I took a look at the Ghidra ones (because I use Ghidra), and I'm unimpressed: <a href="https://github.com/bikini/exploitarium/blob/main/ghidra-12.1.2-rce-ace-calc-poc/docs/classification.md" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/bikini/exploitarium/blob/main/ghidra-12.1...</a><p>The first requires being able to overwrite binaries in the Swift tool directory. Yes, if you overwrite binaries executed by ghidra, you can trigger code execution. This is not a surprise.<p>The second, idk, I'm not familiar with TraceRMI.<p>The third is not a vulnerability in the slightest, they just demonstrate that native 7zip parsing code is reachable. <i>Maybe</i> there is a bug in the 7zip parser, but without that it's meaningless.
Are they all actually 0-day? I think a lot of them are from disclosed CVEs/code that were already fixed upstream. It often seems like the term "0-day" has lost most of its meaning today and people often use it to refer to any exploits.
Repo claims<p>> A single archive of public exploit PoCs and vulnerability research writeups. At the time I post these, none have been reported. Feel free to report them yourself and take credit for the CVE if handed out lulz. Please do not abuse these. I do this so to allure people into the field, and I've always found this is the most efficient way.<p>Which is roughly the definition of zero day. Whether the contents of the repo reflect the above claim is something else entirely.
There is going to be a flurry of this sort of stuff as the AIs get smart enough to find them. It will naturally die down as the legitimate ones are fixed. Yes, there will always be some level of this, but I’d expect it to be low and the exploits found to be increasingly complex. This is a time of transition.
trying something new? this is interesting. the problem is that submitting reports is too slow. if you find one then your not supposed to share. but then over the next 90 days you learn no one cares and 13 other people submitted it before you, 43 after. maybe better that we just know. so we can run code we can trust sooner. zero is the proper number of dependencies. otherwise assume its broken.
Most of the exploits are for opensource/free software.<p>I don't know what methods where used to find these exploits but I am starting to think security through obscurity might not be a bad thing in this day and age, where someone can just let bots loose on your codebase.
Presumably, one could let the bots loose on your own codebase first. The question is one of financing of course. If your end users are enterprises willing to pay for a support contract, they probably care enough about not getting hacked to endure the higher prices that would let you throw enough tokens at the problem. Other open-source projects might have a harder time.
llms are fantastic disassembly partners, they're quite good at labeling functions from various dissassemblers -- the net losses from losing the benefits of open source , imo , outweigh the protection afforded by hiding your source code in yet another layer that is more and more easily unrolled through automated procedures.
And isn't it also mostly a transitioning issue. Those open codebases will be constantly scanned for potential security issues and getting more and more hardened.
There are probably a lot of easy wins that are going to be discovered over the next few years but it should taper out after a while.
True. Its a trade-of, LLMs in this regard are only effective when they have access to the source code?<p>I do not wish to undermine the philosophical underpinnings of free software and its net benefit to society. Without it we wouldn't even have the code generators we have today.
disassembly only applies to client side software<p>something like nginx could arguably be more secure if it was closed source<p>(I am a proponent of and contributor to open source)
Only until a single server running nginx is hacked and the binary leaked though...
Um, the nginx binary would have to be in the hands of hundreds of thousands of server operators. And the set of server operators is rich in the kind of person who would attack it. Not to mention the huge number of leaks you'd get.<p>Maybe if it's some server-side software that you only use yourself...
Open source is a good thing, but I don't think what you are proposing is accurate.<p>A different way to frame this would be that those bugs would never be surfaced or exploited if the software were proprietary.
[dead]
That's one way to do it.
I'm going through each one, and it's fascinating to see things like this. The UAF principle in c-ares is really interesting.<p>The problem ultimately came from not being able to prevent stale pointers. The attack works by figuring out the size of the stale pointer, then spraying memory with data of the same size, and finally achieving RCE (Remote Code Execution). How do people even come up with ideas like this?
But do people actually find these vulnerabilities on their own, or are they using LLMs? I was curious about how these vulnerabilities work, so I tried asking my dear friend Mr. CLAUDE, but he immediately threw an error and ended the session because it was a cybersecurity question. Enterprise APIs block even the analysis itself, so it's amazing that people can actually pull this off in practice.
le sigh, c-ares. Very predictable outcome. If you ever find yourself entertaining the idea that you will simply write non-blocking network protocol stacks in C with manual lifetime management, slap yourself. It doesn't matter if you think you are a super genius of unimpeachable taste. The job is impossible.
we have got to stop putting our bank accounts and SSNs on computers
We need our infrastructure to stop treating bank account numbers and social security numbers as secrets. At least in the US, bank account numbers appear on physical checks and are required to be shared in order to do an ACH transfer, and a social security number is not supposed to be used as an identifier (unless to the Social Security Administration itself) or as a secret password.<p>Ideally, nothing nefarious should happen if both of them were listed and queryable publicly.
... support cash, tell your neighbors
And Monero for online.
til you get debanked
A surprising amount of documentation if the actor was just LLM-dropping these..
Open source is the best
A friendly reminder that a 0-day is a vulnerability that wasn't known until after a malicious actor exploited it. If someone publishes a PoC, it is not a 0-day, just a vulnerability.