Looking at the images here, there is zero attempt at security here from the ledger team. They’re using an MCU (ST MCU with Cortex M4 core) that doesn’t have any meaningful security features (ie, no secure boot, no differentiation between trusted and user mode operation - features the newer Cortex M33 core supports and newer ST parts implement). So there’s no way to guarantee that the software running on this has not been tampered with.<p>There is no physical tamper detection either. No tamper pads to detect case openings, no seal that gets broken when it’s opened that prevents operation. As others have mentioned, the most basic precaution would be to glue the whole thing together, which they didn’t do either.<p>Trusting Ledger with securing anything secret would be a very bad idea.
I just opened a ledger up, its stupid easy to do. Why wouldn't they make this a sealed unit with and glue it to make it impossible to open without damaging? Also why would you not glue the entire circuit board? The entire board is covered in test pads which make it super easy to solder dodgy stuff onto.
At the price of an eSIM and a LTE modem (and of the stolen 100$M), destroying a glued casing and making your own costs next to nothing. Looking at the photos, even without the test pads soldering directly on the components seem pretty easy.
I believe epoxy-filling them a-la IronKey is a good idea, but for longevity reasons, I'd prefer the rechargeable battery to be replaceable.<p>Maybe it increases the price quite a lot, IDK.
I had an old Ledger die recently and replaced it with a new one. Didn't even consider being potentially able to replace the battery, but it would have been nice.<p>On the plus side, I did get to do a "fire drill" of my recovery process, which did work, so that was nice.
I'm a large believer of long-living tools and things in general, so I prefer my tools to be repairable and maintainable.<p>Of course I can't achieve what I want all the time, but being able to use a fixed-function tool till some electronic component dies inside is way more attractive for me to send the same device to recycling or trash just because a part with limited life (and shorter time w.r.t. rest of the device in general) reaches ends of its life.
Depending on who is responsible for this, do you not think these people would have the ability to circumvent physical anti-tampering measures?
why not make it transparent?
Sony SRF-39FP has a transparent case, designed to thwart contraband concealment. The radio often appears on the commissary lists of U.S. federal prisons, hence the "FP" suffix
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SRF-39" rel="nofollow">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SRF-39</a>
Sony D-FJ003FP, Sony WM-FX193FP, SONY SRF-M35FP
It's almost as if the cryptocurrency industry is just amateur LARP…
Shouldn't it be possible to track who bought the esim, where the data is sent, and who owns the wallets where the stolen crypto is transferred?
It's easy to buy eSIMs anonymously. Either directly with cryptocurrency, or with a prepaid virtual credit card bought with cryptocurrency.
They tracked the traffic (not the eSIMs) to some servers in Hong Kong, managed by Alibaba.
Related:<p><i>Ledger confirms spy chip implant behind wallet crypto thefts</i><p><a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50054092">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50054092</a>
how can the implant send the seed words to an attacker? doesn't a crypto wallet have to talk an application on the host computer? wouldn't the communication between the wallet and the host computer never allow for the seed words to be sent from the wallet to the outside world? in other words how could an "implant" tampering of the wallet make the host computer suddenly start sending seed phrases to third parties?
They sniffed the LCD interface and OCR'ed the seed words when they were displayed using an implanted tiny CPU. This is a very sophisticated attack.
They were almost certainly not doing the OCR on the device. Such a CPU would be too power-hungry and the process would still be too error-prone given the limited compute. They would just send the raw data to the C2, which could send it to an emulator, snapshot the output and send it to an LLM.
Well it doesn't need to be a generic purpose OCR, just one that works for this single UI layout and font.
Streaming the raw data would also be more flexible for other use cases. From what I've read, it was streaming off the generated recovery passphrase, but users aren't required to generate one--they can input one. That'd require a much more sophisticated algorithm than simply reading from the screen, since users are using two buttons to pick from hundreds of words in a randomized menu.<p>And besides, Ledger firmware can be updated to change fonts and such so it'd be long-term safer to just stream the raw data.
i don't think OCRing a bitmap font is very expensive or power hungry, if you know the exact pixel configurations of the glyphs ahead of time
The attackers added their own tiny 4G or 5G board.
They put an eSIM in the device…
There is an eSIM with worldwide data in the device.
Though it's not what happened in this case, you could tamper with a crypto wallet to make it emulate a USB keyboard and once connected, send a series of keystrokes to download and run an exploit.
The implant could fabricate a reason to connect to a host computer. Like "Cannot display seed words, connect to a computer to debug"
So where does the implanted chip upload the seed phrase to? Who owns that website? This seems like it should have been caught with wireshark or network sniffing of the Ledger app?
I believe an untampered Ledger is still OK as long as you don't pair it with a compromised machine, which perhaps is not saying much at the present moment...
Every bitcoin in existence will eventually be hacked. It's just a matter of time.
-Post removed as this account is rate limited and I can't reply to comments-
All hw wallets are being breached. Big, easy target. I think a lot of people are interested in this breach and the people behind it. 100 million worth? This might works both ways.. curious about the further investigations. My hunch… after major crackdowns on scam centers in the golden triangle, this is their latest dab to wealth?
Ledger the company was not breached (this time around). The devices here were modified by a middleman in the distribution chain and sold to unsuspecting buyers.
The crypto lunatic fringe have long frustrated me with their assertions of sovereign this and that.<p>There is <i>no sovereignty in crypto if YOU ARE NOT BUILDING YOUR OWN HARDWARE</i>.<p>Any claims of sanctity or reliability in the software stack are rendered null and void until someone with a tunneling electron microscope has completed an audit of your chips.<p>THIS is why Taiwan matters so much, people: there is <i>NO</i> sovereignty for as long as your chips are being imported. You can trust all you want - but trust is nothing without verification. We are <i>all</i> serf-subjects of the wafer-producing overlords.<p>Ledger clearly drank the koolaid. Crypto people: invest in hardware. NOT software. Anything less is utter futility.
not your keys, not your crypto<p>not your hardware, not your keys<p>not your chips, not your hardware<p>not manufactured in house, not your chips<p>not your designs, not manufactured by you<p>not designed by you personally, not your designs<p>ad infinitum. To be truly secure, you must first learn to survive alone in the wilderness and smelt tin
<i>... and smelt tin</i><p>I'll just order my crucible and tongs off Alibaba.<p>Wait a second...
Our grandparents stored their crypto under their matresses.
This is why the assertion that crypto allows you and you alone to control your capital is a fallacy. Depends on your threat model of course...
Yes, that is true.
big bang or bust.
<i>Every cryptographic system has a trust assumption somewhere</i>
ah the good old C-x M-c M-smelting
Crypto people keep rediscovering we live in a society.
I don't get what you are saying here re no sovereignty with no (custom) hardware.<p>Grab the Bitcoin white paper and an airgapped PC with a fresh Debian install.<p>Implement the algorithm(s) in the white paper to generate yourself a private key and then a wallet address from that.<p>Send bitcoin to that wallet. Write down the private key and wallet address, store it somewhere safe, bury it in the garden, whatever.<p>No special hardware is required for any of this...<p>Or am I missing something?
Seems like maybe crypto having a single point of failure (keys) is a problem rather than hardware.<p>You will never be completely secure against failure, the only way to protect yourself is to be able to robustly recover from failure.<p>I'd rather be able to say "every single government is in my hardware and they still can't touch it."<p>Perhaps possible with multisig, but now you're basically back to trusting banks.
Not sure what you mean? Taiwan, imported, isnt taiwan the biggest exporter of high end chips? 100% these have not been hacked in Taiwan. You mean setting up your own fab? I am confused
Some chollima, its always a chollima.
The idea of a hardware wallet sounded wronged to me from the start.<p>Why would you trust some random hardware, that has the <i>sole purpose</i> of holding your money, making it an obvious target, over a general purpose computer you control entirely?
Strictly speaking, a hardware wallet doesn't hold your "money". Your assets live on the blockchain, and your seed phrase generates the private keys that control them.<p>The hardware wallet is just a sandboxed interface between you, your seed, and the blockchain. It requires a computer to connect to you and the internet.<p>In other words: as long as you have your seed phrase (and your passphrase, if you set one) on a piece of paper, you can smash your hardware wallet to bits and be fine.<p>(This assumes a standard single-signature wallet using the BIP-39 standard)
If there was ever any appeal to me, it’s that vague notion that machines get wiped, rebuilt, compromised, travel, get stolen, etc. A dedicated device could kinda avoid some of that if it mostly sits in a safe or something.<p>I never did get one, though.
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When people will understand that a "cryptowallet is a simple Aphanumeric sequence. Why would you need a hardware trick if all you have to do is scan for a match. Crypto has always been a scam, ask yourself do you know anyone of your friends that made it with crypto!