Whoever failed to edit this CVE description down owes us all a bunch of our time back<p>Everyone using LLMs needs to stop shipping their first draft.
Thankfully the vast majority of servers are not creating MPTCP listeners by default (that I'm aware of).<p>Not sure why the article doesn't mention it, but you can specifically check for MPTCP listeners using `ss -M`.
<a href="https://go.dev/doc/go1.24" rel="nofollow">https://go.dev/doc/go1.24</a><p>> <i>ListenConfig now uses MPTCP by default on systems where it is supported (currently on Linux only).</i><p>This seems to imply basically any golang server built since February 2025 is going to be at least attempting to use it.
Yeah seems you're right...<p>Luckily though, ListenConfig lets you override this <a href="https://cs.opensource.google/go/go/+/refs/tags/go1.27.3:src/net/dial.go;l=867" rel="nofollow">https://cs.opensource.google/go/go/+/refs/tags/go1.27.3:src/...</a>
mptpcp usage is not a prerequisite
I fail to understand / find the gist of this article.<p>Article describes the technical aspects of the bug, how it got handled by different vendors...AI position on it...<p>But, one would always ask themselves, why did the author write this article? That part hasn't been clear to me even after going through much of the article.
This is a good portion just slop, another 9000 word article that could have been a couple of paragraphs. More text doesn't mean better.
There's other coverage, this just has most of the comments now<p>Ubuntu (34 points, 16 hours ago, 3 comments) <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50287647">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50287647</a><p>CVE.org (2 points, 7 hours ago) <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50295879">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50295879</a><p>GoogleGroups (slight tangent) <i>Go programs enable MPTCP by default, exposing them to Linux CVE-2026-98432</i> (9 points, 3 hours ago, 4 comments) <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50298526">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50298526</a>
It would have been about 50x less annoying if whoever was driving the LLM had simply told it to make a clickable top of page index/headers in markdown and divide it into sections and subsections by logical topic.
The overlaid HTML popup on that page for "Try The World's First Agentic AI Hacker." tool is cancerous and annoying. This should really be a link to a more reputable link for the CVE in question.<p>It doesn't appear until you've read the page for maybe 10-15 seconds, so if you're not seeing it, just wait.<p>It even managed to get past ublock origin, since there's no specific rule for it yet.
Would dropping these specialized ipv4 syn packets with extra header size beyond 20 bytes (as indicated by options value >5) with the firewall be low enough in the order of things to mitigate the attack? Like, iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --syn -m u32 --u32 "0>>24&0xF=6:15" -j DROP ?
There's no end to bugs like these in Linux. Millions of Lines of Code can easily hide many, many of these. Code that runs in supervisor mode.<p>None of this can ever affect seL4[0] nor a system built on it, due to its architecture.<p>0. <a href="https://sel4.systems/" rel="nofollow">https://sel4.systems/</a>
Given these types of security bugs that are being found left and right, I reckon there's going to be an uptick in hiring of software engineers to fix them.
I strongly doubt that. The fixes for most of these are trivial to the point it’s almost automated.
The resulting mechanical code change might be trivial. The bugs themselves are often decidedly not.<p>You're essentially saying that swallowing a pill is trivial, so therefore pharmaceutical engineering is.
There is a push for that, but the fixes (often as little as a one line Dockerfile change in some cases) still have to be tested and verified by a real engineer.<p>Otherwise everywhere would have patched already with AI.
I suspect a lot of organisations are already on automated AI detect-patch-redeploy loops for a lot of these types of issues.
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This one is quite serious and the type of vulnerability is once again, a C style memory corruption and a race condition combined; leading to an RCE.<p>At this point, we seriously need to discuss whether if the major projects still written in C such as Linux, Chromium and even git can even handle the stream of now near infinite bugs being discovered with AI.<p>Attackers are already rapidly finding and building exploits for those vulnerabilities the moment they are discovered with abliterated frontier-level models.<p>These sort of vulnerabilities are far to common in those projects and in the future, it will be extremely unsafe for even experts to continue using C or C++ in any way.
Unless someone vibecodes a new OS and convinces everyone to use it, we're stuck with what we got. Reaching feature parity with Linux and then debugging it to the point where it'd be usable is a gargantuan undertaking.
> Attackers are already rapidly finding and building exploits for those vulnerabilities the moment they are discovered with abliterated frontier-level models.<p>Are they? Distributions are rating this at a lower severity presumably because it can’t be easily exploited.
I bet there's a half-life to bugs though. Bugs might be infinite over the lifespan of a project, but the rate that they are <i>produced</i> goes down with our ability to detect them.<p>A lot are being found _now_ in projects written in C because the backlog of bugs to find is mostly written in C. We haven't yet gotten to the point when we're detecting most bugs before they're released, but we will.<p>Things won't get worse for too long. If we haven't already surpassed it, we're approaching the point of being able to do static analysis and ensure the mathematical correctness of the most complex C programs ever written so far.<p>I don't use C or C++, but look how much safer it is to use C or C++ these days.
Leading 'maybe' to an RCE, i imagine you need to groom the heap first, unless there is something i'm missing.<p>Edit: also thanks for using RCE correctly, it seems to be any kind of code execution these days is considered "RCE".. boo.
You severely underestimate humanity's goalpost moving capabilities.<p>The state of cope:<p>- models are still not intelligent, they're just like, uhh, really good <i>semantic</i> fuzzers! so you can just put them in the loop, they'll fuzz your code, and all is good :)<p>- the number of bugs is "finite", so - esp with agentic help - we'll just catch up and all will be good :)<p>Annoyingly, the cope frontier is kinda right about both of these, so the joke shall go on. The only real counter to it would be to bring up that this finiteness claim only really applies to a frozen set of security boundaries and attack surfaces, but they'll probably just raise this being "an academic tier concern" and just tell you to ""fuzz"" more.<p>So ironically, it looks like these practices are rescued once again, and the bare minimum stays winning. It also starts being moved to the territory of the magic box, but I guess nobody cares about that anymore. Local AI will just get really good too, fully competitive and self hostable even. Any day now.<p>From the horse's mouth, in case you were suspecting these descriptions to be in bad faith: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NnV_cWeoo5Q" rel="nofollow">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NnV_cWeoo5Q</a>