related (and good writeup): <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50378228">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50378228</a>
Damien Miller also provided some further details on openssh-unix-dev@: <a href="https://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev&m=179388064263131&w=2" rel="nofollow">https://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev&m=179388064263131&w=2</a>
> because we have recently observed multiple cases of
rapid bug rediscovery by AI agents, sometimes within hours, and so now
consider long embargo periods to be a dangerous practice that primarily
benefits attackers.<p>Seems quite reasonable. It’s quite obvious that black hats have day jobs as White hats and have been privy to embargoes for probably decades.
Embargo should last at most to the moment fix is made and code passes test suite.<p>Anything longer is putting systems at danger. I can recompile the package with a patch (even if Ubuntu/RHEL takes 3 weeks to do it) myself in a pinch, and I'd like to have a chance for it before the bug gets re-discovered by malicious party
I think this is a long held belief of the project and why they have been excluded from bug embargo’s in the past.
Some earlier discussion: <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50377221">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50377221</a>
See also <a href="https://hachyderm.io/@damienmiller/117563026759098135" rel="nofollow">https://hachyderm.io/@damienmiller/117563026759098135</a>