10 comments

  • justicz1 hour ago
    I found this! I posted a semi-click-bait-ey tweet about it here [0], I think it’s important for people know how easy these bugs are to find now. It’s becoming borderline irresponsible not to audit your internet-facing code with modern AI tools.<p>[0] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;x.com&#x2F;just1cz&#x2F;status&#x2F;2118009777922228361" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;x.com&#x2F;just1cz&#x2F;status&#x2F;2118009777922228361</a>
    • DavCreator12 minutes ago
      <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;xnotme.com&#x2F;just1cz&#x2F;status&#x2F;2118009777922228361" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;xnotme.com&#x2F;just1cz&#x2F;status&#x2F;2118009777922228361</a>
    • sczi1 hour ago
      Nice work! A similar vulnerability in 2019 also found by you included the recommendation to update with:<p><pre><code> apt -o Acquire::http::AllowRedirect=false update apt -o Acquire::http::AllowRedirect=false upgrade </code></pre> Since this also involves redirects, would that protect users while updating apt for this one also?
    • justicz1 hour ago
      Speaking of which… if any of y’all work on security at OpenAI I have some questions for you about Daybreak! Please email me
  • hollow-moe48 minutes ago
    But how do I update apt if apt is untrustable until fixed ? Good ol&#x27; .deb scp&#x27;d in dpkg&#x27;d.
  • thewisenerd2 hours ago
    dupe (2h ago): <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=50364814">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=50364814</a>
  • SoftTalker1 hour ago
    How would an attacker inject a redirect into an apt package download?
    • mikepurvis1 hour ago
      MITM on the network, I guess like DNS takeover or the like.<p>So you pass through the upstream headers but then simulate a failure&#x2F;resume and supply different contents for the resumed download.
      • SoftTalker1 hour ago
        So apt doesn&#x27;t verify signatures on what is actually downloaded?
        • dinosaurdynasty56 minutes ago
          &gt; Improper file handling when resuming an HTTP download allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to replace a package after verification<p>from the OP<p>APT can use HTTPS, but often doesn&#x27;t, making a MITM attack easier (also the idea for a long time has been signatures are enough, and&#x2F;or TLS certs used to be a lot harder to get, but at this point you should really be using both).
          • SoftTalker34 minutes ago
            Still doesn&#x27;t make sense to me. So package A is downloaded, signature verified, then package B is downloaded, but somehow the package A file is replaced? Is it something like that?
    • jxie20041 hour ago
      [flagged]
  • 8organicbits2 hours ago
    I feel like they should release manual update instructions since the update mechanism is vulnerable. Although I see my systems already updated via unattended upgrades.<p>edit: On lobste.rs I see a recommendation for `apt download`: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;lobste.rs&#x2F;s&#x2F;h7bvma&#x2F;man_middle_arbitrary_code_execution" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;lobste.rs&#x2F;s&#x2F;h7bvma&#x2F;man_middle_arbitrary_code_executi...</a>
  • ChrisArchitect47 minutes ago
    Discussion here: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=50364814">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=50364814</a>
  • kitehosting52 minutes ago
    [flagged]
  • sick_of_slop58 minutes ago
    [dead]
  • opengrass2 hours ago
    [flagged]
    • klez1 hour ago
      I&#x27;m pretty sure apt is written in C++. Am I remembering wrong?
      • Palomides1 hour ago
        parts of apt are being redone in rust, but anyway this seems to be a logic bug (in c++ code)