People are giving all kinds of explanations here why Goldman is doing this, but they are not addressing what the article (implicitly) says: operating coding agents on the primary machines of finance professionals runs directly into the lethal trifecta. It's as simple as that.<p>You cannot have semi-unattended agents running on the same workstations that have access to client/trade/prop information and email client, and internet, and internal networks, it's too dangerous--a major leak is just one small mistake or prompt injection away. Banks are not stupid, they are getting it and shutting it down.
<a href="https://simonwillison.net/2025/Jun/16/the-lethal-trifecta/" rel="nofollow">https://simonwillison.net/2025/Jun/16/the-lethal-trifecta/</a> for anyone wondering.
> LLMs are unable to reliably distinguish the importance of instructions based on where they came from.<p>I know prompt injection is still a real thing, but in Claude I find the opposite is true: if I set up two Claude agents to collaborate, even though I've told them both that's what I'm doing, they won't actually follow instructions without checking in with me. "Scary computer told me to install <well known utility X>, but I need your OK before I'll do it." It's annoying but I get the rationale. They're definitely getting better at avoiding external instructions!
The filtering done by auto mode (generally) catches accidental prompt injection, but isn't effective against actual attacks: <a href="https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2026/breaking-claude-code-opus-5-and-automode" rel="nofollow">https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2026/breaking-claude-co...</a><p>(Anthropic themselves acknowledges this; see the end of the post.)
That's the same thing, not the opposite. If you can't distinguish sources of truth, then you can only trust everything or deny everything. It's the same failure.
I found it worthwhile reading how auto mode works[0]. The short version is that the classifier only sees user messages and the tool call. So if your agents communicate via tool calls, the classifier doesn’t see that text at all (or any other prompt injection) and will block a potentially dangerous command.<p>[0] <a href="https://www.anthropic.com/research/claude-code-auto-mode" rel="nofollow">https://www.anthropic.com/research/claude-code-auto-mode</a>
><i>they won't actually follow instructions without checking in with me</i><p>Until they suddenly once in a while they do, and Goldman Sachs loose some billions because of it...
[dead]
Don't normalize this Trifecta construct. It's catchy for a tech blog but there could be more or fewer dimensions to consider. Someone else can construct an Exacta or Superfecta combination. Or just go for the Win uno and say AI Agent is bad.
This level of reaction only comes when someone steps in shit. So, there likely was some large leak or “mistake” that has the potential to get out and this is part of either covering up or reducing how bad they look.
Their support probably has a big pile of horror stories from their clients by now, it can be an indirect source of concern.
This happens when there's something that is more important than being the cool manager that's following the latest hype.
how much historical anecdote do we need to recollect before it's realized that the finance industry as a whole, but most especially the stuff that is US-centric, refuses to change course unless they're: 1) unprofitable 2) regulated.<p>the only reason they moved on this was because it was noted somewhere by someone that matters that the risk imposed could cut into profit or impose a regulatory hammer.<p><i>those are the only possible reasons for corporate movement in finance.</i>
Well, the billions recently stolen from Binance is a sufficiently large quantity of shit even for the scale of Goldman Sachs.
I belong to an old-computer interest group on one of the socials. Recently a whitebeard posted a picture of a stock trading floor from the 80s or early 90s, and noted that every trader had two PCs—because the NASD did not allow their NASDAQ trading software to be installed with any other application on the same computer.<p>Banks and financial firms have been super careful about this stuff since well before the AI era.
From the article, more than likely they’re curbing local access, but still will provide access via cloud hosted workspaces.<p>Local access is sketchy but doing it in the cloud mitigates most, if not all of the risk.
Maybe they just realized it's a complete waste of money as well. Could be that too
Who is solving federation and access control at scale? I’ve seen other companies doing this internally but have not seen a standardized product-y approach. This is a huge problem where I work as well.
Nobody is <i>solving</i> it, because it <i>cannot</i> be solved in the LLM architecture? They are <i>mitigating</i> it.<p>We should stop using "solve" when we mean "releasing products to target". Nobody will ever solve this problem with LLMs as they are currently architected.
Of course architecture can “solve” it.<p>It’s pretty simple. If you want security, you need to segment. Does that make it hard? Absolutely. Are you dumb if you’re letting rando traders access whatever with agents? Absolutely.
How exactly would segmentation solve federation and access control at scale?<p>The problem isn't even well defined as far as I read it. What does it mean to "solve" federation and what's currently broken?
It seems that the parent is talking about alignment, to which there is currently (long term) solution, that is, what Yampolsikij calls "perpetual safety machine".
Sounds like a great product that could be built from someone who has the tokens for it.
Liability you mean?<p>In my opinion all AI use companies should be attached to a specific employee, and that person is liable and so is the company of course for the actions of the AI
This is a useless statement.<p>It's like saying "developers should be responsible for their own security so we will make them liable if a random node dependency in the application they are building gets pwned"<p>Firstly, liability and security are different things.<p>Employees should never be liable for something that happens if they are using a work-supplied tool at work in the manner in which it is designed to be used.<p>Secondly, it's just lazy thinking to say "oh it's hard therefore we'll make the human sorely responsible".<p>There are many things that can help - sandboxing, adversarial LLM inspection of prompts, separation of security contexts etc. Yes they are hard and might need new primitives.
> “developers should be responsible for their own security so we will make them liable if a random node dependency in the application they are building gets pwned”<p>Developers may not be liable today, but protecting company data and resources from supply chain attacks is their responsibility. At most companies, only the developer is in a position to understand how these supply chains work. Even at larger companies with security teams, the scanners and mirrors are trivial to bypass.
> Employees should never be liable for something that happens if they are using a work-supplied tool at work in the manner in which it is designed to be used.<p>Architects and properly-designated publishers both have potentially <i>long</i> liability that is to an extent independent of their future employment. (The same is true of hospital consultants and others)<p>In significant cases, the way you provoke companies to do the right thing (security, sticking to the facts, not cutting corners in building plans) is to <i>make someone legally responsible if they don't</i>. That person's liability is limited by their actions — if they can demonstrate they discharge those responsibilities appropriately, they are in the clear.<p>That person takes on that designated role, does the job, and is rewarded properly for the responsibility it involves. They <i>embody</i> the push to reduce that risk.<p>So an average employee using the tool as directed by their employer, they do not have liability if the company has designated someone in this role. (And in this scenario, if they have not, there would be a punitive fine for <i>that</i>, independent of other outcomes).<p>I have no particular problem with the notion that a corporate AI safety/responsibility officer is a plausible way forward. If you are delegating responsibility to a machine, someone has to be on the hook. Without such things it's a wild west with lawyers. That's not sustainable.
I have come to this conclusion myself.<p>It's a bit like the idea of the additional responsibility/burden of the publisher of a newspaper.
A particular <i>c suite</i> employee. Each company having a low level sacrificial goat doesn't solve anything. They must be responsible but also be <i>in charge</i>.
"why hire humans?<p>"So we can sue them when our customers get angry"
like it or not this is what's going to happen
This is pretty much what happened with that terrible train disaster in Spain.<p>You can either target systemic problems or chop of some heads to cool off the masses- and quickly go back to work.
The preferred nomenclature is "largely solved"<p>(once you realize how much that phrase is used in the AI-sphere...)
Thats like saying “no one can solve human error. Because it can’t be solve with humans”<p>I mean I guess? Sure?
Yeah, I'm working on an open source product in this space [0]--particularly in finance--that's why I know about this problem quite a bit.<p>I think the solutions is to give people the ability to run agents that are "coding agent like" but in managed and governed infrastructure (i.e. not on their workstations). Basically, Meta Muse or OAI dots for enterprise.<p>It will take some time to find the right architectures and patterns. IMO, coding agents were just the first wave, much more interesting stuff and systems are coming.<p>[0] <a href="https://ls.bot" rel="nofollow">https://ls.bot</a>, <a href="https://github.com/smartcomputer-ai/lightspeed" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/smartcomputer-ai/lightspeed</a>
There are tons of options in this space already.
toxic alert ".. use product like Meta Muse" .. never, never..
I baked in lethal trifecta guards into my primary harness, DSCO, but it makes things much less smooth to run autonomously. Basically if you load secrets into a context, ideally it stops that and creates a process running a small local model that will write some code to not look at the secret and instead run code to operate on the secret without reading it in.<p>The risks are 1) exfiltration (network calls) 2) prompt injection (untrusted inputs) and 3) access to secrets<p>You can do some clever tricks like "spin up subagent without net access" to handle OCR of an internal document and have that agent communicate summaries to another "spun up subagent with net access" - imagine if one subagent is a local model and the other model is a frontier model over a web API. Maybe they still communicate in Neuralese or in abbreviated notes that you don't capture and are able to surreptitiously / covertly exfiltrate your information.<p>Ideally eventually you'll have some kind of dashboard that surfaces these risks as you're working.<p>Reports of AI researchers running massive swarms of 10,000 agents are definitely believable but the moment you start pulling in code libraries or other technology assets seems like you can get destroyed by a rogue actor. Definitely tons of unsolved problems here<p>Writing on mobile so this might poorly articulate the issue but it's interesting
What stops the agent from just writing code to actually read the secret? That’s kind of the core of the problem. The agent can be tricked into doing anything.
Indeed. But if it's a model running on your own hardware it isn't as risky. And the Anthropic models are actually pretty good at kind of writing code that will look at contents of a file without fully looking at the content, so it's insecure but not quite as bad as an open("secrets.txt").read()
Local model or not, all LLMs are susceptible to prompt injection and making mistakes (like those cases where you see the agent randomly deleted someone's home dir.) That's what Goldman are likely worried about. Not Anthropic going rogue or something.<p>Concealing API keys is a relatively minor protection in the wider picture of the risks.
What does that mean? That it only reads part of it into context or RAM?
What does using a local model have to do with it? I’m not worried about the secrets going to Bob, I’m worried about them going to Eve.
I don't know about GP's setup, but you give the AI an MCP that can do the thing without exposing the key to the AI directly. An all powerful agent could setup a fake endpoint and send itself requests and exfiltrate the key that way, so don't let it do that.
I wil encourage you to check <a href="https://runeward.io" rel="nofollow">https://runeward.io</a> this is specifically the usecase we are building this for
Uh why aren’t you using allowlists to prevent exfiltration to random domains?
I’m building an AI governance framework within a self-hosted AI agent platform designed for these scenarios: <a href="https://github.com/rush86999/atom" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/rush86999/atom</a>.<p>I project that small businesses will be the earliest adopters of AI governance due to their lower barrier to entry and lower operational risk, followed later by highly regulated sectors like banking and healthcare.
Interesting idea, but even as someone building in the space I struggle to understand what is it about without digging.<p><i>open-source AI agent workspace for business workflow automation</i> requires a lot from the reader and terms like agent/workspace/workflow are very prone to ambiguity and now you adding <i>governance framework</i>.
Basically every IT device management firm out there is working on an AI governance product.
I've been building an MCP server and an AI Gateway as two separate projects designed specifically to prevent agents from doing effectively anything programmatically, rather than trying to convince them with a clever prompt not to do a bad thing.<p>My work can be found at <a href="https://DollhouseResearch.com" rel="nofollow">https://DollhouseResearch.com</a>, and it's almost all open source with the code on GitHub.<p>One of the key things is to have cryptographically confirmed audit logs and receipts for actions and decisions, and to separate out the agent's authorizations from the user's authorizations.<p>Separately, there is real work being done in the fintech community specifically to identify which agent has what control, when. And you can see some of the work there, which I've also contributed to.<p><a href="https://advancedaisociety.org/proof-of-control" rel="nofollow">https://advancedaisociety.org/proof-of-control</a>
Who the hell is downvoting this? I'm literally responding to a direct question with a direct answer, with a whole lot of information, open source software, and real work from another project.<p>You guys need your priorities straight, whoever you are.
People are allowed to have negative opinions of either the things you linked or the things you said about them, and also allowed to express them with downvotes. Complaining about it pretty much just makes it less likely for it to bounce out of negative votes after more people have read it than if you hadn't.<p>(Not my area, so I don't have any opinion on your first comment.)
To be clear the lethal trifecta is something most of us can get away with it, but not someone who is clearly a high value target (such as every single trader at GS).
Part of It is easy to solve. For example, Our developer workstation have no access to the production network. This already solves issues beyond merely giving unattended agents access to production.<p>Then one can simply move the agents into something akin to cloud codespaces where they have only access to git, if at all.<p>Any access to data that is still needed can go through an authorised / authorising mcp proxy.<p>It doesn’t mean your bankers can’t use LLMs at all.
Also working in a finance role and it is exactly that. They don't want to give us access to any fun tools.<p>Things that are common on dev machines like a working copy of python...nope. Admin...nope. Even RPA tools that automate clicking on things are no bueno because they could be used to bulk extract data from intraweb sites<p>Great deal of access...but it's calibrated towards low bandwidth human uses. Which indirectly prevents bulk data exfil
OK so people who work in finance are doing this now? They just let Claude Code run amok on their machines, with all their employee credentials?<p>I am out of the loop with the industry, but I thought many people were using cloud agents and controlling them through tmux or something. But yeah I guess that also means you don't have access to do much.
Cloud agents or even sandboxes are too technical for most. And most corporate workstations do not allow sandboxing of any kind (virtualization or containers).
> And most corporate workstations do not allow sandboxing of any kind<p>I don't think that's phrased correctly. What corporate it does is set policies. Often those policies disable virtualisation. (They don't disable sandboxing - that's used in many ways and security loves that) But if the business need is to run LLM agents safely, the policies will be changed to dictate how to run agents safely.
Dev containers under vs-code are a good example of this.<p>Many teams use them to make sure that the coding environment is consistent, and they are well accepted in many corporate environments as a result.<p>But they are a good way of firewalling agents away from files and resources that one must be able to demonstrate that the agents did not and could not have access to.
It’s the case in all industries. People have been feeding medical patient data into Claude
Finance is a whole industry and you will find all sorts of approaches, certainly including letting Claude run amok with your credentials.<p>You can certainly imagine very senior and powerful traders at GS demanding it. I'd be only slightly surprised to find that GS allowed it. The traders would have had more power than the IT people trying to forbid it.
Chad is surely using tmux...
It is as simple as that, except:<p>1) <i>everyone</i> can run into the lethal trifecta<p>2) the product cannot, on an architectural level, be fixed to stop it<p>3) they are helping the maker of the product go to IPO<p>If banks are not stupid, they'd say "hey, this presents an unacceptable risk to our customers and by extension, to us, maybe this isn't something we should be involved with".<p>But no.
every day we read a 'whoopsie my agent did XYZ, no mallace! (sic)'. Currently with relatively low stakes but still surprised how blasé people are.<p><a href="https://x.com/jakerunzer/status/2117474337682780643" rel="nofollow">https://x.com/jakerunzer/status/2117474337682780643</a><p><a href="https://x.com/WilliamBaude/status/2118420271333777856?a=tVmJUtI5d2azLwVAAbY&s=20" rel="nofollow">https://x.com/WilliamBaude/status/2118420271333777856?a=tVmJ...</a>
It's quite logical actually but they could run claude code in remote sandboxes still.
Banks don't even let humans cross that boundary.
That sort of risk could be controlled. Goldman has control of those desktops and could ensure Claude Code is always sandboxed, or they could offer it through a remotely hosted platform. I’d be very surprised if they were not already doing at least the former.<p>No, I think the risks they are talking about would include things like financial risk due to bad trades based on misinformation from buggy code that the authors don’t understand. This sort of policy pivot happens after an Incident that had a Financially Material Impact.<p>They also cited productivity concerns, which is also something I’ve observed: some people waste a lot of their time and other’s time due to using these tools to do work they do not understand.
Remote-hosted agents are available in most places. BUT they are not interesting, because they do not have access to all the user's data.<p>People really want to run agents on their data.<p>Re sandboxing: I dont know Goldman's particulars, but most enterprises lock down all sandboxing tech on workstations. So I assume this is actually harder than it seems. So people just run it directly on the machine.<p>The article is referring to the dilemma of the trifecta twice.
> People really want to run agents on their data.<p>That's exactly the gap I've been working on <a href="https://github.com/mickael-kerjean/fdrive" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/mickael-kerjean/fdrive</a> you mount your existing data, apply control / permission and can monitor everything the agents are doing with your data: <a href="https://www.filestash.app/agents/" rel="nofollow">https://www.filestash.app/agents/</a>
What logic led to rules that block sandboxes but allow AI tools like that?
Seems hard to do well in practice.<p>Can the agent read the internet for context? What if the fetch reveals a secret?
> Goldman has control of those desktops and could ensure Claude Code is always sandboxed<p>Agents have already broken out of what were supposed to be sandboxes in the networks of the companies that are supposed to understand what they do. Do you really think banks would be any better?
Some of that was negligence, but beyond expertise, we also need to think about which companies are willing to invest in the necessary barriers and accept the limitations that comes from obeying them.<p>It may just be there's no safe nexus for asbestos floor tiles, no matter how skilled the installers are.
> Do you really think banks would be any better?<p>Absolutely, yes.<p>If you’re talking about OpenAI and Anthropic that’s an extremely low bar.<p>May I ask what in particular gives you confidence that these two companies know what they are doing wrt cybersecurity.
> May I ask what in particular gives you confidence that these two companies know what they are doing wrt cybersecurity.<p>It's not that I think OpenAI and Anthropic know what they're doing - although I can see why my slightly flippant comment might make you think that - but that I just don't trust anyone with these agents, especially when the whole point of using them would be to do that with such critical data.
If you mean the HuggingFace hack, that wasn't so much a sandbox as a wide open door with a tiny sign that said "please don't leave".<p>Supposed to understand, yes. I think a highschool class could do better.
I got a series of Teams messages from some random person at the work address yesterday asking me to fulfill some access request to them. I noted by the part of their org (wildly different from mine) that they were looking for a different person.<p>I responded by saying they were looking for someone else, and got a response to the effect of “oops that was Copilot, sorry to bother you”<p>Read into this what you will.
But they allowed that exact situation for a while now and no one cared. Stupid security but politically safe since Trump would never investigate.<p>Big corps never pivot throughout the whole corp for a single issue, only when risk in a certain context keeps compounding. The Dem wins compounded risk of legal action; it's not just that the laws are on the books. They were on the books a month ago.<p>"Yeah that's what I said it's to hedge legal risk."<p>It's the way you said it; ignoring potentially relevant political context. A lot the rhetoric demonizing politics is intentional to embed a negative reaction causing us to discount it's value
> <i>they allowed that exact situation for a while now and no one cared</i><p>Source for them having allowed it versus not tightly enforced IT rules?
This is global, starting with Hong Kong months ago. I doubt fear of US regulators were was the motive.
ELINA, please! As a non-American, I don’t understand why anyone would care about Trump in this context. Aren’t the people who look into these things different departments? And don’t they only look into anything after a breach?
The current administration was basically "corporations, do whatever you want as long as it doesn't interfere with our money making".<p>A lot of people felt, and there seems to be mounting proof, that the administration wasn't going to enforce a lot of laws, especially since their stance was to cut the agencies in charge of that (SEC, FTC, FCC, EPA, FDA, IRS, etc).
This still isn’t quite de-Americanized enough for me to track. He has the power to cut funding for whatever specific agency he doesn’t like? And they, knowing this, decide to sit on their hands for four years to keep their paycheques. Finance companies in turn, change policies, knowing that these agencies will not be enforcing laws for four years.<p>The recent change is that this free-for-all may be cut short? What am I missing here, this sounds like banana republic shenanigans.
So a lot of companies assumed that that was not going to change in the future, aka. that the Trump administration is final and democracy is finished in the USA; do I understand this correctly?
These days democracies are a lot fuzzier and there are lots of degrees, many named flawed democracies.<p>And the current president still needs to hand over the reins peacefully so I wouldn't declare victory, yet.
> And the current president still needs to hand over the reins peacefully so I wouldn't declare victory, yet.<p>Sure, my point is about that basically companies already made decisions based on the assumption, that he will not do that.
But... Why?
Leaky llm syndrome is like putting in a wormhole to bypass all those cybersecurity investments.
operating coding agents on the primary machines of finance professionals runs directly into the lethal trifecta.<p>I've professionally interacted with GS for over 30 years. It blows my mind that GS allowed real exposure to "the lethal trifecta" for even a moment in time.
At our org they have been clawing back Claude access because of chronic billing overages. Budgets are tight and consumption billing models are being stamped down on everywhere. Anthropic sales can not offer us any sort of normalized billing rate.<p>Gemini is swooping in because they offer flat consistent billing and handle overages through throttling access to higher models. For 90% of the non-engineering org the experience is near enough it makes no difference.
> because of chronic billing overages<p>I don't get how this is such a common issue. Are companies paying API rates for devs? The $20/mo plan pretty much works fine for most people at my company
Subscription plans are limited to companies with fewer than 150 users.<p>Anything above that requires an Enterprise plan, which is billed at API rates.
I work for a company that pays by API.<p>But I wonder whether the cost shown to us is what the company actually pays? Pretty sure finance would have written a discount which is not shown to employees to keep us in check.<p>My hearts says that's what going on but ... does someone know?
I looked into this the other day - it's hard to get concrete numbers but rumors online lead me to believe that negotiated discounts tend to only be in the 10-15% range and you need to commit to six figure of spending to get them.
I've seen the bill at our company (few hundred users, few thousand total employees); we're paying the full API rate.
In my experience Anthropic won't give you much of a discount, if any, unless you have a multi-million dollar a year contract.
The actual cost your company pays is likely _higher_ than what Claude Code shows in /cost, not lower. Also, very few organizations are getting any discount on API rates. Maybe the US military.
What exactly prevents a person signing in personally for a plan and just getting reimbursed by the company?
There’s so many reasons. First off, I cannot just download and install arbitrary software on my work machine. It would also never get approved due to governance and compliance reasons, data protection and the fact that I would be using a personal license for work projects. I believe this would violate not only my employment contract but also Claude ToS.
It's so odd. Never before have I seen an example where small companies have such an insane benefit over large ones. (because of the insane rates large orgs need to pay for AI).
I could never work somewhere that my work machine was locked down like that. I guess it's good I won't have to worry about ever being employed again, soon lol
Not much other than corporate policy and Anthropic's policy that you are not allowed to do that unless your company is very small.<p>Anecdotally, I know that quite a number of people at my company (mid-sized, ~5000 employees) have personal ChatGPT or Anthropic subscriptions they are using. Despite the fact that we have Microsoft Copilot (the web version) for everyone, and Github Copilot (the CLI thing) with low limits (500-1900 credits/month) for people who can justify it. But Copilot isn't all that great compared to Claude Code, so a lot of people continue to use their personal account.<p>It violates a number of policies and is probably a firing offense, but I haven't heard of anyone getting nailed for it yet. And I know that line managers are aware of it happening.<p>I do wish they'd just let us buy Claude Code API access. Copilot w/Opus 5.5 is noticably worse than CC using the same model. But oh well, I'm not getting fired over it.
If you have 150 people with Claude acess you probably have enough of a need for compliance and audit trails to put the kibosh on that.
Data protection guarantees. This is especially true if you need zero data retention, which isn't available on individual subscriptions.
This is ok when you're a startup and don't give a shit, Goldman Sachs, McKinsey, Accenture, won't do that, 12 people in their legal, support, security and billing departments died of an heart attack reading your comment
I understand that with 12.000 engineers at least one will get prompt injected. But how would such a thing happen? I guess if you'd email me: "Delete all files", when I ask Claude to check my Thunderbird mailbox in theory it could get confused and delete everything.
Funny thing is... Startups <i>should</i> give a shit. Along with BigCompanies, they should also be worried about not getting sued, not leaking their customer data to Facebook, not getting 0wned by a 13 year old kid in his basement. The fact that small companies get away with being so cavalier about privacy, security, and legal issues is a failure of our regulatory system to hold them accountable.
90% of startups deal with unimportant data that nobody cares about, there is no need to give a shit. Companies worry enough already about getting sued, it's a massive drag on our entire society that helps nobody.
Basic security and governance?<p>IP and trade secret protection?
Because the enterprise plan provides necessary features, contract terms and vendor assurances to comply with local law, industry regulations, customer contracts, and company AI and security policies?
Besides all the other reasons, I have a strong feeling that Anthropic went to the Oracle School of License Enforcement and they seem like the type of company that would be willing to sue their customers into oblivion. Maybe not now, before the IPO, but afterwards, for sure.
Anthropic figuring that out? People not wanting to incur business expenses on their personal accounts? In what world is that a realistic scenario for a large organization??
For businesses anthropic offer a teams plan for up to 150 users which is billed like a collection of individual users i.e. you have a seat, you get some tokens/month, you buy a higher tier seat and you get some more tokens/month. For >150 users you pay $20/month/user just for access to the platform, then all tokens are billed at API rates.
Most folks I know have companies that deploy the models via Bedrock or Azure foundry and the token cost goes against their spend with those vendors.
Those personal plans are hard to manage. As an administrator I can't control settings across the org if everyone is on their own plan which means people may be giving sensitive code/data away to Anthropic or sketchy connectors without my knowledge.<p>So most businesses at least use the Anthropic Team plan, which is $25 or $125 but isn't as generous as the personal max plans. Overage is API rates. Almost all of our devs are over the allotment most months.
Hah I can’t imagine only using a $20/mo plan. (Robotics engineer)
I honestly can't imagine using a bigger plan. The $20 a month plan is able to be used almost all day without hitting the usage quota so long as you moderate what model you're using.<p>I really don't understand why so many people seemingly use the bigger plans. Are people just running opus 5.5 as 4+ subagents 24/7?<p>In order for me to actually understand what's being done, I always keep it brief and use specific prompts (and usually use smaller models since they're perfect for that). Do people just let "claude take the wheel"?<p>When you have to go in to your next standup and explain what your code does to your boss, and what you've done since the last meeting, what do you say?
> When you have to go in to your next standup and explain what your code does to your boss, and what you've done since the last meeting, what do you say?<p>You say the same thing to your boss as if you were a lead or manager reporting on a project that your junior and mid-level devs are working on. "What" is the easy part to explain; "how" is the details that your manager doesn't need to hear about if you're doing your job properly.
> When you have to go in to your next standup and explain what your code does to your boss, and what you've done since the last meeting, what do you say?<p>I hand them a writeup of how incorporating agentic decision making into cleaning up some of our messy data saved us $XXX,XXX at a cost of $XX of tokens, with the receipts attached.
I run 4 agents under one supervisor agent for 12 hours a day building computer use environments. Yes, I don't read the code, but testing is 90% of my work. Got to find other ways to buy trust in AI code. I came up with a stack of 5 layers of testing which is pretty similar to the recent Anthropic writeup. I can consume the $100/mo plan weekly quota in 2 days.
How do you get along with the 20USD plan and that much utilization?<p>I use Claude mainly via Webinterface and when on Opus 4.8 or higher, I reach my weakly limit around 2 - 3 days before rest - and Im just prompting single/specific very limited & constrained classes & functions with proper description and architecture upfront.
> Do people just let "claude take the wheel"?<p>Yes, I'd wager most people just let "claude take the wheel".<p>> When you have to go in to your next standup and explain what your code does to your boss, and what you've done since the last meeting, what do you say?<p>You say "Claude, I've got a standup in 10 min, give me a high level summary for my boss of everything you did since the last standup" and then you read that lol.
I let Claude take the wheel with various non-professional projects which often means heavy subagent workflows. Prompts like this easily eat through my 5x Max plan limits:<p>> I want you to look for UI issues related to transitions. Look for jumps, reverts, or anything that doesn't follow UI/UX best practices. You might need to figure out how best to even record and review UI transitions. Do all testing locally on a local dev server, but make sure to undo any database changes you make in the process of testing. Be exhaustive and report back with an .html report that highlights the visual issues and proposed solutions so I can review each one. Ultracode on.<p>Which means I have up to 10 Opus 5.5 medium agents running concurrently for long stretches of time.<p>I want to be clear I don't think that using Claude in this way gets you the best possible results. But when the app is fully vibecoded then audit prompts like the one above can be seen as a definite net positive. Making Claude think really hard about various improvement routines will get you better results in that one aspect than Claude's first attempt to build something from scratch did.
The 200 dollar plan weekly limit runs out in like half a day or a day if you use it heavily with subagents. The 20 dollar plan is a blip.<p>You can build a lot of stuff this way. You can also waste it. You need good people who will use it well and usefully.
Claude Team has higher usage than the Claude Pro plan for individuals (<a href="https://claude.com/pricing#team-&-enterprise" rel="nofollow">https://claude.com/pricing#team-&-enterprise</a>).
The enterprise cost controls that Anthropic offer are blunt, really only allowing for allow/disable specific models and a general monthly hard cap per user. No per-model spend allowance. Their "reduced cost" mode is just Sonnet on Low with no flexibility.<p>They are frankly reaping what they sow here, enterprises have been very clear about what controls would help us align costs, but they have been very poor at shipping features on that front.
I thought enterprise contracts (ie teams with >x users) offered only API prices. Am I wrong?
You aren’t allowed to use the flat rates for companies, unless you’re cheating them they’ll come for you eventuallt
Last time I checked (a few months ago) it was fine for a company to pay for regular Max/Ultra accounts (not even the per-seat ones). Is it different now?
You can use the Claude Team plan up to 150 seats.
> The $20/mo plan ...<p>Is just the first hit your dealer gives away for free. Treating that as the actual baseline cost for what they need in order to justify current AI valuations requires some truly fraudulent mathematics. Hell, even the current API rates are unsustainable -as-long-as- they need to keep investing into training the next model they will be serving 6 months from now.<p>The plan has always been to develop these models using borrowed money, get everyone's business process addicted to them, moat off access to alternatives (e.g. chinese / foreign open-weight models), via technical superiority -or- more likely regulatory shenanigans, THEN jack the prices up through the roof starting with direct enterprise customers buying API access but then obviously bubbling down into literally every product / service every human being on this planet purchases. Unfortunately, it's a garbage plan based on a multi-ton house of cards that is about to collapse on everyone.
Yes, in industries where you have legal/regulatory/security restrictions on your data, you pretty much have to pay API rates. Furthermore, if you buy through providers like AWS Bedrock or GCP Whatever-The-Fuck-They-Renamed-Vertex-To, depending on your setup you may not benefit from the pricing on cached tokens. It can anywhere from 10x to 100x the prices you pay.
Anthropic forces you onto api billing for orgs above a certain size
Enterprise plans are billed at API rates, with small discounts only if you’re quite big.
Yes, any decent size business is paying API rates.
Yes, many companies have Enterprise, for SSO/SCIM, audit logs, data retention, HIPAA, support, org-wide connectors and skills, usage tracking.<p>That is usage based and therefore expensive.<p>Putting everyone on their own plan is economical, if you can give those things up.
At the enterprise level, API billing is post-paid, and a lagging indicator on an unlimited expensive resource with bureaucracy between service owner and end user is a recipe for disaster
Serious question: is the increase in performance not enough to justify the cost?
Honestly, for most casual business work (document analysis, data science, web scraping, basic scripting, etc) the Gemini Pro models are pretty well rounded and competent.<p>The problem is we now have a two tier infrastructure where some teams get Claude and some get Gemini and IT has so support both.
Consumption billing? Claude code is primarily a subscription. A heavily subsidized one at that. How are you doing it so wrong?
Anthropic does not sell subscriptions to organizations over 150 people, only API billing.
their subscriptions aren’t subsidised. in fact its near 100% margin. you are getting the lowest priority access with no service level guarantee in the gaps in supply left over by api users, anthropic’s cost basis on hardware would be the same without subscriptions.
Companies this size don't get the subsidy
Regardless of tech tool, non-tech writing POCs they try to force tech to get into production is a timeless story. LLM just allows people to get there faster, with less knowledge of coding.. which leads to the actual problem I think.<p>Banks have a ton of legal/compliance/reglatory/reputational concerns about application access/entitleements, data privacy, data licensing, granular data entitlements, data access (auditable).. approval chains (auditable), as well as actual financial risk.
It could also be as simple as the technology adjacent people developing tools via LLM that somehow end up in the critical path of some business function and now it needs to be supported by someone.<p>I’ve seen the same happen with insane spreadsheets.<p>As empowering as something like Claude code can be, leaving development to developers means the output is inherently supported by the organization long term.
Extending the thought, there’s also the risk it enters critical path but something upstream changes or Anthropic starts charging 1000x for the tokens and now someone needs to walk through god knows how many lines of never before reviewed code to figure out how it works.<p>By wholly depending on the assisted coding you are wholly dependent on Anthropic, forever, for something that is now critical.<p>There are probably thousands of these little microscopic dependencies that occur when you make these tools widely available. What happens when you don’t want to foot the bill anymore?
This is what happens. We had this happen with end user scripting pre AI where these scripts became unknown production applications. It made the actual engineering impossible because you had no idea if anything you changed would impact the ??? processes run by users that have become critical. AI would amplify that greatly so we have an explicit rule that it can only be used for reporting and prototyping only and we restrict any write action
I am co-teaching an AI course for college business students. We decided to use Claude Code and Visual Studio since the space is moving so quickly and we thought understanding some of the fundamentals is the most value they could get from the course.<p>It was the right choice. But many of the rough edges of the terminal do surface and confuse non technical people.
> which leads to the actual problem I think.<p>Getting there faster with less knowledge of coding isn't the problem.<p>Pre LLMs, the main barrier to producing software for non-tech people was writing the code, literally. With LLMs, this barrier is now gone. This results in a much larger volume of slop than before. And then the real barrier shows up -- understanding, fool-proofing and maintaining that code. Code is cheap, show me how it runs in prod.<p>Like it's great that quants can iterate on their ideas much faster now. But GS is saying they shouldn't leave their sandbox.
Elephant in the room is QA, the thing that disappeared when Agile took over the world.
As much as I agree I think the leading comment is actually even more spot on. Understanding dies on the hill of having a tool build out the process for you, and not understanding, especially in a space as knowledge critical as finance/trading, is where you run into catastrophic levels of risk.
> But GS is saying they shouldn't leave their sandbox.<p>Exactly
Maybe there is an irony in that LLM with coding harness could be a step in the right direction for operational domain experts to solve business problems while maintaining high standards for legal/compliance/regulatory/reputational and prd-deployment concerns.<p>User scripts that turn into applications that need production support are often consequential and business-differentiating since they do the things that can't be bought off the shelf and effectively encode tacit knowledge.
The most interesting part of this announcement is the timing. GS is leading Anthropic's IPO, what motivated them to announce this a few weeks before trading starts?
In an honest, well-functioning org, those are decisions made by completely different groups that do not (and should not) report to each other. It's actually kind of depressing that we (and I include myself in that) assume otherwise by default.
I have bad news: most large corporations are successful because they know how to make money. Often, the internal operations, are disappointingly bad, just not bad enough to kill the corp fast.<p>Source: I've worked in and with many successful organizations, and worked at one place with proper internal processes, so I know what's possible
I have observed that also. Though I'm still not sure whether: 1) there are some small pockets where important decisions are made, innovation happens and the needle is moved, and dysfunction I see is just justified bloat of the company 2) it is the entire corporation like that but it somehow works at the end.
The way I would describe large companies is similar to that joke "Mandatory scheduled fun events" just with innovation. Most large organizations cannot innovate, instead they execute well. Look at all the major large organizations, they primarily distinguish themselves on execution, not innovation. A startup that's hobbled together by passionate soft drink makers (or whatever) aren't gonna come close to full business efficiency of Coke Inc. The manufacturing capacity, distribution channels, the logistics, the brand management and awareness, the brand integration and cross promotion, and other things that come from economy of scale. The rigid structure is not a place for innovation to grow.
>I have bad news: most large corporations are successful because they know how to make money.<p>Who is they? Do you have any idea what its like working at an org the size of GS, that you actually think these two completely different departments discussed the matter with each other?
I'm no longer in that industry, but as I recall there are actually rules imposing independence from investment banking and research arms, for example. Dates back to the Dot Com era where research analysts were touting IPOs for the investment banking division.
In this case, both decisions are weighty enough that they should be made at the very top, by the same people.
> In an honest, well-functioning org, those are decisions made by completely different groups that do not (and should not) report to each other.<p>I don't agree at all. Different groups should be supporting each other and the overall bottom line instead of their parochial, narrow self-interests - the latter is a poorly functioning org.<p>If by group A delaying its $100M cost-cutting, group B can add $1B to the bottom line, it would be a corporate and group management failure for group A not to cooperate.
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A well functioning org happens regularly. A well-functioning world is far more difficult.
Well functioning by what metrics? To make money? No doubt Goldman sachs does that. But making money often has the incentive of ignoring ethics .. which is what this thread was about. Would they ignore ethics to make more money?<p>So here, would they synchronize announcing big things in relation to the hottest and most risky investment there is right now?<p>"what motivated them to announce this a few weeks before trading starts?"
What was the point of this comment?
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nirvana_fallacy" rel="nofollow">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nirvana_fallacy</a><p>Also what’s your point? Goldman Sachs shouldn’t pull Claude Code because there’s no point in trying in this world and we should all give up on everything?
Kind of an odd strawman
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This wasn't announced, it was an internal leak reported by Bloomberg. Perhaps they should have known it would leak, but there doesn't seem to be any grand strategy.
At a large bank like this, the people responsible for cybersecurity have a completely separate reporting chain and incentives than the ibanking side. If there was a security risk identified, it'd be completely inappropriate to wait a few weeks.
Goldman wants to lead the IPO, and have a successful IPO, because Anthropic and Anthropics investors will give Goldman more business if it does that. However, if Anthropic is overvaluing itself then Goldman may not be filling the book on the offer. This story may drive down the value that investors give to Goldman when it does its research, enabling a lower price on the IPO which will then generate more institutional interest and make the IPO a success.
Probably easier to bury it in election cycle news and current downturn than worry about it closer to the IPO, no?
Conflict of interest? Might as well cover their ass before IPO to claim the underwriting was fair
this is an extremely interesting point
Plausible deniability.
A drug dealer never consumes.
> A drug dealer never consumes<p>That is:<p>> Number four, I know you heard this before<p>> Never get high on your own supply<p>Nonetheless, I think the advice being applied here is number 3<p>> Number three, never trust nobody
Strats still have access. They probably want the traders to focus on trading and then strats to do this stuff. YTMYTS.
Goldman is very unlikely to have decided proactively to cut off traders access, and it's much more likely there was an operational loss. What kind of loss? I don't know but consider:<p>1) Claude Code is only being taken away from traders.<p>2) Only traders have permission to send orders to the market and book client trades.<p>3) Claude code would probably have been running as the trader, under their account with minimal review.<p>If you run a coding agent in that environment it's only a matter of time until it enters a bad order or books a bad trade, and once that happens it's only a matter of time before management decides to take this kind of action.<p>Goldman is definitely not doing this for cost reasons. They can afford the tokens.
> Goldman is definitely not doing this for cost reasons. They can afford the tokens.<p>Well, sure, but if the tokens aren't benefiting them enough to justify the cost it could make sense to do for cost reasons.
Technically yes, but in practice:<p>a) They are pulling it entirely rather than imposing a cap or enforcing the use of cheaper models. This would be a strange choice if cost was the only concern.<p>b) Famously, traders at Goldman are well renumerated. Given the costs of these people even small productivity improvements carry a large value.<p>c) It would be very difficult to determine in any kind of conclusive way that the benefits were smaller than the costs.<p>For all these reasons I find it totally implausible that this decision was driven by API costs.
Having sat in a trading seat at a GS competitor, I can second this. If a Claude Max subscription led to one better trade over the course of a year, there's an almost 100% chance that it would pay for itself. And consider that a trader at GS would be doing dozens if not thousands of trades per day (depending on the seat/product).<p>Cost isn't the issue here.
If it was being used for research rather than execution, isn’t there a risk of leaking information therefore inadvertently causing price movements.
Definitely not using something like an Anthropic model for research, FWIW. The amount of data the LLM needs to consume to build context for even simple trade sequence comprehension makes it next to useless.<p>There are a litany of other mathematical and ML models that can more aptly be applied to the space.<p>But to answer your question more directly, yeah...there's no way in hell you'd let the questions your traders are asking in research out of the four walls of your building if you can avoid it.
A relative sacked a team at his finance firm for using AI.<p>Short version :
1. Document ( transcripts of phone conversations, Bloomberg chats, WhatsApp messages etc ) need to be collected and collated accurately on a periodic basis for an industry regulator.<p>2. The very highly paid team used AI to inaccurately perform the task.<p>3. The resulting errors could have resulted in jail time for the decision makers.<p>4. The team was removed.
> The Hong Kong restriction was based on location and contract terms, and the new one is based on role. Goldman's in-house AI assistant, which uses models from several companies, is still available across the firm. The restriction applies to third-party agents that can write and run code by themselves.
12.000 engineers, for a bank? What!? What could possibly require that many engineers?
As the things stand, we used to have thousands of Excels with obscure macros heavy-lifting businesses. Now we have thousands of Claude artifacts doing the same. Nothing has changed, much less improved.<p>Wherever I've seen a pull back, it is all because of compliance or security. And that too not because of the purity of heart; but because some checkbox couldn't be ticked due to AI.
Excel macros are deterministic, don't leak BI and PII, aren't malware, and don't cost an extra engineer's salary per engineer. Comparing them to Claude is quite a disservice.
Not to forget versioned inside the document. The same spreadsheet produces same answers if it is not edited. Same can't be said from programs that can be recreated over and over again.
It's funny you mentioned excel macros not being malware. Various scripting systems provided by excel has been a long standing malware vector.
The obvious end state here is an ExceLLM.<p><a href="https://spreadsheets-are-all-you-need.ai/" rel="nofollow">https://spreadsheets-are-all-you-need.ai/</a>
I have mentioned this a couple months ago to a higher up. I do not feel it is safe and prudent to let codex loose with full root access, network access and remote access to other LAN connected machines.<p>Not to mention it having access to any files and binaries which may expose credentials or setup which may lead to credential leak via hsm access.<p>I was simply told to bring it up to an another manager for a "second opinion", but I'm not sure if this even a good way to approach it. Security by committee is an abysmal trap and a way for deferred liability.
It's really hard to make these models useful and safe. Useful means wide adoption, long running tasks with no human in the loop, wide access to read and write data (analysis, summaries, dashboards, etc).<p>Safe means containers, guardrails, egress filters, human in the loop, deliberate per agent mcp controls, and real expertise in prompting/task selection, etc.<p>So far the pattern I've seen is security teams say no, it gets escalated, it's allowed, then 1% of the time the model yeets data where it's not supposed to (no amount of promoting or controls seems to really fix this), it's locked back down.
If they had never used it, maybe it wouldn't matter, but if they were allowed to use it and then got blocked, I think the sense of going backwards would be huge. Simply blocking it does look like it would become a bottleneck for work efficiency, but it seems like a decision made after really weighing which matters more for those jobs, work efficiency or security. Developers would of course lose a lot of efficiency without something like Claude Code, but I don't know the jobs mentioned in enough detail.
This just means Claude Code on their bankers/traders laptop is not ok, they will buy managed agents and similar products for non-engineers. Sound like high margin products to me.
They should use something like Synthetiq to let the traders build apps but keep it in a managed environment with observability and policy enforcement
> Barclays is moving in the other direction<p>Just fyi.
> Barclays is moving in the other direction<p>> Barclays said in October that it expects half its developers to be using Claude Code by the end of the year, and three weeks later named developers among 5,000 job cuts. Like Goldman, it is giving coding agents to engineers. Unlike Goldman, it is also using them to reduce how many engineers it employs.<p>It says nowhere Barclay’s is permitting them to traders, just that they are - like Goldman - permitting them to developers, who they subsequently will be firing enmasse.
If you had to follow a bank's strategy on basically anything, would you follow Goldman or Barclays?
Well the real question is: Is this about using AI, or switching from public AI to private AI, or about Anthropic having access to confidential information of their own underwriter?
Look no further than the recent email leak story. The tool is quite powerful and I can see the argument that at an enterprise / risk management level it should only be used by those capable of reviewing it.
Goldman any day, if you're asking based on their respective reputations.
They've been in business longer than the USA's existence, they must be doing something right - some 336 years.<p>The UK is <i>very</i> good at banking.
Uhh... colonial empire? See also: HSBC and Standard Chartered. For those unaware, one of France's largest banks, BNP Paribas is also an old colonial bank from... wait for it... Netherlands! Paribas stands for "Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas". For those unaware, the old French term for the Netherlands (Holland) is the low countries, which is literally "Pays-Bas" in French.<p>To be fair, UK's #1 talent and economic advantage for global commerce in 2026 is their contract law and the courts that judicate it. It is <i>unmatched</i> globally. Sure, New York, Paris, Tokyo, Hongkong, and Singapore are pretty big, but nothing competes with London for international contract law. The ecosystem is just so massive and concentrated in London -- courts, highly experienced judges/barristers (lawyers)/academics.
> For those unaware, the old French term for the Netherlands (Holland) is the low countries, which is literally "Pays-Bas" in French.<p>"Netherlands" still means "low countries".
Maybe not Goldman.<p>But DEFINITELY NOT Barclays.
Better not ask that question to Merrill Lynch circa 2006
Every company is struggling with the right balance right now. All the more impossible as the quality of the tools changes so dramatically every quarter.
Original source appears to be Bloomberg via <a href="https://www.fa-mag.com/news/goldman-restricts-traders-and-bankers-from-using-some-ai-tools-89026.html" rel="nofollow">https://www.fa-mag.com/news/goldman-restricts-traders-and-ba...</a> , with State of AI being some kind of AI-written site run by a spam company.
This IPO is too juicy for it to be a fair game.
Those cost is one thing but security is a huge issue too.
Agents in their current incarnation leak data all over the place.
Goldman Sachs is lead left on the Anthropi IPO, so dropping this in the middle of that process is a wild move.
I dunno, I have a lot more sympathy for non-technical users writing slop than engineers. I think it's really great that more people get to "properly" use the computer, in that they experience a flexible programmable environment, rather than a fixed set of discreet programs "take it or leave it".<p>If the issue is security, a much more interesting problem for the engineering team to do is design the programming environment for the bankers so they cannot hurt themselves.<p>If the issue a performance, designing great abstractions that the bankers' agents can use is "low code done right".<p>I hope the bankers rebel hard against this policy change!
The ability of bankers or traders to even create an app that others can run, without any IT review/approval process is probable a compliance issue in and of itself.<p>There are things simple building blocks don't prevent in the event of nefarious or stupid behavior.<p>Imagine a nefarious banker creates an app that lets him talk to a trader on the other side of the "Chinese wall" about M&A deal flow without getting caught because they are avoiding monitored channels like email, slack, phone, zoom.<p>Imagine an idiot writes an app that scans his email and summarizes client information he is privy to and writes it to some database that his app then serves up to others on the trading desk. He is unaware that entitlements exist, and by giving others access to his new app he has broken them. Btw summarizing email is a HUGE use case across non-technical users in finance that they are very excited about.
> <i>Imagine a nefarious banker creates an app that lets him talk to a trader on the other side of the "Chinese wall" about M&A deal flow without getting caught because they are avoiding monitored channels like email, slack, phone, zoom.</i><p>Back channel conversations have been happening since forever and hardly need vibe coded apps to pull off. They can use non-corp services on personal devices, or kick it old school and grab drinks at the bar downstairs.
The point is liability, plausibly deniability, etc.<p>If a trader uses their personal cell / WhatsApp / etc in today's age, all the liability falls on that trader.<p>If organize drinks with a coworker adhoc and communicate things they shouldn't.. the same.<p>However, if a trader on their work PC, on the work network, in the office can communicate in electronic form on an unsecured, unmonitored channel.. the bank is paying a very large fine. This is like leaving gmail unblocked on work computer/network.<p>Likewise if the bank itself organizes a monthly drinks between 2 departments on different side of the Chinese wall, offsite and things get communicated that shouldn't .. its obviously somewhat intentional by the bank and they will get fined.
> Back channel conversations have been happening since forever and hardly need vibe coded apps<p>Thats the reason why there are companies like:<p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_Reasoning" rel="nofollow">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_Reasoning</a><p>(funded amongst others by In-Q-Tel, the investment arm of that intelligence service)
>The ability of bankers or traders to even create an app that others can run, without any IT review/approval process is probable a compliance issue in and of itself.<p>Now worries! Its called the "citizen developer" today! :-D
<a href="https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citizen_Developer" rel="nofollow">https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citizen_Developer</a>
I feel the same way. There's also a lot of startups promising this future but none of them are technically equipped to deliver it. I think almost every company is going to have an interesting ecosystem of internal apis in the future.
Yeah it should be a dialogue with bankers / front office. It can even be "OK if you wanna do this, we gotta teach you at a high level how the computer works, so we can figure out broad company policy together". Done right the rest of company finally gives a shit (because they want to keep their cool new personalized toys), and it's never been a better time to be back office IT.
we are all growing the same thing (internally)
In certain industries, compliance/lack thereof has serious consequences, so it might be more to do with that rather than punishing non-technical users just for using AI. For example, if an AI model trains on your internal financials, and someone else uses it to make a quick buck, then that's insider trading. Things like that.
Good security policies always contain building blocks. If your security realies on low-privilage code been fully human-auditted, you've already lost.<p>Only select high privilege code, where we don't know how to make it "secure by construction", should depend on full audits.<p>The right use-case here is "custom homegrown Bloomberg Terminal add-ons", not autonomous trading software that can see everything and also isn't routed through trading risk software.
There have been a lot of recent issues with LLMs finding security bugs quickly. If the issue is security, they need to design the bulletproof platform first, then give the less-technical users access to it.<p>I dunno if rebellion is the right framing. Maybe pulling the organization toward their side instead. Ultimate the “bankers” at an investment company decide where the company is going, after all. Grabbing your own steering wheel isn’t rebellion.
Yeah, I wonder if the medium term shift here is away from CC (which runs on your own machine and is super risky if you have sensitive client information) to something like Claude Managed Agents, where everything is sandboxed.<p>Or just the Claude app with local execution disabled by org policy, if that’s a thing.
Even managed solutions are just mitigations, the "problem" is coding. Computer programs can do anything. This was gated before by knowledge, only coders could effectively write software, including malware and poor-security software. Now anybody can write software.<p>The corporate computer is a locked-down environment, the set of actions you can perform are limited. They ideally should be the actions you need to do your job, and nothing more. Any method of writing and executing code breaks that wide open - you can now do anything, given enough time and effort. Now the time and effort floors have fallen, too.<p>Claude Managed Agents might prevent the agents themselves from doing something nefarious, sure. But that was never the draw of AI. The ideal use of AI is doing the least amount of stuff with AI, and the most amount of stuff with code. Asking AI to sort my email? That's good, but writing a program to do that is better. Asking AI to do statistical analysis of my trades? Again, sure, but it's even better to write a program to do that.
The sensitive data problems aren't just about sandboxing. If a systems development model at Anthropic discovers a clever optimization trick based on a customer's complaints to their account team, that's a great deal that saves a lot of work. If a trading model at Goldman discovers a clever pricing trick based on a customer's complaints to their account team, that's an enormous problem, even if the underlying data is never seen by anyone who Goldman wouldn't trust to handle it responsibly.
Sure, but moving to CMA lets you enumerate the sources and assert the customer complaints are not visible to the workflows that shouldn’t have it.<p>The “Claude can read everything” model is great for vibe coding but not suitable for regulated industries, which require more structure.<p>My point is mostly that there is a middle ground that can preserve some of the wins; Claude can vibe up a CMA pipeline pretty quickly. There’s likely room for an internal platform to enforce required invariants though.
> rather than a fixed set of discreet programs "take it or leave it".<p>> If the issue is security, a much more interesting problem for the engineering team to do is design the programming environment for the bankers so they cannot hurt themselves.<p>Interesting take but it doesn't compute. When engineering team teams design programming environments so that people can't hurt themselves they will be locked into a "take it or leave it" set of environments.<p>Also, you do know security isn't just about engineering, it is also about data right?<p>How do you suppose it works when bankers who have day to day access to sensitive data as part of their job - upload it to AI? What to do then? Restrict data access?<p>> rather than a fixed set of discreet programs "take it or leave it".<p>This part always amuses me. AI boosters seem to think everyone hosting their own bespoke app is the next big thing. But who manages that? Banks are not tech giants. Most engineering teams don't bring in money and headcounts are strictly managed. As the article says:<p>> "He told Bloomberg that traders and bankers had built tools with AI and passed them to the firm's engineers, of whom there are about 12,000, to be improved."<p>So, how does engineering with limited staff design a safe environment and improve 12k apps. I am sure Goldman's management wont be thrilled about increasing engineering headcount to match these expectations.
> design the programming environment for the bankers so they cannot hurt themselves<p>Sounds like the web platform.
Anthropic and OpenAI can’t design secure programming environments.
> they experience a flexible programmable environment, rather than a fixed set of discreet programs "take it or leave it".<p>> If the issue is security, a much more interesting problem for the engineering team to do is design the programming environment for the bankers so they cannot hurt themselves.<p>> If the issue a performance, designing great abstractions that the bankers' agents can use is "low code done right".<p>You do realize you're contradicting yourself right? To get to a state where "bankers cannot hurt themselves" or "low code [is] done right" is to end up right back at the "take it or leave it" programs.<p>Security was already addressed, by these "take it or leave it" programs.<p>Add enough abstractions on top of each other that must be adhered to or else it falls apart, and what do you get? "take it or leave it" programs.<p>This reminds me of the sovereign citizen movement that got really popular in 2019. The illusion of freedom feels great I'm sure. Until you realize you are entirely dependent on the existing infrastructure and the people who maintain it to enjoy the apparent freedom.
The issue is probably an overwhelming amount of slop like PoCs, presentations on every topic, claude artifacts with 1000 pages instead if 10 liner in the chat.<p>All this is just counter productive and drowns everyone is slop.
6 days ago source: <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-11-02/goldman-restricts-traders-and-bankers-from-using-some-ai-tools" rel="nofollow">https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-11-02/goldman-r...</a> (<a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50341065">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50341065</a>)
Im more suprised this was allowed in the first place
Businesses are just realizing that spending 50k a year per employee on an app/ide doesnt make sense...<p>Im not convinced it's creating any economic value at all.<p>Like 10% of people use it reasonably/responsibly and the other 90% basically become turbo lazy. I think I'd rather my employees be working "slow" but actually working hard and not just functioning as meat proxies for mediocre bots and reducing my workforce to some median competency.<p>There's no edge in using the same tools that everyone else is using, especially in markets/finance.<p>Let your competition all melt their brains, maybe only give employees you know are actual super contributors, (and not just mentally offshoring their work) unlimited access to llms.
You’re overlooking the red queen race. That there’s “no edge” in using the same tools as everyone else is the wrong way round - the edge is lost if you stop using it.<p>A few years ago someone built a fibre optic cable between New York and Chicago to save 3ms on trades. Naturally every trader had to pay to use it, at great expense. One company couldn’t decline to use it “because everyone else was using it so there’s no edge”.<p>Goldman have said they’re not using Claude, because their claude use will be leaking their secrets and IP. They will absolutely buy the hardware to reimplement their own version of Claude.
I'm not surprised in the slightest. Claude Code is a proprietary mess that only serves Anthropic, not any of the people using it. In a financial setting, I've had disastrous results with it. This is a good move Goldman Sachs, and I think everyone will be happy it happened.
why not just do a Palantir integration and leverage all the tools through that, instead of directly?
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<p><pre><code> Internal guidance updated in October restricts Anthropic's Claude Code and Microsoft's GitHub to the bank's engineers
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There. Now only devs can use Claude Code. That makes sense.<p>Has nothing to do with AI being bad. Good engineers have a mind for it. They tend to be more detailed oriented. Understands how parts connect. Understands the pros and cons of approaches. Can see when the AI does something stupid. Probably knows a better way if the AI veers off.<p>We don’t ask software engineers to file Goldman Sachs yearly company taxes using just AI right without any expertise right?<p>We don’t ask engineers to go out and do cold calls for sales right? Engineers don’t have the mind for that. They’d suck at it.<p>We don’t ask sales people to write programs right? Have you met a sales person? They’re the opposite of builders. They lie, take corners to close a deal. You can’t do that building a real production system.
the take away is that Ai enhances expertise rather than making experts out of everyone or replacing them
> There. Now only devs can use Claude Code. That makes sense.<p>This hardly makes sense to me. Claude Code is an excellent tool for running your environment and augmenting your productivity. Most traders are sharp folks who could use CC to great effect I am sure. I'd be super annoyed.
It does make sense. But the problem is that no one wants to spend a few trillion dollars on a nice tool for devs. The investors want the magic wish-granting genie they were promised.[1]<p>1.<a href="https://www.the-independent.com/tech/chatgpt-ai-cancer-cure-sam-altman-b2832612.html" rel="nofollow">https://www.the-independent.com/tech/chatgpt-ai-cancer-cure-...</a>
Yeah, this is more likely to not waste engineers time while dipshits vibe code their own "tools" and demand that they are production ready despite being said dipshit.
> Has nothing to do with AI being bad. Good engineers have a mind for it<p>I never like these kinds of statements because it makes so AI can’t ever be critiqued. You can always go “well that’s a bad engineer.”
Erm why are you so defensive?<p>There’s plenty of firms out there claiming sales people can create all sorts of productivity apps…
> "He told Bloomberg that traders and bankers had built tools with AI and passed them to the firm's engineers, of whom there are about 12,000, to be improved."<p>As someone who has been on the receiving end of many of these tools, I feel 'improved' is doing some heavy lifting here.<p>Completely overhauled to be operationally viable, perhaps.<p>Thrown into the dark recesses of the backlog, more likely.
I have a non technical friend who's been building apps for his (much smaller than goldman) investment bank just as an ingestion for their old pitch decks, deal documents, live deal agent that can surface tasks from emails and then work on things for the bankers. Been impressed with how seriously he's getting into CI, SDLC, etc but I don't think most management or business users are on the same page he is.
Someone will build an enterprise thing that takes care of this, and probably make a ton in the process.
I haven't been in this position before. Serious question: are you any better off than if the traders had simply forwarded you the prompt directly?
<p><pre><code> > A trading floor is a bad place for unreviewed code written by people who can't read it, and the information barrier problem would be reason enough on its own. Requiring that agent-written code come from people trained to review it is a sensible rule for a regulated business.
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Jokes on them: devs are also losing the capacity to read the code. Can't mix move fast, high volume with "read code".<p>Agentic engineering needs to be "all in".
Why must agentic engineering be all in?
At which point it's vibe coding, not engineering.
That's how I see it.<p>You have to go all in on agentic engineering. And if you're all in on agentic engineering and doing it well, then anyone should be able to build safely and no one needs to look at code. The code should look highly consistent and agents should be enforcing best practices, approved architecture, running security scanning, etc.<p>The gains at the middleground compromise are not really significant and, IMO, creates frustration and friction.<p>Works best to go all in. GS should let everyone have CC and GH and focus on making their enterprise harness safer for everyone.
LMAO. If nobody is looking at the code, how would you know, and why would you care?<p>And, no, it doesn't actually work. Agentic engineering is a myth by people who got high on their own farts.
Worse, instructed to just keep prompting and not even look at it, let the software factory review and regen if quality < 0.8
I bet engineering loved traders tossing vibe-coded crap across the wall and demanding it be productionized. "It can't be hard, after all I've already written the code for you."
For decades Wall Street traders have been throwing spreadsheets over the wall at developers to be productionized.<p>The details are very different, but variations on this theme have played out for a long time. I have seen fixed income instrument modeling systems 20 years ago that allowed Traders to put in limited C++ code to define new exotic instruments.<p>At least that stuff had guardrails around it.
i know one who Claude-generated entire fixed income pricing library. he s using it for his daily trades lol. wondering how that will go
If it is just a stateless UI, then probably fine. I've converted a number of these into production apps and the gaps existed in places a non-technical person wouldn't look: the overall architecture, database schema, security, and handling of edge cases to name a few.
When the AI companies are making the big math breakthroughs, it's clear that one of the most lucrative things they can do with their capability is hold it back and run a hedge fund. Knowing how Goldman and others do things at all levels is a massive accelerator. Goldman just woke up to that fact.
> Amazon shut down an internal leaderboard after employees ran agents on pointless tasks<p>Looks like someone was overusing the good old <<a href="https://github.com/calvin-ll/is-even-ai" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/calvin-ll/is-even-ai</a>>.<p>Jokes aside, I bet this sums up the difference between an engineer and a regular user who might just use whatever API they can find (although I concur that no single 2026 LLM would ever propose that).
“ When someone outside engineering builds a tool with Claude Code or Copilot, a named engineer should take responsibility for it before it touches production data.”<p>Why would a dev agree to this? Maintenance only for an incompetently generated tool? Absurd.
Funny how David Solomon used ai for his Wharton School MBA graduation speech, but now is banning it at his company.
Programmers are still allowed. It is curious that GS sued an engineer leaking source code to a competitor in 2009 when they now voluntarily give up their entire source code to Anthropic.<p>Apparently they finally got the memo that leaking corporate secrets for at least traders and bankers is unwise.
Check out the image in the article. Take a close look at the middle trader. I've heard about "one arm tied behind your back" but this is the next level.
is this gonna have an impact on gas prices in Europe, too?<p>is claude on the waiting list of shooting stuff going through the strait of Hormuz?<p>isn't goldman sachs like a caring foster step mother to big AI corps in the MSX White Label OpenAI NVIDIA Soviet?<p>wait, are they about to increase prices while deteriorating the current cohort of models? god damn it!<p>did the whole rewind on RE cause a bit of an AI getting worse cuz it cant use the best AI anymore syndrome, some inverse of AI imposter syndrome? ho-ly shit!
Instead of reading I spent time studying those traders with both hands left! Ironically they are obviously the ones who need claude the most.
> Why a coding agent is riskier on a trading desk<p>If you need to ask, maybe you shouldn't hand it over to non tech, high risk individuals just yet.
I never understand why Goldman Sachs gets so much attention for their technology. Their tech stack for front office (sales, trading, quants) is utter shit -- Slang is like a closed-source poor man's Python, and SecDB (their database) has no SQL interface -- only key-value pair (like a NoSQL database). The tech stack at JPMorgan and Morgan Stanley is light years ahead. My only explanation: The Goldman PR team is unbeatable. I assume that they are sometimes paying/bribing media to run stories. To be fair, Goldman's <i>risk taking</i> is excellent, but their tech stack in 2026 is so mediocre.
Maybe this site should restrict the use of Claude to write its articles.
OK so when push came to shove, the frontier of LLMs were not trusted at Goldman Sachs. Maybe more banks to follow? Maybe other professions? The market cap for that juicy 2 trillion dollar evaluation shrinks for each one. Especially bad if the financial system itself doesn't trust the product.
"Ueno!"<p>er, I mean: "Oh, no!"
Who would have thought that having experience would matter in software engineering as well... Just like it does for every other field.<p>It's mind boggling how hard business people keep trying to replace software engineers.<p>I suspect it might be because it's a real skill which businesses depend on so this makes engineers hard to replace and gives them more leverage to push back on unethical business conduct. If you're a manager, your value lies entirely in your ability to stay aligned with business objectives and to align others with those objectives. You have no value besides that hence you have zero leverage to push back on anything which stands in the way of those objectives, including ethics. Engineers have some leverage and hence they can push back a fair bit without putting themselves in the firing line but that makes them a problem for leaders of the organization.<p>Compare that to an HR manager; they can't lift their pinky finger if it doesn't align with business objectives; even a slight hint of doing so would immediately put them in the firing line because alignment is almost 100% of the job.
From the article: They are only pulling it from bankers and traders and only in Hong Kong. This isn't as big of a news as the title makes it seem. Engineers still get to use Claude Code and other AI coding tools, nothing to see here folks.<p>Giving a coding tool to a non engineer is like giving a chainsaw to a 5 year old. You just don't do that.
Nice that the header image is AI slop where one of the bankers has an arm coming out of his back. Helps drive home the message.
Just on another thread today or yesterday we have a Claude code developer saying “permissions are old hat”… so not shocking that a business with real infosec concerns would dial back on the product.
The anti-AI movement is gaining grounds every day! \o/<p>AI skynet has not yet won.
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My wife is an MD and I got her using Claude Code for all sorts of tasks adjacent to but not actually generating code that will be used by others. I am quite sure Claude is writing code to accomplish the tasks she asks for, but she doesn't really know or care about that. She also uses Claude for family stuff, she had Claude build us a packing list artifact that helps us pack for our family vacations, and he now manages our address book, friends birthdays, an other family administrivia.
This is scary. With tools that Claude offer it is very easy to cross HIPAA line and accidentally send shitton of data to claude
MD is often “Managing Director” when the top level subject refers to Goldman Sachs, et. al.<p>Also AIUI both claude[0] and chatgpt[1] offer HIPAA compliant BAA’s.<p>0: <a href="https://support.claude.com/en/articles/13296973-hipaa-ready-enterprise-plans" rel="nofollow">https://support.claude.com/en/articles/13296973-hipaa-ready-...</a><p>1: <a href="https://openai.com/solutions/industries/healthcare/" rel="nofollow">https://openai.com/solutions/industries/healthcare/</a>
Ok my bad then. MD I took for medical doctor.
Isn't it crazy that ai companies have private inference but still spy on the consumers.<p>I don't think it's far fetched to say the reason the subscription discounts $1k of API to $200, is that the data is worth $800.
They have ZDR arrangements for this reason
Do you think my wife is dumb and doesn't take her job seriously? She is very aware of HIPAA rules and makes sure to steer clear.
> Claude is writing code to accomplish the tasks she asks for<p>Is this typical behavior with LLMs not just Claude, but you can discourage from doing so by explicitly stating not to use tool or only use knowledge either in the system prompt or user prompt.<p>LLMs are trained to use tool if they can't solve a problem rather than guessing/hallucinating.<p>A dumb example is asking to count. As the range grow it'll attempt to write a script or use commands like seq to generate the numbers.
I really hope she’s not using any patient data with it.
I was using Claude Code yesterday for iterating with Claude Design. At some point it got faster and started producing screenshot PNGs of the canvas locally. I asked it what was up and it said that it wrote a local renderer to simulate the Claude canvas runtime.
To those who are replying with surprise and fear:<p>I work in healthcare-adjacent tech. You can use Claude with HIPAA/PHI. You need to sign a BAA (Business Associate Agreement). It dictates how Anthropic may use and how they must safeguard the PHI (Private Health Information), including not training on it.<p>I assure you that Claude and other LLMs are used extensively in healthcare, with PHI access, just about everywhere.<p>Don't be naive. Don't be alarmist.<p>If anything, LLM use under these conditions is far more safe than the way most people use LLMs. Engineers who aren't under any regulatory regime like HIPAA are using LLMs without the BAA safeguards, exposing personal data directly to the insecure, shared models, which are now training on all the personal data that's being fed into them. People think their communication with LLMs is private and isolated, but without the BAAs in use by companies under compliance regimes, it's not isolated.
> Don't be naive. Don't be alarmist.<p>To me it’s the phrasing “I got her using Claude code”. Maybe that means “I helped her set up access through her employer approved AI account” but it’s not exactly that common for such access to be set up by your husband. It just as plausibly means “she’s using the same personal account she’s using for the family tasks I also mentioned”. I don’t see that concern as naive so much as in tune with the way people frequently use tech.
Thank you, I am taken aback by the crazy reaction here. People assume doctors are some sort of tech illiterate luddites who would be throwing around PII left and right if they weren't restrained by us smart programmers?<p>She takes HIPAA very seriously, and yes she got Claude Code access through her workplace. I did not set up my personal CC account on her work computer and there is no way she would let me (or her corporate controls even if she did...)
who is "he"?
By MD, you surely mean Medicinae Doctor, a.k.a Doctor of Medicine, right?<p>If it's some other corpo-acronym, I would hope you would define the term before unleashing it on us normies.
Claude writes code just fine, and can create shareable "artifacts" that may have full backends, databases etc.<p>Claude Code is a poor fit for non-engineers, it carries a lot of features, vernacular, and patterns that don't make sense to people that don't code.<p>So I don't think this means much? All of the coding functionality a non-engineer could want is still available, just no need to switch to a different tab in the Claude app (or even worse the terminal).
A reasoning cited in the article is that there was no source control in place for the trade tooling that Goldman Sachs finance employees were building.<p>I'm guessing that + probably the absence of any deployment infrastructure for the finance people to be forced to use made Goldman Sachs' eyes widen and pull the plug immediately before something blows up (if it hasn't already internally).<p>I also wonder if a lack of diligence with Claude Code (or any LLM tool for that matter) resulted in private information getting leaked, and that feedback is just now getting back to them.<p>In terms of the big picture of the industry and the AI bubble though, yeah this isn't too big of a deal.
Claude is great at running scenarios. I think gs traders will be behind the other traders without these tools