> On Mac, some command-line tools included with macOS or the Xcode Command Line Tools (including curl, git, python3, ruby, perl, and openssl) check certificates against /etc/ssl/cert.pem. For certificates that chain to a root CA certificate in this file, these tools don't check Apple's block or whether the certificate has been revoked. This file will be updated in a future macOS update. If you use these tools and don't want to wait for the update, you can remove root CA certificates from the file.<p>What a clusterfuck
Wonderful AWK command there. For those with hobbies other than AWK, here's what it does:<p><pre><code> - set variable s to that string: -v s='=== /C=IN/OU=emSign PKI/O=eMudhra Technologies Limited/CN=emSign ECC Root CA - G3'
- on lines matching the regex between //, set skip to false: /^(===|###) /{skip=0}
- on lines matching s, set skip to true: $0==s{skip=1}
- if skip is false, print the line: !skip
</code></pre>
Note the last part where it just says !skip without a curly braces. AWK defaults to print in that case.
Related: Ten days later, Git on macOS still trusts the compromised eMudhra certificates <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50271640">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50271640</a>
I'd really like to know why it's taking Apple so long to ship a fix. Especially if they can explain how to update an existing computer, what's the general holdup? Is it their release process? Is there some underlying complexity that's poorly understood?
that should really be a security update
I'm rally disappointed in the Apple response here. I can't understand why they wouldn't consider `/etc/ssl/cert.pem` in scope for a security update. This arbitrary boundary has no justification at all, and makes people less secure.<p>Come on Apple, do better.
There <i>is</i> justification for controlling the scope of security updates. Apple practices incredible defense in depth. This is one of the reasons they can claim such privacy guarantees compared to other vendors. But, I agree that they should have been able to update this file automatically, and hope they will add that capability for the next time something like this happens.
[flagged]
Good on Apple for providing such a detailed article. I disagree that they're doing badly by not updating this file remotely on current software versions in the wild -- most likely their Rapid Security Responses / Background Security Improvements framework does not already support this file, which is why they state a full operating system update will be required. Most likely that will be fixed for the future, but in the meantime, being transparent and open about what administrators can do about this <i>now</i> is the RIGHT APPROACH in this situation, and no other vendor has been nearly as thorough about documenting this.
Google, Microsoft, Mozilla, several TLS libraries and language runtimes, and even many Linux distros run by volunteers had this issue comprehensively fixed over a week ago: <a href="https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/#developers" rel="nofollow">https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/#developers</a><p>Meanwhile, it's unsafe to run `git clone` on macOS unless you manually edit some files, and then edit them again after a macOS update puts the dangerous root certificates back.<p>In what world has Apple been the most "thorough"?
Apple has been the most thorough in documenting this transparently and honestly. They didn't have the process for updating that file in the wild, and most likely that will be fixed.<p>Apple security updates, especially automatic ones, likely don't have the capability to simply write to arbitrary files on the system or run arbitrary commands at install time. Of all vendors, certainly from Apple I'd expect this.<p>Most likely, other vendors either already used a similar store as the root of trust system-wide (didn't have their own separate security stacks), or their security updates do have the ability to write anywhere or do anything.<p>And of course, Linux distros and other platforms where the component can be updated separately from the operating system have an even easier time.<p>This is not Apple intentionally leaving terminal users high and dry. The article literally is the proof otherwise while they no-doubt work on a better solution.
All of that is Apple's fault - they designed and created MacOS. It's not like they're publishing to a third party platform.<p>Why would I judge Apple only on the quality of this docs page (which is good) but not on their poor work that resulted in this situation in the first place?
This is a legacy BSD store that macOS inherited. Apple has their own security stack that already responded to the incident within 2 hours in most cases, which means all first-party and most third-party apps were already covered. They seemingly just didn't have a mechanism to update the legacy BSD store out-of-band, which is more of an oversight than "poor work".
There are so many "likely" in this comment that I don't know if I should care about a single word at all. Looks pure speculation if not fiction to me.<p>Looking forward to a comment that is much more grounded than substantial than this.
The article states a software update will be required to fix the store:<p>> can still accept these certificates until a future software update<p>This suggests they don't have the capability to patch it with Rapid Security Responses / Background Security Improvements, given that they haven't.<p>Sure, I speculate that they likely would have already if they could have. Sure, I speculate that if they couldn't have, they might add the capability for the future. Sure, I speculate about why they wouldn't have already had a process for this. Whatever whatever. Disregard all that if you want, but the fact remains in the article.
My reply to a deleted reply:<p>> I'm sorry, but how is revoking a bad cert not supported in an easy way? Along with adding a cert and using it to establish a secure connection, that seems to be the core features of a cert store?<p>> Yet somehow, you manage to come to the conclusion that the vendor requiring manual work is the most thorough? I mean, in documenting their failure, maybe.<p>> With all their talk of caring about user privacy, this seems incompetent at best.<p>To be fair other vendors almost universally don't document their failures at all or provide any remediation steps to users whatsoever. I always enjoy the exceptions to this rule, but it's not the norm whatsoever.<p>You seem to be ignoring that Apple's security framework responded to the incident within about 2 hours in most cases. Safari and other macOS apps were protected right off the bat.<p>It's only this legacy BSD store that needs an OS update, almost certainly because they simply didn't already have a process in place to update it out-of-band. Because they're vertically integrated, they probably don't have an arbitrary do-anything feature that can paper over the lack of foresight here, like other vendors might.<p>I'd honestly consider that a feature, but sure, the benefits would outweigh the risks in this one particular case.
They're doing badly because they have a market cap at 5 trillion USD ($5,070,000,000,000 to $5,110,000,000,000) and chose to ditch the first principals of a CA store. Doing impressive backflips to compensate for lack of understanding first principals is exactly that.
Can you explain what first principles you mean? /etc/ssl/cert.pem has been a fairly standard convention on BSDs, and Linux distros usually have an equivalent somewhere too, like for example /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt.<p>I don't blame Apple for overlooking it when they have their own security stack that all their own apps use, which already responded to the incident within two hours of the revocation. As another commenter pointed out, Terminal commands probably just weren't a priority of their threat model. I do hope they fix that, but mentioning their market cap is not gonna help here.
Where exactly is it good, that:<p>* apple told admins how to fix the vulnerability
* apple shipped update 27.2, with no fix (today)
* the update reverted the admin fix quietly
> most likely their Rapid Security Responses / Background Security Improvements framework does not already support this file<p>Why would it support this file? Are CA trust stores really that important? /s<p>> and no other vendor has been nearly as thorough about this<p>1. That's totally not true. Apple has messed up something that is trivial to fix.
2. The EU's CRA is going to crush them if they don't get their shit together.