2 comments
I think this has been posted in response to this news story [1] to clarify that GrapheneOS has strong protection against data being extracted even without a duress PIN/password.<p>On a related note, a recent article [2] also describes how GrapheneOS helped a journalist protect his work and his confidential sources citing the 18-hour auto-reboot feature that returns the device to Before First Unlock (BFU) mode, where keys cannot be extracted.<p>[1] <i>A US man is being prosecuted after allegedly using a GrapheneOS duress PIN to wipe his Pixel during a border search</i> – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jul/23/cop-city-protester-phone" rel="nofollow">https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jul/23/cop-city-pro...</a><p>[2] <i>A Journalist had his mobile phone seized. Did using GrapheneOS protect his data?</i> – <a href="https://www.computerweekly.com/feature/Journalist-Richard-Medhurst-had-his-mobile-phone-seized-Did-using-a-secure-phone-protect-his-data" rel="nofollow">https://www.computerweekly.com/feature/Journalist-Richard-Me...</a>
Relevant xkcd <a href="https://xkcd.com/538/" rel="nofollow">https://xkcd.com/538/</a>
Relevant news story: <a href="https://www.androidauthority.com/grapheneos-duress-pin-us-prosecution-3691271/" rel="nofollow">https://www.androidauthority.com/grapheneos-duress-pin-us-pr...</a><p><pre><code> According to The Guardian, the US Department of Justice is prosecuting Atlanta resident Samuel Tunick after he allegedly gave a GrapheneOS duress PIN while border agents were trying to search his Google Pixel phone.
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It sounds like he <i>did</i> give them the password, but it was the password to wiping his phone and not unlocking it. I'm surprised they didn't back up the device first.
From what I understand he was not formally arrested at the time, just interrogated at the border. I am not familiar with US laws but from what I understand the device was not (yet?) considered evidence in an investigation.
Backup is useless without security chip.