It's 5:20 AM here in Europe and I just rotated a bunch of keys.<p>Only to read,<p>> <i>Because deployments are paused, you will not be able to redeploy your services to pick up the new credentials until builds are restored. We will post here when builds resume with any additional details.</i><p>So now my service <i>does not work</i>. Which is worse: a stolen key or a broken product? I'm genuinely regretting following their advice on rotating keys, because logs showed no sign of incorrect usage, and our service would at least have remained online.<p>I hope that they automatically redeploy their customer services. I just worry that I won't have tested it. I mean: 5AM. Keys changed. Nothing more I can do. Should go back to sleep. No timeline to wake up to check deployments, so... I... wait?
They only re-enabled the redeploy feature for Pro and Enterprise customers, leaving users on Hobby plans unable to redeploy...<p>Making a security incident recovery a paid feature is a new low. I guess this is how they plan to recoup the money they lost from the incident.
I don’t know if this is a real question, but for <i>most credentials</i> a stolen key is worse than downtime on a product.
Live by the sass, die by the sass.
If it's a serious key like AWS or Zendesk then you're probably screwed the instant it gets stolen.
No, a leaked credential is a nothing event in a mass leak as far as expected loss goes.<p>You’re better off waiting and monitoring until you’re sure you can get back online if your service supports any kind of revenue.
A nothing event? Having access to our database is a nothing event? For most applications, all they keys a businesses castle are stored in a platform providers parameter store / secret key system. Downtime is bad for customers and slightly bad for a business. Stolen credentials are critical for both.
A stolen key isn't just a key to your customers' private data.<p>It's a key to your creditcard. Your revenue will be wiped out if you get the AWS bill after hackers booted hundreds of GPU instances under your account, moved terabytes in your data-transfer budgetm, burned tens of thousands of CPU-minutes in github actions under your creditcard, or used thousands of $s worth of tokens with your AI provider.
If that nothing event can cause not only loss of revenue, but loss of everything, I'd rather sleep soundly than panicking 7/24 until a fix arrives.<p>From Margin Call:<p>> It's just money; it's made up. Pieces of paper with pictures on it so we don't have to kill each other just to get something to eat.
<i>> No, a leaked credential is a nothing event in a mass leak as far as expected loss goes.</i><p>Even if that were not absolutely wrong¹ these days², if your risk is mitigated by being one of millions the damage done if you are hit could still be so high that you can't afford to³ knowingly take that risk.<p>--------<p>[1] if the credentials can be easily linked to the relevant account, cycling through them to see what useful stuff can be accessed using which is not difficult to quickly automate<p>[2] if it were ever right<p>[3] or your customers can't afford for you to
What are you talking about.
Late stage capitalism at its finest; protect the profits at all costs.<p>Thankfully, they clarified they're in Europe, so GDPR prevents them from ignoring known leaked credentials, lest they have that to deal with, on top of the revenue loss they'll make when all of their customers eventually find out: "they ran leaked credentials knowing our data was at risk, but decided to suck it and see".
Spend limits saved me. I noticed a massive spike on one of my Anthropic keys and couldn't figure out where it was coming from. It hit the cap in one day, which isn't normal. So I rotated it just to be safe. I went to update it in Railway only to find out that I couldn't do deploys, so I also have a broken product. The good news is that it's only serving around 300 users, but still. Not great.
how the hell are they able to resell the keys and be able to take profit from that is beyond my imagination. Is not money what they are stoling and they are still able to take advantage of it.<p>With cloud credentials I understand that they are able to create machines, but with api keys... what they are able to do to take profit from?
The customers of my company are angry. It is 9.45 AM here in SE Asia. Things are bad.
It's now 6 hours later and still builds are taking more than 1 hour or failing completely, complete mess
Same situation. Frankly unbelievable - how do you not lead with this? You can't tell customers to rotate their keys and not inform them in the same breath them that actually, environment variable updates currently cannot deploy.
They're actively firefighting an incident, and are likely going to make some mistakes along the way. In this case, they've erred on the side of security over availability, which in some cases is the better outcome. I know not in all, but some.
I think they meant you can't deploy new code. I had zero problems rotating an env variable earlier (and restarting my container)
They did.
No. They did not. From <a href="https://blog.railway.com/p/security-disclosure-wednesday-october-21st" rel="nofollow">https://blog.railway.com/p/security-disclosure-wednesday-oct...</a> :<p>> <i>What you should do: As such, we strongly recommend that you immediately roll all environment variables, including any API keys, stored in Railway, as well as any private registry credentials, and review logs for those services for unusual activity.</i><p>> <i>All deployments are paused while we investigate. Until builds are restored, you will not be able to roll out new versions. We apologize for this inconvenience.</i><p>They lead with rotating keys.<p>Next, I did not realize that this meant not being able to restart an existing deployment to bring up new env vars. They also speak of builds. I don’t need a new build. I need my existing deployment to work.<p>It was not at all clear ‘paused’ mean this; maybe I should have realized, but I had interpreted it as doing new deployments or builds. New services. Code changes. New builds as they even say. It’s fully reasonable to pause that in this sort of situation and so I had interpreted their statement that way.<p>If there is a clear impact from following advice — ‘do what we recommend and your service will not function’ — those who provide that advice need to make that clear.
Their first message where they recommended rotating keys did not make that clear (though obviously if you cannot deploy, rotating keys means you will go down)
Yeah. OpenRouter disabled my keys because of this and now i'm in a catch-22
Why even use railway?
Yeah, I had to rotate my data store keys ASAP. Now I'm stuck with a broken application. Best option, horrible option.
Naive question: why would someone trust private keys and other secrets to a service provider?
Crazy day for cybersecurity: PHP RCE, eMudhra certificates, and now Railway.<p>And it’s all just getting started imo.<p><a href="https://blog.cloudflare.com/emudhra-certificate-compromise" rel="nofollow">https://blog.cloudflare.com/emudhra-certificate-compromise</a><p><a href="https://www.wiz.io/blog/php2shell-php-rce" rel="nofollow">https://www.wiz.io/blog/php2shell-php-rce</a>
I think the pingcap hack might be the biggest of them all, somehow it has gone under the radar.<p>[0] <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50173716">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50173716</a>
I guess I picked the wrong week to stop sniffing glue.
Related ongoing thread:<p><i>PingCap TiDB Leaks</i> - <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50173716">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50173716</a> - Oct 2026 (32 comments)<p>(It had only spent 3 hours on the frontpage so I re-upped it.)
I find it wild how much they have downplayed this in their statement. <a href="https://www.pingcap.com/trust-hub/security/security-update-october-2026/" rel="nofollow">https://www.pingcap.com/trust-hub/security/security-update-o...</a><p>”An external incident response firm reviewed PingCAP’s production systems and found no evidence that the attacker ran commands or maintained persistent access in the systems reviewed”<p>hmm, I don't think that's true.
"Found no evidence" doesn't mean it didn't happen, it means the incident response firm didn't find it.
Plaid is listed as a customer. Good times.
Honestly…I’ve never heard of pingcap
That was a single company, the cert problem hit something like 70% of <i>all websites and devices</i>.
yes, how is nobody talking about this
pingcap breach is crazy...
Jesus that one is bad
<p><pre><code> > We even stood up a replication feed of their own control-plane database using credentials committed in their own repositories — GCP service-account keys and an Azure service principal — and let their infrastructure deliver it to us. Every six hours, for the last twenty-two days of the campaign, from 8 September to 30 September, that pipeline faithfully re-exported every table of the operational heart of TiDB Cloud — tenants, users, API keys, cluster credentials, changefeeds, migrations — and pushed it out. Eighty-eight consecutive exports, not one detection event.
</code></pre>
I can’t even
Also GitLab<p><a href="https://docs.gitlab.com/releases/patches/patch-release-gitlab-19-5-1-released/" rel="nofollow">https://docs.gitlab.com/releases/patches/patch-release-gitla...</a>
And about 50+ sev 9+ CVEs for the linux kernel
It seems the bugocalypse (or however you write that) has landed.
Yea, and I feel like we'll experience more like this
And litellm too
"It's just marketing" HN mostly told us
I thought we solved cybersecurity with Mythos and it was the "death of cybersecurity" according to media
Being that guy, I say cybersecurity is an oxymoron with the messy and heterogenous implementation of identifying the authorised actor. For example passwords are known like two decades or more being frail and vulnerable, yet that's the backbone of security after all those years? So it had to be patched and scaffolded with various techniques like 2FA and one time codes. Still, different ways in all places, so users resort putting all their eggs in one basket just to be able to get moving, storing secrets and keys in one place, handing over to someone on the internet, while calling it progress and the edge of technology. It feels like for a frustrated user who needs to fight through daily identifications in at least one or two of the dozens of systems (distracting from productive work) that the poor person is forced to use as everything must be put on the net regardless if it is better that way or not, it is modern and good for the developer. All in the name of security, so poor user starts to write things down or put all the eggs in one basket in other ways, aggravating the password situation and exposing/risking his life and livelihood. As we see from the frustrated folks in various threads here on HN too.<p>I do not thing there is (any) security in cyberspace, and this is exposed big now with the use of AI.
[dead]
Postiz founder posted on X that his service is being brought down, his keys were already used and Railway was quiet about this until he spoke up:<p><a href="https://x.com/wickedguro/status/2113015432974405658" rel="nofollow">https://x.com/wickedguro/status/2113015432974405658</a>
I already moved my big customers off Railway after an earlier incident this year that leaked customer data.
It’s a stunningly horrible situation to not be able to cycle environment variables after such an event.
I did an emergency migration to fly.io today with minimal disruption today.
I’d recommend everyone to immediately migrate somewhere else ASAP so you can change environment variables.
And of course never give Railway a cent more of your money.
Right just as I take my first day off (for the entire year!) from work to fly out for a vacation. The mother of all security bombs starts dropping all around stacks and services that I am responsible for. How else could have taken time off go for me…
Brother do not cancel anything for these people, they do not care about you, it's their fault for not considering bus factor in their org chart. Why can't the person above you handle that?
Rob: They're not real. You get that, right? None of it is real. The critics aren't real. The customers aren't real. Because... <i>this</i> isn't real.<p>Chef Finway: [laughing awkwardly] Okay...<p>Rob: Derek, why do you care about these people? They don't care about you. None of them. They don't even know you because you haven't shown them. Every day, you'll wake up, and there'll be less of you. You live your life for them, and they don't even see you. You don't even see yourself.<p>[long pause; Derek's tight smile has slowly faded into a look of sorrow and regret]<p>Rob: We don't get a lot of things to really care about.
Prioritize your mental health, go enjoy your vacation.
Thanks, yes I will. Left without the laptop(s). Let the chips fall where they lay. If they need me back so urgently, they will have to go through the full cancellation of booked flights and hotels first. Lets enjoy the time off.
Strongly concur
Not your problem. Enjoy your vacation. Bus factor of 1 is poor planning of leadership.
Take more days off. Today was my first day back after 2.5 weeks.
Either a) your company will reimburse you for your costs incurred and give you a different week off, or b) they don’t need you there that badly.
I say this as a Railway customer, go take your vacation. The only time you should even reconsider is a massive bonus plus more time off for staying.
Services you <i>were</i> responsible for
None of this matters if you zoom out.
Seen multiple folks in the Railway Discord confirming that their secrets stored in Railway have been used by third parties, so it definitely sounds like the attackers were able to read decrypted environment variables.
Environment variables are a terrible place to store secrets.<p>I'm just going to say it, since having said it non-stop for over 20 years, nobody seems to listen and we keep circling this drain.<p>The 12 Factor manifesto was 100% wrong on this point.<p>Use environment variables to point to where secrets are located, not to store their values.
It doesn't sound like they got them via a shell environment, they just hacked into the place that stored them. If the place you store secrets can be hacked into, it doesn't really matter if they are injected into environment variables or not.
Environment variables are generally fine for secrets. Environment <i>files</i> are problematic. Modern systems that inject secrets into the environment launch the program itself.
(pre-caveat thing to not be massively annoyingly pedantic throughout, I'm not a security buff and I know who it is I'm talking to, I'm not trying to correct them)<p>I'm not sure I get the difference - the issue I would have thought was having the system code have access to the secrets themselves? Env file vs env vars injected at runtime seems the same there - either can be exfiltrated. The difference would be having it injected when used.<p>Is the problem with files about what happens outside that, being committed, etc?
Everything can be exfiltrated. If you never store the environment in a durable file, it's not meaningfully easier to exfiltrate from the environment than from process memory. Most of the wisdom about the insecurity of environment variables falls out of people setting them in .profile or in .envrc files --- <i>that's</i> very bad, yes, as are configuration files (the thing 12 Factor Apps was responding to).<p>The headline here is that there's no reason to believe "environment variables" were the reason this data was breached; presumably, the database those variables came from was what actually got hit.
> Use environment variables to point to where secrets are located, not to store their values.<p>Now your apps need to be able to read the secret that is pointed to, as opposed to the task runner populating the secret and the app would not know about the details.Not to mention the changes it entails to development.
How does this help? If your container gets compromised it's trivial to exfiltrate the secrets.
Or we could just use our operating systems for the things we do well, and have a service to send our API calls to that inserts the appropriate token.<p>I don't have to enter my Mac's password every time I open an app.
systemd makes it easy: <a href="https://systemd.io/CREDENTIALS/" rel="nofollow">https://systemd.io/CREDENTIALS/</a>
Yup, got my OpenRouter key. They managed to run up a whole $2 on Opus 5.5 and Fable. Well, time for a new hosting provider I guess...<p>Incidentally, I'm testing Muse as an email triage agent today - it buried "oh also, railway and anthropic say yours keys have been leaked and you need to rotate asap" under 50 routine deploy / admin emails notifications. Oh to live through such an AI powered software renaissance!
I have a bad gut feeling that every day is going to look a bit like today with endless urgent patches and breaches.<p>Fwiw it sounds similar to the hack over the weekend that opencode suffered.
The security team at my company is working with a frontier lab to scan all our code/systems. They are in a borderline panic to close every possible issue, even innocuous ones that are buried under defense in depth. Whatever they are seeing from our partner has them spooked -- as in "acceptable risk" is no longer a thing anymore.
The internet is over. We are going back to static htmls for public pages, and Point to Point VPN bases connections for B2B service provision.<p>B2C? too risky to publish services online haha.
>We are going back to static htmls for public pages...<p>God yes, please. I backpack and mountaineer in the PNW and have been trying to research trip ideas up in British Columbia, and as a result I discovered <a href="https://bivouac.com" rel="nofollow">https://bivouac.com</a>.<p>Here's a website that's still frequently used by a large number of people as a valuable resource, is regularly updated and maintained, and yet looks like it's straight out of 1995.<p>Every pages loads instantaneously, everything is <i>simple</i> yet packed with detail, and it's such a basic, straightforward, delightfully pleasant experience to just browse through the site. I was so thrilled after just 5 minutes on the site that I threw them $25 for a year's full access.<p>Sorry for the tangent, but oh man, it's such a refreshingly stark contrast to the rest of the bullshit that fills the web these days.
Still some industries where you cable colocated servers in a shared DC together where neither server has internet access.
Static HTML, yeah.<p>Not sure about VPN. Seems likely to provide a false sense of security.
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I fully believe the only sustainable future is that hot patching will need to itself become fully automated. Hot patch now with a minimal allowed amount of line changes to head off the AIs, review it in office hours for auditing and the team is actually awake.<p>My second belief is that environment variables as a development concept will need to be retired. If it's something that causes a security breach if it by its mere existence on a public git repo, it is information that by design cannot ever pass to a filesystem out of a chain of trust, not by mere development conventions people choose to adhere to.
<i>> hot patching will need to itself become fully automated.</i><p>Great, even less control over the things we use and more power ceded to corporations.
Due to the small nature of hot patching (eg. bump this dependency, rotate these keys, turn off that config, follow the runbook) it will unlikely need to be a frontier model and is likely able to be done LocalLLM/Jev style decision making rather than having to hand all the keys to frontier model operators.
One more step to just turning it all over to Skynet. It's hilarious how prophetic that movie was.
Do you want your shit hacked? Better patch.
Hot patching is itself a liability
It's only just starting. It'll get worse before it gets better.
I think the only way out is to go back to on-prem for everything, like in the 00s.<p>LAN cables will go up in price soon.
Ha, Cyberpunk 2077 is becoming reality. We're proposing the Blackwall.
coincidence?<p><a href="https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20261020736847/en/Blackwall-Raises-%24100M-at-%242.2B-Valuation-to-Scale-Its-Global-Web-Traffic-Management-Platform-for-the-Hosting-Market" rel="nofollow">https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20261020736847/en/Bla...</a>
That was always going to happen. The future of the internet is AIs scamming you and your grandmother, ransomwaring you, draining your back accounts, etc. There will be no reason or rhyme, it's simply a function of available compute and ease of automation, both of which have reached a critical threshold.
"So you want to build your own data center?"<p><a href="https://blog.railway.com/p/data-center-build-part-one" rel="nofollow">https://blog.railway.com/p/data-center-build-part-one</a>
I think we'll see a reduction in complexity and an increase in transparency, rather than just on-prem.<p>One medium-sized server can now easily serve the entire banking system of a large country. So you don't need clusters of servers with careful tradeoffs between consistency and availability because of the CAP theorem.<p>Just get a big honking host, slap Postres on it, and run your application server in a VM on the same host. For backup, export the WAL logs from Postgres onto your favorite off-site blob storage. UI for it? There's Pigsty.<p>It still makes sense to host this in a cloud provider, just because you probably don't want to deal with actual hardware. And maybe get a second standby server for redundancy.<p>That's it.<p>You'll need a bunch of external dependencies for email, 2FA, observability, LLMs, and so on. But they should all be outgoing dependencies that should not allow access back into your system.
How does on-prem help if your product is a SaaS.
You open a SaaS shop where people come to use it
Instead of being a SaaS it will need to just become a S
You put the SaaS into a Box your customers can install into their datacenter!
What a brave new concept!<p>Sometimes I do miss owning the hardware to run a thing.<p>What I don't miss was having all of those appliances run a different base distro of Linux, each with varying levels of update support, while the security team keeps reading security scans to me.
Like back when you could rent a Google appliance.
surely once there's been enough patches the code will be perfect though?
Train wreck. People were writing on discord 3 hours ago, 10 hours after the incident started, that keys created just for railway were running up usage. Meanwhile builds have been down for more than 12 hours. Only NOW did they just send out an email to all customers. I wouldn't have found out until then if I wasn't checking the discord periodically.
Hi Angelo from Railway here. This is very much me. <a href="https://x.com/ngeloxyz/status/2113077263386239309?s=20" rel="nofollow">https://x.com/ngeloxyz/status/2113077263386239309?s=20</a><p>We have gotten a lot of comments about why didn't we just message the breach sooner when people have noticed compromise with their accounts. I think that crit is fair and justified, and although we have been up for days on end- I don't blame you if you don't have sympathy for us.<p>Our thought process was that we didn't want to recommend that people roll keys when we couldn't possibly confirm that we confidently plugged the breach and rolled the mitigation(s). I am comfortable to publicly say that this was a highly motivated attacker. Meanwhile, our threat team mitigates DDoSes, CVEs, while been patching everything immediately as dealt with exploits.<p>As for this breach in particular, we tried to balance a duty to warn, which we take very seriously... However, it took a significant amount of time on the order of hours to verify, reviewing, and keep up with the attacker as they attempted to move laterally around, and briefly, within the system. We didn't want message anything beyond a shadow of a doubt that there were no further exploit paths.<p>We take the view that we would like to "aviate, navigate, then communicate" when we deal with incidents like these then we prepared communications to the public and all users. While it was ongoing, we were in contact with external partners and vendors to revoke keys (the source of some online chatter) with investigators that required time and coordination.<p>On the incident side of the house, it's a suite of bad options, we're still in the middle of it making sure customers are safe. But, hopefully this offers a view into our thought process.<p>Formal postmortem after we fully restore service and complete the investigation. Apologies to all, I personally I feel like I let everyone down.
> and although we have been up for days on end- I don't blame you if you don't have sympathy for us.<p>From my timezone, this started last night and is ongoing into today. Has this been going for longer than the status page and email indicated? If so, why was notification delayed so long?<p>I love your product, have an incredible amount of sympathy for you as humans (having been in similar sleep-consuming nightmares) and was willing to forgive the GCP-triggered outage as an understandable teething pain, but sadly this response has really knocked my confidence.<p>I understand the hard reality of security issues -- "urgently rotate your keys, they're already compromised" is an important message to share -- but "sorry, that will also require your site going down because we've blocked deploys" (presumably as a response to the incident...) is an incredibly frustrating situation to find ourselves in.
I also want to briefly note that communicating, from the outset, "this is a significant incident, your keys are compromised, the attack is ongoing and you cannot enter new keys as _those too will be compromised_" is a better response than leaving people to figure out the unfortunate combo endpoint of "my keys are compromised, I have rotated them, this has broken my site but I have new keys, and oh surprise, I can't deploy". The full story needed to be communicated more clearly; the email just said "revoke your keys", which I urgently did... and then remembered/found out that changing environment variables requires a deploy.<p>I would rather have known earlier that I should put a notice on my site, or my own social media, or notify my own customers ASAP and disable some functionality (or make my own choice about porting somewhere else as a mitigation) than get caught out like this after the horse has bolted and it turns out you've been desperately trying to get it back into the paddock for days.
> Our thought process was that we didn't want to recommend that people roll keys when we couldn't possibly confirm that we confidently plugged the breach and rolled the mitigation(s). I am comfortable to publicly say that this was a highly motivated attacker. Meanwhile, our threat team mitigates DDoSes, CVEs, while been patching everything immediately as dealt with exploits.<p>> As for this breach in particular, we tried to balance a duty to warn, which we take very seriously... However, it took a significant amount of time on the order of hours to verify, reviewing, and keep up with the attacker as they attempted to move laterally around, and briefly, within the system. We didn't want message anything beyond a shadow of a doubt that there were no further exploit paths.<p>Once you realize there is compromise, you message accordingly, as soon as you are able. If you can't immediately determine exactly what subset of customers were affected, this means you have to tell everyone. Then you provide follow-up updates to fill in gaps as you develop your understanding of scope+impact and work on remediation.<p>What you should never do is hold off on reaching out to possibly affected stakeholders that they may be affected by a compromise because you still have uncertainties about current status.<p>A situation like this does not in any way a constitute a dilemma or tough balance regarding when or to whom to do initial disclosure - you do it as soon as you can, to everyone except those you know are not impacted.
"aviate, navigate, then communicate" only matters if you are the one in control of outcomes.<p>Customers could have simply revoked keys and <i>not</i> re-launched services with rolled credentials (that from your post, may have been re-stolen), but instead you let this fester.<p>What a disaster for Railway. I hope you get through this stressful moment, but this should be the end of Railway.
You know... I get it.<p><pre><code> Railway / OpenAI: I had a key compromised this morning. It hit our limit, so I revoked the key... and figured, well, we'll have to track down the leak.
Then this security notice came out, telling all of their customers to rotate all their keys... As the guy whose spent the entire evening rotating keys and etc. doing
this is... it's a huge message to send.
The cost and implications go really far.
We have many production services that we've taken offline or disabled because we can't deploy to fix the credentials. because of the railway deploy problem...
Railway was stuck between some pretty nasty tradeoffs. I get that the few hour delay in communication caused some of us more cost, issues, and potential breach... and maybe larger suff.
But I also realize that rolling the keys while things may still be compromised, with deployments blocked, could make thins even more sticky
leaves only very bad options. Also we don't know how much they we're spending time actively stopping the attack. the time and focus could be very much consumed. if it was 5% of exposure and they prevented the 95% exposure.. i'm sure glad they aviated instead of communicated.
We make the best decision we can in these moments.. and they all just suck.</code></pre>
I was a loyal railway customer for a while, but this response smacks of "we didn't want people to know" instead of "we wanted to take responsibility."<p>The options railway has given us are "rotate your keys and bring down your service" or "keep your service up and let the exposed keys remain at risk." Kind of a crap position, no? Mistakes are going to happen, but when the suggested mitigations are to stab yourself in the leg or stab yourself in the ass, it's hard to be sympathetic.<p>I have to imagine quite a few users are asking their agents to port their stacks over to alternate providers like I am. The cost of switching has never been cheaper thanks to AI.
IMO "aviate, navigate, then communicate" does not work in this situation. There is more than one pilot. The moment you detected a breach, hell, even knowing that an attacker was inside your system, you should have pointed to anyone. Hell, even AI, to draft a disclosure with more info coming.
Jeez, what a rough past 24 hours for all security folk. Hang in there
It's going to be a rough decade.
I really don't know how we are going to deal with accelerated exploit generation via LLMs — it blows up the disclosure processes we've evolved.<p>The only thing I can think of is hunkering down with static HTML to reduce attack surface, but that's laughably incompatible with many many business requirements.
In new software I write these days I limit the number of external dependencies and mostly vibe code anything I need besides the most critical foundational libraries (increasingly I am replacing these as well).<p>I think this, the supply chain attacks and binary reverse engineering will cause us to go back to thin clients, html over the wire and vibe coded libs instead of external open source deps.
Vibe coding deps is security through obscurity, with all of its weaknesses (and strengths). It's not that such deps have fewer security bugs than the open source reference implementations from which they are derived, it's just that those bugs are currently less discoverable.<p>In the near to medium term, the current open source regime has issues because bugs have become extremely discoverable and easy to exploit. But I am skeptical that obscurity will provide vibe coded deps sufficient protection over the long term. As soon as the source code for those vibe-coded deps leaks, you are screwed.
It's not just obscurity, it's increasingly difficult to trust the governance and quality of code of any outside library. A lot of deps in code are unnecessary you use maybe 1-10% of the api surface. But since building and maintaining software can be cheaper now it can be better to maintain a 1-5k LOC vibe coded version that meets your security bar than to trust an external party's governance & quality. This has the additional benefit of reconsidering if you even need the dep or if you can reuse something you already have (since you may not want to maintain the lib).
> it's increasingly difficult to trust the governance and quality of code of any outside library<p>The value of 'code written before 2024' is going to be substantially higher than of code written afterwards.<p>Sort of like a 'low background steel', a comparison someone made on HN before which I think was pretty good.
I really doubt that. If these models continue to improve, they will be producing higher quality code than, maybe not the best human developers, but certainly the average human developer who would have typically been writing code on these systems.<p>Pre-2024 code is full of human-written vulnerabilities.
This only applies to its value in regards to training data for LLMs.
Limiting the number of dependencies is always good, within reason. Especially with eco-systems that want to pull in everything and the kitchen sink. That's just asking for a supply chain attack. I try to limit myself to what well reputed distros provide and what I can review. That's still no guarantee but it cuts down the risk substantially.
I think it will kill open source to some degree. I found it already very hard to imagine how the endless queues of issues were being dealt with so diligently, but at least there was a human on the other side. The torrent that is unleashed now is not manageable on a human scale. It's a highly automated arms race with a bunch of good-willing humans caught in the crossfire between large companies and criminals duking it out.
Could open source activity transition towards provably correct software, with far more modest feature sets?<p>I don't have experience with proof based tools, so I'm not sure what's feasible.
Business requirements will have to change. All your competitors are under the same pressure with the same shitty set of options, after all.
It already _is_ a rough decade. I have hated the 20s so damn much.
Yeah, the future of our jobs in this industry... for the type of work we do. are concerning. Explosure has whole new meaning
It feels like the only solution is going to be proactively running your own AI agents looking for patches and applying them.
The issue is where to direct the LLM's attention.<p>Prompting the LLM to "look for vulnerabilities in PHP's multipart upload handling code" is going to find stuff that "look for vulnerabilities in PHP" won't.
Does any one know of good feeds that we should be pulling or scraping from?
I think the proactive nature here is seriously important.
Yes, so who will pay for that? Open source so far meant you would use your brains and your creativity, now you need to use your money too if you want to keep pace. From a 'guts, credits & glory' proposition to 'slop processor if you can afford it' is not really an upgrade.
Or, you know, use client certificates so the bots can’t hit you.<p>Those can leak / be stolen of course, but a bunch of my clients php apis survived as without a cert they’re told to fuck right off.<p>It does make their client onboarding a bit harder but it’s a trade off which seems to have been the right one.
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I'm already tired, between pushing back on vibe coded internal projects being put onto the internet and then the constant barrage of CVEs that mean nothing.<p>Then you have real security incidents that you need to tune into constantly.
job security!
I have a bad feeling about all the recent news. Woke up today to the Railway email and rotated all my keys. Checked my OpenRouter dashboard and, to my surprise, there were API calls to Anthropic models I didn’t make. Luckily I have all my limits set to $25 a month...<p>Interestingly enough, from the logs they were only using Anthropic as the provider, with a Go HTTP client. Pretty sure the main target was LLM API keys...
As an european, just woke up to this, wow crazy.<p>All my apps are on Railway, deployments has been down since yesterday morning (24 hours), feels nuts that they have waited until 2AM to say this.
How is it possible rotate keys if you disable deployments? You're basically telling us to take our services offline...
What about buckets? I tried to regenerate my secrets but deploys are paused. I don't know if they actually rotated or not because the old keys seem to still be working! Dear attackers, please don't read or mutate my files while my app is offline :)
I've already taken my applications offline and will be migrating to a new host...
In general, the new host will have its own problems, otherwise you would've used them to begin with.
I'm curious where you decided to go
Yep. What an incredibly frustrating notice. I like Railway and I guess their hands are tied here, but wow.
I rotated mine. If you just change the keys and hit deploy it works
Saw someone on Twitter indicating that they did this, and new keys got compromised.
It appears to work in the UI, but go test your product. Mine didn't receive the new keys.
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> As such, we strongly recommend that you immediately roll all environment variables, including any API keys, stored in Railway, as well as any private registry credentials, and review logs for those services for unusual activity.<p>> All deployments are paused<p>Can you explain us how can we rotate secrets without going down too?
It’s funny that every security breach disclosure now has a mandatory “the attacker used AI!” as if it absolves you from having to maintain a secure system. If anything it makes the situation more damning. If it was possible to find exploits using AI then your own red teaming should have found them before the attacker did.
Defending is so much harder than attacking. You don't even have to focus on one target, as you can just mass-AI-script a lot of attacks wherever it's possible, and see what sticks. Even if you did everything right, there's always the social-engineering angle, or a single compromised device, or just accidental bad upgrade through supply chain. If you can mass-spread the seed, and plant something that "calls home" constantly, you can just have an agent that would start the attack the minute it gets infected, and go deeper.<p>It's really a wild west right now, have no idea how we fix it. I'm assuming everything will get more concentrated in big co's hands, as having a very robust security is extremely hard.<p>Also, we have to agree that younger people will start companies. There will be small companies that cannot afford red teams. There will be companies that are just not equipped, and their profit margins cannot sustain constant attacks.
> It’s funny that every security breach disclosure now has a mandatory “the attacker used AI!”<p>This isn't in the article? They do not at all claim "the attacked used AI!".<p>The only mention of "AI" is "We believe this is part of a series of attacks recently targeting platform companies with the aim of compromising AI inference providers." This is the same (apparently) end-goal as the Opencode breach last week, and is not blaming or finger-point at AI. It is stating (rightfully) that AI inference is very easy to resell and turn stolen credentials into cash.
> your own red teaming should have found them before the attacker did<p>Easier said than done. The defender has to do everything right, all the time, to prevent a headline like this. The attacker only needs to be right once, and it's game over. AI or no AI.
It's a nice saying, but if you did enough things right, the attacker still needs multiple things to line up in order to get anything of value, <i>if you get everything right</i>. No one competent who's doing everything right is leaving open S3 buckets open to the world. Doing some things right means using multiple buckets, using multiple time limited-keys with limited read-only access, using special write-access, not having admin keys on developer laptops, a SIEM system that monitors buckets for traffic going in & out and sending emails (both amount and who it's going to) to the person on call. A firewall (inc IP-address-based blocks so eg China can't access the customer data from China at all). A WAF.<p>That's not an exaustive list but if the attacker gets one of those "right" once, it is not game over. (They aren't of equal strength, mind you.)
Unless they edited the post, they never said this. You should delete this; it's false information.
I didn’t actually see that in this post at all. They mention that the end goal of the attackers might be to get to AI inference providers. But I don’t think they are crying “AI was used” here.<p>Or did I miss something?
We (Railway) make no claims about the tools the attacker used in the above post.<p>However, from discussions with partners, it resembled the pattern of attacks to secure AI API tokens and credentials. Preliminary forensics tell us that this was the primary goal of their attack. That said, I want to be careful here commenting until we have our formal public post-mortem.
This one doesn’t?
For the people who had OAI/Anthropic API keys stolen and used? Are you able to see how they were used in your dashboard?<p>I'm really curious how hackers have monetised the compromised API keys? Do they submit them to a shady AI-multiplexer that provides cheaper inference using stolen keys? One would expect completely random/disparate usage patterns/prompts if so...
Do cloud providers have a lock-down mode where you can press 1 button and stop all spend?
After the last outage we considered moving off to Cloud Run - used it several times before and it is rock solid - but we gave them another chance. Unlikely we are staying after a day of no deployments and then this.<p>Rotated all our secrets but since deploys are paused our app is down.<p>I'm unimpressed.
I had an Anthropic API key that was used in a Railway deployment be disabled due to evidence of unauthorized abuse ~3hrs after receiving the Railway security notice. They managed to spend about $20 in Opus 4.8 tokens before the abuse was detected. What a headache.
Genuinely curious: how much liability insurance do you need to survive something like this?
It's pretty crazy how php saga and railway service came on the same day...
Anyone can help?<p>I changed he api key in the env var as openrouter revoke the previous one based on this incident. However, as the redeploy cannot be done in my region, the env cannot be updated and now the product cannot be used. Any command in railway to fix this?
It's time for competent programmers to get rehired to help patch massive exploits that are about to unfold before us.
What stopped them from building the systems competently when they were employed?
Bad take.<p>What's happening is that machines are now better at coding than humans are, and they are finding copious numbers of vulnerabilities in software written by "competent programmers" over the last 40 years.<p>This is only going to get worse.
like the competent programmers that built php or?
how are the secrets decrypted, I would like some explanation so that I can have some understanding here, I am starting to feel like all these companies are just meme-ing with their security posture.<p>Like did someone vibe code too hard, how do env secrets leak for everyone...
secret encryption is always a bit of a conundrum for a running cloud system. the secret needs to be plaintext when you use it, so you have to decrypt at least on every deploy. but that means the keys have to be ready at hand, no passphrase, somewhere an automated system can get them. that makes it very hard to actually protect them from someone with full access
Easy, all the bad guys need to do is access whatever system stores the decryption keys.
They absolutely are. Every ceo sees security as a massive money pit (it is) but there’s a reason it’s expensive and hard to do well. Those compliance frameworks they show off are meaningless and can be manipulated extremely easily. There are a lot of security leaders who are going to be having a very bad time soon.
Is this our new AI daily reality?
script kiddies now have access to frontier models. bad
companies probably have php and Python applications exposed to the web and nobody knows.<p>the speed of irresponsible deployments is infinite now, by design
I'm rotating production secrets all night... great. I confirmed that they've actually used many of my secret keys already.
meanwhile on railway.com:<p>Ship software peacefully
This is so fucked up. I was reviewing my account and I just saw this in the logs... Claude says database credentials and bucket credentials go in via env vars so likely they had access to database and bucket contents.<p><pre><code> Audit Logs
Oct 21, 2026 05:54:13 PM CDT
BucketInstanceCredential.regenerated in my-project production by Railway Staff
Oct 21, 2026 05:54:13 PM CDT
BucketInstanceCredential.regenerated in my-project production by Railway Staff
Oct 21, 2026 05:54:13 PM CDT
BucketInstanceCredential.regenerated in my-project production by Railway Staff</code></pre>
Really? Security announcement on blog subdomain, while the largest text on their home page is "Ship software peacefully" slogan, without any mention of the issue? And after looking at it for a while I still don't know what it exactly is, some kind of Terraform/CloudFormation GUI?
<i>sighs</i><p>Thankfully I'm only using Railway for a hobby project (aptly, for a real-time transit dashboard) but still
The past two days have been awful as someone who uses Railway.
Damn I guess all those l33t hiring practices were for nothing
Of course, it was a giant scam that tested for nothing and optimized for how to pass a <i>test</i>.<p>Let's see if companies are ready to hire more people who know what they are doing, against a super-intelligent swarm of millions of agents with cyber capabilities.
Related: <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50177413">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50177413</a>
i revoked my api keys, changed with new ones but guess what? railway does not allow deployments at the moment, so my app is down.
Huh, I've been using Railway tonight and this was the first I've seen of this. Just got an email about it now too at 23:36
If you're on Railway do not wait, ROTATE every API key at the source, and do not set new values because Railway is still compromised and not secured.
Railway was not honest about the reason for their last big outage.
someone managed to get the environment variables AND the encryption keys for those? i feel for the secops engineers over there right now. brutal
I’m lucky I moved away from it to host my own db with coolify
11:43am CET here: builds still stuck in the queue. We are supposed to rotate keys but keys can't be rotated because you need to redeploy for the changes to take effect. Effectively speaking the potentially compromised keys can't be updated.<p>Also it's impossible to get verified on the Discord server to see what's going on and the support link in the dashboard leads to a 404 page.<p>I am kinda losing patience here.
I have 3 clients projects running there. I am on pro plan. Openrouter has invalidated all keys. Nothing is working. Clients are angry. Railway is taking forever to resolve this and are taking steps in a mildly brain dead way. I cant swap keys.<p>What can i do? Move to render ?
Actually I will move my projects away from Railway. With AI what it is today, no reason to shy away from hosting on actual VPS.<p>What is the best VPS to use today? Is it still hetzner or ovh?
Despite them saying that deployments work on Pro accounts (as of 30 minutes ago), my deployments are still stuck. Honestly disappointed.<p>Also they regenerated credentials for buckets but stopped deployments so the services could not connect to the buckets. Completely stupid. If you are going to regenerate the credentials, then let us redeploy the services.
Yeah I’m not sure what happened but there was a huge bot swarm the last few days<p>I had an open gitea host pulled into some botnet<p>Luckily digitaloceam sent an alert.
Aw shit. I just got done patching our PHP servers, now I gotta do the Railway too? I swear I'm gonna wake up to a Vercel SNAFU.
Well this is certainly interesting, I wonder how their secrets were being stored, I assumed they were stored in vault and then injected with a sidecar, but I guess not
Ugh. Love Railway.
the worst service I've signed up for has to be railway. What a terrible product.
Fuck, I thought this was about trains
> We believe this is part of a series of attacks recently targeting platform companies with the aim of compromising AI inference providers.<p>So basically, the same shit as in the crypto heydays - rich techbros providing extremely lucrative incentives for unscrupulous actors to hack anyone and anything.
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>We believe this is part of a series of attacks recently targeting platform companies with the aim of compromising AI inference providers.<p>Is that an accusation? As in, major AI players taking out competitors ?
It's a cop-out and cheap attempt at misdirection to distract from their incompetence.
I don’t think that’s what’s implied here. Possibly they are trying to get API tokens of providers to distill their own models.
This is exactly why we should own our deployment stacks. Going to push up the launch here as pdt is a railway alternative t<a href="https://github.com/autoidm/pdt" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/autoidm/pdt</a> for scheduled jobs<p>AI makes this so much easier to do now, we should all own our own code, and deployment infrastructure (use a cloud instead of someone wrapping aws for you)
Do you own argcomplete, backoff, certifi, cffi, charset-normalizer, cryptography, google-auth, google-auth-oauthlib, idna, markdown-it-py, mdurl, msal, oauthlib, pyasn1, pyasn1-modules, pycparser, pygments, pyjwt, python-dotenv, pyyaml, requests, requests-oauthlib, rich, rich-argparse, shellingham, and urllib3?
No, and this isn't about a supply chain attack on Python libs. This is about running your service(s) on a service that runs in front of a cloud provider. My argument is simply that it's needless extra risk<p>You do have an argument to be made about vendoring our dependencies, or removing them in general. Not a bad idea