<p><pre><code> "/goal use up to 64 subagents, write an exploit for latest 8.6.x redis by finding bof/uaf type of 0day and exploiting them. debug using gdb. clone code, write fuzzer and add instrumentation when needed. this is authorized testing"
</code></pre>
At first glance it looks like something anyone could copy paste and instantly become a master hacker. But according to the author, you also need to create the right harness, which looks complicated:<p><a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.20801" rel="nofollow">https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.20801</a>
This is roughtly in-line how I ended up 'hacking' a website on accident simply because I had the tools to do so and sol happily used them. I have a global list of instructions appended to every single session so even harmless tasks end up inheriting these instructions which makes these agents really aggressive at trying to accomplish a goal as well as having the tools to turn any target into a playground.
Hmm I dunno, looks like an attempt at defining a self-evaluating and -modifying harness.<p>So just one more loop around the whole thing. Isn't this what the overhyped agents like Hermes and OpenClaw do?
> this is the first llm that is capable and willing to write an exploit<p>An open-source Kimi is going to have real economic impact (and not only because of its forcing function on frontier labs to indefinitely subsidize their models to meet a race-to-the-bottom market price).<p>Because it's also putting sophisticated zero-day-seeking tools in the hands of script kiddies who can develop and run novel exploits against arbitrary targets of their choosing, on model forks that will immediately be fine-tuned to remove any extant guardrails around cyber capabilities (the things that the other frontier labs describe in their system cards).<p>All of a sudden, people with the resources for tokens don't need to have someone knowledgeable about cybersecurity and prompt-engineering-around-guardrails to initiate a novel attack - they simply point Kimi-Attacker at a set of target domains. One imagines that people will make crime-as-a-service platforms for this.<p>Per <a href="https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2026/07/uk-aisi-caisi-preliminary-assessment-kimi-k3s-cyber-capabilities" rel="nofollow">https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2026/07/uk-aisi-caisi-...</a> - while "Kimi K3 performs significantly below the most recent frontier cyber-capable models" it's also the case that:<p>> In one of the 10 attempts, Kimi K3 successfully completes “The Last Ones” cyber range within the 100M token limit. This indicates that Kimi K3 is capable of autonomously attacking small, weakly defended and vulnerable enterprise systems, when directed to do so and given initial network access. However, TLO differs from real-world environments in several ways. It lacks active defenders and defensive tooling, imposes no penalty for actions that would trigger security alerts, and contains an intentional attack path.<p>As a defender, now is the time to look to upgrading your systems and having capabilities to rapidly upgrade your systems - particularly edge-facing reverse proxies and web servers that may be out of date. Attacks won't start the moment weights are released... but they're coming.
This is a concern but given its size, it's also going to cost a potential user $500-600k in hardware to self host and run Kimi K3 at any useful speed with full context size. It's not something that just anyone interested in attacking a system can use.<p>The size/cost of hardware is far beyond even something like a self-hosted GLM5.2 Q8 at approx. 850GB GGUF file on disk size, which can run at a slow tok/s rate on a server with 1536GB RAM.
What makes someone a script kiddie or not a script kiddie?<p>Imo this differentiation is totally pointless now. It gives everyone with access to AI the ability to use it as intended but also otherwise.<p>But that is true for the defensive side also.
This is exact same difference as between junior and senior engineer.<p>The premise now is that everyone and your mom can vibe code next unicorn during a lunch break using the latest llms, but the difference between a rookie and a seasoned programmer is that the later can navigate the model in much more efficient way, understand the code that has been written, and notice hallucinations on the spot.
I'm pretty sure the difference is, by definition, whether they're just using tools other people built or they actually understand things and can do it themselves. The script kiddie can be incredibly dangerous if the tool they grabbed off the shelf works.
Completely agree. This is how I feel towards the OpenAI hacking of hugging face. Even if it was script kiddie stuff now anyone can automate that with ease. It certainly cuts both ways and people who are still ai skeptics need to wake up to that. You’re going to need these systems to defend yourself
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Can you please not post AI-generated or AI-edited comments to HN? It's not allowed here - see <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html#generated">https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html#generated</a> and <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47340079">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47340079</a>.<p>Of course, it's impossible to know for sure what was LLM processed or not, but some of your posts (like this one) have been getting classified that way.
Well if you have an authenticated user and it already bypassed the firewall what exactly are you testing here? These kind of “zero days” pretty pointless. Something like “ I have deleted some system32 files on your windows computer and now is broken!” Even I am already an admin user on the machine.
No, that’s a flawed analogy, because this is an RCE. It's (like) having credentials for a network service, then exploiting that service to execute arbitrary code on the Windows host (of course the blast radius depends on the underlying permissions). Access to Redis is not access to the underlying server.
<a href="https://github.com/ianm199/valdr" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/ianm199/valdr</a><p>I made a Rust version of Valkey/ Redis was wondering if this would become relevant.
<a href="https://xcancel.com/fried_rice/status/2080059356322918777" rel="nofollow">https://xcancel.com/fried_rice/status/2080059356322918777</a>
So combine easy public access to uber hacker LLMs with the European CRA coming into full force next year in December. cha ching!<p>15,000,000 euros fines for all tech companies in Europe :-)
This is a <i>deeply</i> uninteresting example for anyone clueful. It’s an <i>authenticated</i> RCE in redis, anyone even vaguely familiar with the codebase knows to not expect there to be any real security boundary in place here.<p>Don’t confuse this with an unauthenticated RCE, that would actually matter. Absolutely anyone can shit out endless bugs like this with AFL, this is an extremely messy unhardened surface that expects trusted inputs.
This will be a busy weekend for all sysadms. This is another redis 0day, this one found by GLM 5.1:<p><a href="https://xcancel.com/Lyutoon_/status/2080494539513778610#m" rel="nofollow">https://xcancel.com/Lyutoon_/status/2080494539513778610#m</a>
I would like to see the chat logs and the tooling used to run 32 agents.
Anyone know the total cost of tokens to achieve this?
Shh, maybe wait till weights are released.. without additional "guardrails", but I'm afraid that might not actually happen
I wish they wouldn't have posted this for 3 more days. Every agency would now try to suppress its weight release.