password manager accidentally opens on the shared area.
There is an option in the Windows client in settings, under privacy, called screen security. If you turn that off, then you can take screenshots.
It's a bit awkward, but one workaround is to take a picture of the screen instead.
The problem with all things Signal related is that it eventually encourages people to think about things they're accustomed to not thinking about and so you get a lot of very silly outputs.<p>With the biggest one being the number of people who apparently assumed that when they send a message to someone, that person couldn't just tell anyone else what they said anyway.
Tangential article for those on Apple platforms - <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/victory-you-can-now-exclude-apps-siri-ai" rel="nofollow">https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/victory-you-can-now-ex...</a>
I will stick with services that can be my dumb pipe and use E2EE libraries that can do MLS [1], OMEMO [2], OTR [3], GPG [4] and manage keys out of band but I do appreciate that services like signal exist to limit the number of governments that can eavesdrop.<p>[1] - <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messaging_Layer_Security" rel="nofollow">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messaging_Layer_Security</a><p>[2] - <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OMEMO" rel="nofollow">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OMEMO</a><p>[3] - <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off-the-Record_Messaging_protocol" rel="nofollow">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off-the-Record_Messaging_proto...</a><p>[4] - <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard" rel="nofollow">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard</a>
All of these are vulnerable to AI tools installed on your device or on your contact's device. That's what this article is about.
That last droid update did put some AI crap on my phone but I tried my best to disable it. If it gets re-enabled I will force them to ban me.
Those are just protocols, it's the specific apps and applications that have to prevent screenshots and access to their notifications to AI tools
And how many of the people you chat with daily use all those? Your friends, relatives, elementary school classmates, high school friends who still call you over for a beer (and you them), coworkers from previous projects with new leads etc.?
What does that look like in practice for you, day to day?
If Signal were serious about privacy, you wouldn't require a phone number to be linked to your account.<p>If you need to reduce spam sign-ups, let me pay a few dollars in crypto instead.
<a href="https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/11197884108826-Phone-Numberless-Registration-for-Android-beta" rel="nofollow">https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/11197884108826-...</a>
It also wouldn't store a list of your contacts, your phone number, your name, and your profile pic in the cloud forever while lying about that in their privacy policy either.
You can't be serious about privacy with a closed-source app and centralized server.<p>Signal is better than basic SMS, iMessage, Facebook Messenger, etc. That's got value. It's convenient and has reached critical mass so the barrier to entry is low enough that it's a viable option.<p>It's better than nothing, and just secure enough to be worth it and just secure enough to maintain a customer base.<p>It's still a business, and they will make it as secure as needed to earn money, and no more secure than that.
Signal is closed-source? I can see APGL3-licensed source code for the Android App[0], the iOS App[1], and the server[2].<p>[0]: <a href="https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android</a><p>[1]: <a href="https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-iOS" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-iOS</a><p>[2]: <a href="https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Server" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Server</a>
You can review some source. You don't know what's actually running on the production system and who has access to everything.
I don't quite get this take... I can't know what's actually running on <i>any</i> production system out there (except my own), because giving anyone access would be a fatal choice.<p>What can Signal do to annihilate your concerns without giving you access to their system?
The actively fight against self hosted Signal servers and clients - like those where you can know what it is running because it is you (or your friends) running it!
Unless you have some examples, both your statements seem false.<p>At best they (very) passively fight against third party clients connecting to their official servers.<p>At best they (very very very) passively fight against self-hosting the server by not providing elaborate guides and having the public repo lag behind production.
This is a great point and I wonder if we could see some sort of remote attestation for consumer messaging apps. It would do a lot for my confidence.
Signal is one of the first apps with fully reproducible builds. Source code matches perfectly the android app and you can get byte identical by yourself. And if client crypto and protocols hold, backend does not matter.
If only Signal was zero trust and then any server implementation would be irrelevant from the security and privacy guarantees it offers.
They could open source it and you still wouldn't know what's actually running on their servers.
At some point the public repository for the server wasn't updated for several years.<p>The one you download also has proprietary binary blobs.
<i>The one you download also has proprietary binary blobs.</i><p>This is straight up lies, and I don't need to prove it to this specific user, because I already have, but (s)he likes to be obtuse and wilfully ignorant.<p>For anyone else, full source reproducible verified for iOS: <a href="https://github.com/commandersaki/signal-ios-build-verification/" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/commandersaki/signal-ios-build-verificati...</a>
It's not a problem, but it is true. They keep the spam filter closed source. This person seems to be talking about the server, not the clients.<p>And the Android clients come with closed source components from Google. It's still not a problem, but it's true.
There is no proprietary blobs in the Signal Server source code.<p>The build of Signal Server from public source does not mean that's what they deploy in production.<p>For security analysis the Signal Server is immaterial, all claims of security can be verified from the client. For all intents and purposes the server is just a dumb pipe.
As a person working on privacy tech, this attitude, as well as the one in some of the sibling comments is a major reason we don't have better privacy solutions. Signal is not just better then nothing. It's better then all of the viable alternatives.<p>You have no idea how demotivating your comment is for people who have taken a pay cut, and dedicated their lives to try and find a better balance between usability, privacy and sustainability.
It is still valid to point out the false sense of security, not to mention there being an intentional single point of failure (and metadata monitoring).
As a person working on privacy tech you should probably be more concerned with the fact that they store your profile info (name, photo, phone number) and a list of all your contacts in the cloud forever where it's kept in a very questionably secure enclave and avilable to anyone who can guess a pin (<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230519120156/https://community.signalusers.org/t/proper-secure-value-security-pins-are-too-easy-to-brute-force-sgx-is-not-reliable-enough/15096/2" rel="nofollow">https://web.archive.org/web/20230519120156/https://community...</a>) all while they lie about never collecting and storing sensitive data (like your social graph) in their privacy policy because they haven't updated it in years even while they add new features like mandatory data collection and optional message content cloud storage backups. This isn't how a company you should trust with anything behaves.<p>There are better alternatives to signal and other companies who aren't outright lying to their users about what data they collect and store in their privacy policy.<p>You can read more about the issue here: <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20250117232443/https://www.vice.com/en/article/signal-new-pin-feature-worries-cybersecurity-experts/" rel="nofollow">https://web.archive.org/web/20250117232443/https://www.vice....</a><p>Note that at the bottom of that article they talk about giving users a way to "disable" the pin, but there is no actual opt of the pin. If you choose not to create one, one is created for you, and that's used when uploading your data to the cloud even though you won't ever be able to recover the data. You cannot opt out of the data collection.
It is a <i>non-profit</i> company.
> Signal is better than basic SMS, iMessage, Facebook Messenger, etc.<p>You can't just say it and leave. Anything better than SMS which was not even meant for communication.<p>But lumping imessage and even Facebook messenger in the same pile is disingenuous.
In case anyone is unaware, Facebook (and WhatsApp) use the Signal protocol for encryption, although my understanding is they don't fully utilize all the security features that Signal does. I also trust the Signal foundation much more than Meta.<p>There are serious cryptographers working on iMessage too, eg. <a href="https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/03/03/post-quantum-imessage-with-douglas-stebila/" rel="nofollow">https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/03/03/post-qua...</a><p>SMS should indeed not be included in the same conversation as those two.
Is it a business though? I thought it was a non-profit organisation.
Weird how to signal macos is the least private OS in respect to this topic. Most people consider apple to provide the most private and secure os's.
Consumer sentiment and truth can be orthogonal.<p>Most people admire German engineering thanks to the "Deutsche Qualität" ad campaign, yet we forget that came from Opel, one of most unreliable carmarkers at the time.<p>Apple has invested billions to advertise how private they are, but reality is more complex than that. They have been hostile to security researchers multiple times, and have been slower than the industry average at patching vulnerabilities multiple times.
My impression is that the desktop apps have never been very high on the list of priorities. They’ve always felt like checkbox tickers.<p>This is unfortunate because a lot of the people who are knowledgeable and care about security/privacy spend their days in front of a keyboard, which is always going to be vastly better to jot out messages with than any kind of handheld mobile device.
> Most people consider apple to provide the most private and secure os's.<p>It's certainly not. A reasonably hardened Linux box, preferably running open firmware, is certainly more private, and also probably more secure, at least against interference by Apple.
It's been great marketing for them but it's never been actually true beyond what they need to do to make the marketing believable.
I do not consider any messaging service requiring a mobile phone number as the account handle to be private or secure. One cannot build security on the foundations of inherently insecure technologies.
They did fix that though.
It's not true that a mobile number is required since there is also the option to pay a fee to register without a mobile number, just sayin'
To pay, using a KYC-based system you mean, since Signal does not accept crypto?<p>In the countries like Russia they simply blocked incoming registrations SMS from Signal and the others to wade off people from the service. I wouldn't risk using a direct payment in a country famous for jailing people for payments to "extremists" organisations either.<p>Just do email, or stop calling yourself "private" and "secure"
Russia, China and Iran is an edge case Signal don't care about. Messengers need network effect and there are too many hoops to jump through to make Signal work inside the network where the state is actively opposing that. Just wrong tool for the job and different set of assumptions.<p>Most likely such an attempt will fail even earlier than Google/KYC become relevant: their account creation vCaptcha de-facto doesn't accept challenges made from VPN connections (based on app reporting the network status, not endpoint IP).
Can you not purchase a prepaid credit card with cash and use that to make the payment?
The KYC based payments use zero knowledge proofs so all that anyone can know is that you bought a signal account.<p>I do think they should accept crypto.
> One cannot build security on the foundations of inherently insecure technologies.<p>Of course you can?<p>Maybe I am missin your point, but that is fundamental basic that you put the encryption and decryption in the ends, and you can transfer over any inherently insecure technologies.<p>But you need the ends to be secure of course.
What a joke. The very first sentance of their privacy policy is still a lie. They've started permanently keeping the sensitive data of every signal user in the cloud which cannot be opted out of, and later added an option to start keeping message content for signal users in the cloud as well, but the first sentence still says "Signal is designed to never collect or store any sensitive information." which is objectively false.<p>When a company lies to their users about their risks when using an app being marketed to activists and whistleblowers whose lives/freedom could be put at risk you know exactly how they feel about protecting their customers.
> <a href="https://signal.org/legal/" rel="nofollow">https://signal.org/legal/</a><p>I don't see the same privacy policy online.<p>> Signal Terms & Privacy Policy<p>> Signal is designed to never collect or store any sensitive information. Signal messages and calls cannot be accessed by us or other third parties because they are always end-to-end encrypted, private, and secure.<p>It's _designed_ to never collect...<p>> Signal utilizes state-of-the-art security and end-to-end encryption to provide private messaging and Internet calling services to users worldwide (“Services”).<p>That is the first sentence I see under "Privacy Policy".<p>> Your calls and messages are always encrypted, so they can never be shared or viewed by anyone but yourself and the intended recipients.<p>Is this the part that is a lie?<p>> Information we may share<p>> Other instances where Signal may need to share your data<p>* To meet any applicable law, regulation, legal process or enforceable governmental request.<p>* To enforce applicable Terms, including investigation of potential violations.<p>* To detect, prevent, or otherwise address fraud, security, or technical issues.<p>* To protect against harm to the rights, property, or safety of Signal, our users, or the public as required or permitted by law.<p>Oh, I see what you mean. That's pretty broad.
The page opens with "Signal is designed to never collect or store any sensitive information." and that used to actually be true. They liked to brag about all the times law enforcement agencies came to them asking for data only to be turned away because they literally had no data to give them.<p>That changed a long time ago when they started collecting and storing sensitive data in the cloud. Exactly the kinds of data they were getting legal requests for. (see <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20250117232443/https://www.vice.com/en/article/signal-new-pin-feature-worries-cybersecurity-experts/" rel="nofollow">https://web.archive.org/web/20250117232443/https://www.vice....</a>). You can fake your name, use a dedicated phone/number, and never upload a photo but your social graph is always highly sensitive data.<p>Worse than that they are storing that data in not very secure ways (<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230519120156/https://community.signalusers.org/t/proper-secure-value-security-pins-are-too-easy-to-brute-force-sgx-is-not-reliable-enough/15096/2" rel="nofollow">https://web.archive.org/web/20230519120156/https://community...</a>) and not being very clear at all with users about any of this. At the end of the vice article they talked about adding an option to "disable" the pin, but what they actually did was give users a way to opt out of setting a pin, but that just auto-created a pin for them and then still uploaded all the data to the cloud. There is no way to opt out of them collecting and storing your data.<p>If the lie at the top of the page titled "Signal Terms & Privacy Policy" isn't bad enough, their actual privacy policy has also not been updated since before they started with the data collection/cloud storage, so none of that is included in the "Information you provide" section of their privacy policy. That just talks about the optional "contact discovery" feature. They later added another optional feature where you can store actual message content in the cloud too, but still never updated their policy. They say "Signal queues end-to-end encrypted messages on its servers for delivery", but at least in some cases that data is stored in the cloud (also not their servers) forever as a "backup". This also means the "We will update this privacy policy as needed so that it is current" line in their policy is also a lie.<p>My best guess is that the company refuses to update the privacy policy as a dead canary to warn others that the service is compromised as loudly as they can (in the US gag orders can stop you from saying things, but can't force you to say something - or in this case to publish updates to your privacy policy). The alternative explanation is that they're just intentionally misleading people who have a lot on the line about their risks when using the service.
The simplest solution is often best. Have a separate device you use for activities you wish to keep private, running an OS and software you trust will not infringe on your privacy. Use another device for activities where you have decided the benefits of agents outweigh privacy risks.
When the default OS of phones includes all these agentic backdoors turned on by default, this becomes a pretty naive take.<p>I should be able to expect basic privacy in my day-to-day chats without needing to spend time/money/resources setting up a goddamn second device just to have truly private chats with my friends and family.
Has signal ever commented on the fact ( <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/24191267-wyden_smartphone_push_notification_surveillance_letter_to_doj_-_signed/" rel="nofollow">https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/24191267-wyden_smart...</a> ) that the push notification services that signal forces users to use have been being used to spy on users?
They give a literal settings option to block the content of the message in the push notification:<p>"Settings > Notifications > Notification Content and selecting "No Name or Content" (or "No Name or Message" on Android), the device prevents the operating system from storing sensitive message previews in its internal database. Additionally, enabling Sealed Sender in Signal's privacy settings hides the sender's identity from Signal's servers, preventing traffic analysis."
> Additionally, enabling Sealed Sender in Signal's privacy settings hides the sender's identity from Signal's servers, preventing traffic analysis."<p>Until / unless the recipient responds and the traffic analysis detects back-and-forth and pairs your message's recipient with the recipient's recipient.<p><a href="https://abcnews.com/blogs/headlines/2014/05/ex-nsa-chief-we-kill-people-based-on-metadata/" rel="nofollow">https://abcnews.com/blogs/headlines/2014/05/ex-nsa-chief-we-...</a>
It is ridiculous that you have to go through multiple steps to "harden" signal. It should have a macro, akin to lockdown mode that turns off all the dangerous features. And their electron app should be running the majority of their logic in multiple wasm compartments.
They wouldn't get the content anyway, even if you didn't have that on. It would just be stored locally like the rest of your Signal messages.
> This means that we are restricting the latest AI agents built into mobile operating systems from potentially capturing and storing your Signal data.<p>This decision is mine to make, not Signal's. As the owner of the computer, I decide what programs have access to what. Signal has no business attempting to block my own user agent, which I run with my fully informed consent, accessing my own data.
Ok but what about people who you're chatting with? When do they get to tell you "no I don't want your agent to be reading our messages"? Do you disclose that in all your chats?<p>As a user of signal, I do expect signal to prevent my chats from being read by anything other than the other contact.
Why should they have any say in this? Once you send a message, you relinquish ownership of it. Same was true and accepted ever since humans learned to write and invented notes and letters. Sender does not get to dictate when and how receiver reads the message, or what they do with it.
You can choose to disclose attestation status and trust level of other signals without deciding on restrictive policy up front on behalf of everyone
It’s interesting they even try to fight this fight because fundamentally they can never control one side of the conversation taking photos or otherwise logging. That they pretend its tractable at all makes me question their security in general.<p>Preventing man-in-the-middle is different, something you can actually do technically. That is something you can actually promise to a degree.
That is different than having it sent to the cloud with users "unaware" and then the cloud leaking it though.
They could go full mandatory remote attestion, in principle closing every hole but the analog one. This understanding of privacy, one in which the user is part of the threat model, slouches inevitably towards DRM.<p>Either Signal respects that regular people have general purpose computing or they don't.
Don't they though? You can always form it if you don't like their priorities and decisions, just like those for any other feature.
Open source both client and server, I can self host server, remove phone number requirement AND any other shenanigans you put as an alternative like payments to unmask people, then we have a start to talk about privacy, other than that, do not trust Signal.
Groups is even more serious, but on a different front:<p><a href="https://groups.app/confidential.html" rel="nofollow">https://groups.app/confidential.html</a>
Isn't the solution kind of obvious here? Mobile devices already have permissions (location, file system, contacts, photos/media), so they just need to implement 'AI/agent' access. If denied, agents are simply prohibited from working. It should be an opt-in toggle similar to location when the app starts, it can request the AI/agent permission during its lifecycle at the right moment (such as tapping an 'ask AI' button and a prompt appears with the permission).<p>But really, the key to privacy is trusting the recipient, because one the data lands on the other device, it's outside of your control, and if the user has malware enabled (consciously or not) there's not much you can do about that.
<a href="https://truthout.org/articles/waltz-reportedly-archived-signal-messages-on-israeli-intelligence-linked-app/" rel="nofollow">https://truthout.org/articles/waltz-reportedly-archived-sign...</a><p>I cannot expect privacy on Signal for voices and opinions critical of Israel. I wouldn't trust any marketing about privacy coming out of Big Tech, YCombinator or Silicon Valley. They made their bed and now they have to sleep in it.
> This means that we are restricting the latest AI agents built into mobile operating systems from potentially capturing and storing your Signal data.<p>I have family conversations in Signal that I <i>want</i> Siri and Spotlight to be able to index. I've been considering moving to a different app solely because of this. Make it a setting!!<p>I don't trust Google and Facebook, but I <i>do</i> trust Apple. Don't force-distrust Apple on my behalf, I don't want that. This should be <i>my</i> choice.
If I were in your Signal group, I'd like <i>my</i> signal messages to be invisible to your Siri. Don't violate my privacy just because I message you.
This outlook is initially appealing. The problem with it is that it is not only your choice that matters, it is also the choice of your contacts. Do your contacts want you to share their private conversations with you with online AI, unencrypted? Do you want your private conversations to be leaked by your contacts?
These are all great things to worry about. But the fact is, there are lots of situations where if app X can't read data from app Y the data might as well not exist. Usability, security, and integrity are tradeoffs. If you make the app sufficiently unusable you can't protect anything because you just force people to copy the data by hand into a different app.
I'd imagine stuff like this is why, say, Telegram has a difference between "non-secret" and "secret" chats. I'd imagine all Signal would need is a similar mechanism for either locking down an existing chat or making a new locked-down chat. Then you could be confident that none of its participants could be passing it to a leaky or unscrupulous provider.<p>Signal could even make it the default, because I have no shame in asking my family to let me index their chats. That would be better for the masses, I'd imagine.
Oh, so they will finally support others to build compatible federated alternative servers and clients, make all builds reproducible and drop the need for phone numbers once and for all, right ? Right ?
This is such a joke. If they were a serious organization they'd:<p>* Discuss the issue with google keyboard privacy<p>* Discuss the issue with the google translate API<p>* Release all of the backend automation code for their infra that runs signal
Some people aren't reading the whole article. You can turn it off if you disagree with the product decision. I'm sure there will be folks mad on the opt-in/out axis either way.<p>That said: periodic reminder that Signal cannot protect you from your chat partners' devices. You might have this protection enabled, but if your chat partner has it disabled, their OS's AI can now read your chats.
How about they start encrypting at rest Signal desktop!<p>Signal feels like a begrudging partner in this, not someone who has your back. I love Signal but they have a lot of work to do. It was only recently that (and too late for me) that they could even backup the last 90s of chats when sending in a device for repair. It feels like they hate users. Why is WhatsApp (which harvests your entire address book to meta) still have a better experience?
Signal has woefully underinvested in QoL issues like this. Every time they hit me up for a donation, I wish after I tap "no" it would give me the opportunity to tell them why I don't want to donate so I can deliver a bunch of actionable complaints. The usability gaps between Signal and e.g. Viber (at least when I left it after the Rakuten acquisition) or WhatsApp are massive.
> How about they start encrypting at rest Signal desktop!<p>Signal does keep the message history in an encrypted sqlite file.<p>Unfortunately they store the key in plaintext alongside it.
they write that every os screenshots all screen content, sends it to a server to be analyzed, and half the comments are bitching how signal is not actually secure.<p>what a sad day for hackernews
As much as they beg and plead, I have a very suspicious automatic gut reaction to US based companies screaming from the heavens about how they're the one true privacy bastion... They have a lot of frothy-mouthed fans who poke their head out immediately when I bring up any of my concerns about things[0] - or when I state that: <i>one company should not be the only one fighting for private messaging</i>.<p>The smart play is to have companies in many countries and have them federate traffic across each others infra (like tor) and to have third-party clients with their own ability to implement the E2EE bits...<p>- or, even better: use something like Matrix amongst friends, you only need a slightly technical friend to set it up for you and now it's really hard for someone to violate your trust, and you're not even a big target for mass surveillance: win-win.<p>As it stands, Signal can still be compelled to act against their users, especially those not under US jurisdiction, and they're forbidden from talking about it. They're directly under the CLOUD act (if they're not a honeypot designed explicitly to drown out other private messengers, which sounds conspiratorial but its the only thing that makes sense based on how effective their marketing is compared to others- the concerns raised against Signal would kill other messengers).<p>[0]: <a href="https://blog.dijit.sh/i-don-t-trust-signal/" rel="nofollow">https://blog.dijit.sh/i-don-t-trust-signal/</a>
I have followed digital privacy and nation-level-actor interception stories since the European Parliament's ECHELON report over a quarter-century ago, and to me it is a given that no strong state like the USA would permit a truly secure app being used at a societal scale. I use Signal myself, but am under no illusions.<p>The developers might be bona-fide idealists and the E2EE encryption might be reliable (if only when compiling the app from source oneself), but it feels obvious that the US authorities would gain access to things like contact metadata or forcing a compromised build on request. The app is leaky in this regard, and Signal rents cloud infrastructure which enables covert shenanigans with the server, like compromising the infamously vulnerable Intel SGX which is the only thing keeping people's contact lists (uploaded by default to the server) private.
This is a reasonable take, though I would add that simply compromising the notification server is enough to get the metadata about who's talking to who.<p>My general impression is that Signal is about as secure as I can reasonably expect, but that the entire ecosystem is compromised because it's going through two companies that are beholden to the US government.
Hasn't Matrix had a series of cryptographic blunders?<p>Ah yes, I do remember: <a href="https://soatok.blog/2024/08/14/security-issues-in-matrixs-olm-library/" rel="nofollow">https://soatok.blog/2024/08/14/security-issues-in-matrixs-ol...</a><p>As for Signal being open source (or your claim in the link that it is not open source as in they don't provide the source for builds; and you only need to look at the client source for the security claims), as of a previous post about Signal on HN I have started verifying the builds on iOS which I can confirm are fully source reproducible:<p><a href="https://github.com/commandersaki/signal-ios-build-verification/" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/commandersaki/signal-ios-build-verificati...</a><p>Signal already provide instructions on Android reproducible builds and it wouldn't really take much to extend that to fully source reproducible.
It turns out that good privacy tech doesn't rely on jurisdictions.<p>It's a stupid take that the country matters. If the tech is sound and trustless, it won't matter what country the company is based in.<p>Similarly "digital sovereignty" is stupid. E2EE is what matters. And SimpleX shows that you can essentially add highly effective client-side metadata encryption.<p>For content privacy, you're much better off with an E2EE file service hosted in North Korea than non-E2EE file service in Switzerland.
servers, computers and users all live inside a jurisdiction.<p>Technology <i>must</i> work around this fundamental fact, or work within the law: everything else is a perpetually losing battle.<p>You can't have an organisation providing anonymous E2EE if there are laws that force KYC or CSAM scanning; and you will be hard pressed to argue on the side of fraudsters and kiddie fiddlers in front of the population.<p>Like I said, the best solution is small local groups; just like neighbourhoods- there's no actual need to have ONE directory and ONE "instance" of a chat network outside of convienience.. and truthfully, it's not that convenient, because everyone chooses a different chat network anyway. (Whatsapp, Signal, Telegram, Facebook messenger-- which <i>isn't</i> whatsapp for some reason, Wechat, Threema, etc,etc,etc,etc).
E2EE is only about message contents. Intelligence services have made it clear that metadata is enough for them, and Signal's code (since at least the introduction of Intel SGX features) doesn't protect that, precisely because of server jurisdiction.
But, if it was in an EU country, the media would still be collected by intelligence services. And shared due to the various eyes alliances.<p>I think Signal's threat model is more about law enforcement local or national than intelligence agencies with backdoors in the internet.<p>As it happens a lot of the abuse of our rights comes from law enforcement. So it's a big improvement to protect against that.<p>I don't think anyone's expecting Signal to be super anonymous when it's run on AWS.<p>Yeah, I admit they should work a lot more on metadata privacy. Because anonymity is important in messaging for contact privacy.
"Moxie Marlinspike" I am not going to trust some jabroni, straight out of central casting, who doesn't even fly by his family name. Seems like yet another usgov+hollywood fabrication. Good on you.<p>JWZ site, so if you don't want the HN testicle egg, copy paste, don't click:<p><a href="https://www.jwz.org/blog/2025/04/signal-3/" rel="nofollow">https://www.jwz.org/blog/2025/04/signal-3/</a>
><i>Signal Is Serious About Protecting Your Privacy (signal.org)</i><p>The problem is that this is also what someone not serious about protecting our privacy would say.
Yes, you’d really have to look at, like, their track record - for instance, an entity with something like 20 fucking years of delivering a messaging platform that the fucking FBI regularly complains they can’t read could make that statement with a little more credibility than whoever you’re thinking of.
Coming from a non-profit basically dedicated to that with a great track record, I believe it.<p>Similar claims from big tech ad-companies I support... taking with a grain of salt.
Sure, but it's not like Signal doesn't have a track record here.
If you have to talk about how much private your platform is...
Please point to what part of the code makes Signal not private. It's all reproducible, so we know that the code in the GitHub repository is what's running on our devices. So please send a link instead of spreading fud with no evidence. What's running on the server also does not matter.
Fact: Author is former Google employee, stayed with Google for _12 years_<p>Whether this fact is a pro, con or irrelevant to protecting software user "privacy" is a question left to the reader<p>Different readers may arrive at different answers. Not all readers will necessarily share their answers in comments. Commenters comprise a small portion of readers
There is no proof that the Signal app a user is running was compiled from any particular source code unless the user compiled the app themselves from that source code<p>As it happens, frequently, if not always, the Signal app is compiled by the US-based Signal Messenger Limited Liability Corporation not the Signal app user<p>Even assuming the Signal app user could compile the app themselves from source code provided by the corporation, the Signal app user may permit the corporation to remotely install additonal executable binary code at any time ("RCE", "updates", etc.). This new software is not compiled by the Signal app user nor has its (alleged) source code been published for inspection by the user prior to installation<p>There's no need to decrypt anything when other parties can compel the corporation to remotely install executable code on a particular user's computer
Irrelevant. If only all the people spreading fud about signal would point to problems in the source code because it's all there and it's confirmed to be that same source code that's running on our devices. And it doesn't matter what's running on the server.
"We collect metadata, including your phone number, but we care about your privacy". [1]<p>Cry me a river.<p>[1] or instead of your phone number, give us your CC number.
>or instead of your phone number, give us your CC number.<p>I want them to accept anonymous payments too, but they use zero knowledge proofs, so the non-anonymous payment does not link you to them. Also, they don't get cc number, Google does.
no, it isn't.<p>if it was, it wouldn't require a phone number or a payment to sign up. that's an utter non-starter for a privacy tool. no public API, no third-party clients, no first-party web client. Signal Messenger LLC is, painfully obviously, a SaaS company operating at a loss and waiting for a buyout from a megacorp.<p>and the undeserved glazing it got from the media reeks of operation mockingbird bullshit.
The phone number does not compromise your privacy. There's no rules for privacy tools being a non-starter or not.<p>The payments use zero-knowledge proofs, so they're not linked to you. All that's known by anyone is that your payment method purchased a Signal account.<p>There are third party clients.<p>So you're advocating for web cryptography. That opens up a significant attack vector for your privacy.<p>It's a non-profit that can't go against privacy for its users.<p>>and the undeserved glazing it got from the media reeks of operation mockingbird bullshit.<p>Instead of spreading fud, since signal clients are fully reproducible, meaning the code on github is what's in the apps running on your phone, please point to the code that makes it backdoor in some way. Because you could easily prove these claims. But instead you provide no evidence.
>The phone number does not compromise your privacy.<p>it links your account to a government issued ID in most countries.<p>>All that's known by anyone is that your payment method purchased a Signal account.<p><i>We kill people based on metadata.</i><p>>There are third party clients.<p>there is no public API. any platform can have the kind of frankensteined clients that reverse engineer the official one. the point is that if they cared about privacy like the OP claims, the official client would be a suggestion.<p>>So you're advocating for web cryptography. That opens up a significant attack vector for your privacy.<p>are you under the impression that web cryptography uses random npm libraries for cryptographic primitives?<p>>Instead of spreading fud, since signal clients are fully reproducible, meaning the code on github is what's in the apps running on your phone<p>is the server code on github also?
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I don't trust Signal in the sense that I realize it costs an extraordinary amount of money to run a messaging service with literally billions of users (WhatsApp) on it. The Signal Foundation wouldn't be able to finance Signal operations if too many people started using it and they'd probably end up selling it to some VC who'd immediately force people to buy a subscription or riddle it with ads.<p>In addition the new owners would probably undermine the encryption to curry favor with the government.<p>No Signal for me. I'll stick with WhatsApp or (if push came to shove) I'd start my own server.<p>There are still a lot of snafus with WhatsApp like it not using an end-to-end encrypted back-up <i>by default</i>. They make you jump through all sorts of hoops to enable it. I find this fishy since there's always someone in your conversations who hasn't enabled E2E back-ups, enabling LEA and others to read it (eventually). And for some strange reason they're requiring a separate password for the back-up.
You are basing your decisionmaking on a malicious fantasy, and opting for a product that actually has the problems you ascribe to Signal in said fantasy
> No Signal for me. I'll stick with WhatsApp or (if push came to shove) I'd start my own server.<p>All of your argument is pure conjecture and untrue. But the last line is the gold. You'll actively choose and defend using a messenger from <i>the most willing company on the planet to sell you out</i> as your validation. Ignorant thought process said out loud being normalized in 2026 is wild.
That's because I'm satisfied that WhatsApp's security is sufficient. It's far from bullet-proof and there are loopholes (back-up), but making it less secure would only enable competitors to get a foot between the door so I don't think Meta would do that.<p>In addition billions (including 300 million Americans) are using it and the U.S. government would never allow any other nation's intelligence or LEA organization to hack it. I therefore consider it as safe or safer than most alternatives.<p>How do you imagine the Signal Foundation would run the service if people started using it as actively as WhatsApp? And with the numbers of users WhatsApp is currently servicing? They simply don't have the money or expertise to do that. They'd have no choice but to sell it or curtail the service.
Signal is run by a careless, low effort team.<p>It may be the best we have, but the bar is so low.<p>How can you claim to care about security and your desktop application is just a electron wrapper?<p>Over 300 MB & 1 GB ram for a texting app?<p>This is a very unfocused team.
If you don't like Electron, there are also unofficial apps that run natively. For example, I created a Qt based Signal client called Corvus. However, just because the official Client is built with Electron doesn't automatically mean it's insecure. The Signal developers probably know a lot more about these things, so my client is likely less secure in that regard. Not to mention the fact that you then have to trust another person beside the signal devs.
signal-desktop is more than a texting app. I use it daily for fairly complex videoconferencing. Yes, Electron is not ideal, but a native app for all of the supported OSes is a lot to ask.<p>And I don't find signal-desktop's load onerous on my middling-RAM computer, though this is the only Electron app I have running (I get the impression that many HN readers have multiple Electron apps going, which I guess would add up.)
Out of curiosity, since signal has a native iOS app, why don't they use the Apple's Catalyst framework to port the same app to macOS?
> but a native app for all of the supported OSes is a lot to ask<p>Is it nowadays? AI should be able to port the app to any OS in a couple days.
Bad headline. Everyone is "serious about protecting your privacy". Even vendors who store your passwords in plaintext say that.
Signal is great for sure, but is is really useful when WhatApp (which uses signal under the hood) archives all your conversations?
WhatsApp doesn't use Signal under the hood. They use or have used some of the same cryptographic protocols; Whatsapp at some point started using the axolotl protocol developed by Signal. But there is no sharing of messages or infrastructure.
Signal the app is not signal the protocol. The latter is what WhatsApp uses. What WhatsApp chooses to do on top of that protocol has no bearing on Signal the app.
Corrections/clarifications on top of what others have mentioned:<p>- WhatsApp only ever said they used an older version of the Signal protocol (that, e.g. lacks post-quantum encryption).<p>- I think WhatsApp can encrypt your backups, but that is not the default.<p>The backup thing, plus the AI stuff mentioned in the article make it much more likely your WhatsApp conversations end up stored in the clear somewhere than your Signal conversations.<p>The other main reason WhatsApp is currently worse than Signal is that WhatsApp harvests your metadata (to support Meta's ad-tech business) and Signal does not.