Here's the primary source: <a href="https://deadeclipse666.blogspot.com/2026/05/two-more-public-disclosures-it-will.html" rel="nofollow">https://deadeclipse666.blogspot.com/2026/05/two-more-public-...</a><p>Other links:<p><a href="https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/YellowKey" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/YellowKey</a><p><a href="https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/GreenPlasma" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/GreenPlasma</a>
<a href="https://infosec.exchange/@wdormann/116565129854382214" rel="nofollow">https://infosec.exchange/@wdormann/116565129854382214</a>
The BitLocker exploit seems simple and very dangerous. Companies and individuals have been relying on BitLocker to protect information if the device is lost. Despite promises, Microsoft doesn’t seem to be serious about security.<p>What will it take for more companies to truly understand their risks with Windows and being locked into Microsoft’s platforms?
This looking so much like an intentional backdoor just makes me wonder even more about TrueCrypt's sudden recommendation in 2014 that everyone switch to BitLocker. This particular backdoor didn't exist then (it's only Win11 apparently) but this sure makes it seem more plausible that another one might have.<p>Though if TrueCrypt <i>was</i> killed to try and get people to switch to encryption that could be backdoored, then why allow its successor VeraCrypt to exist? It's open source and independently audited, so it really shouldn't be backdoored.
Remarkable. Does MS take a huge reputational hit for having a backdoor, or are they so essential to most places this won’t matter?
I’m assuming the EU speeds up the uncoupling cause of some of this.
It's not an actual backdoor. An attacker found a way to exploit Windows after booting it up in this recovery mode. The security of files on the device depends on it being impossible for Windows to be pwned by an attacker on any surface exposed before the user is unlocked.<p>This is why operating systems like GrapheneOS disable the USB port on the initial boot to limit the attack surface that an attacker has.
As far as I can tell, there's no concrete evidence that it is actually an intentional "backdoor."
Earlier thread: <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48114997">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48114997</a>
How is this even possible, backdoor or no? Isn't the whole point of this type of encryption that even a compromised machine can't decrypt without the passphrase? If this works it means that the key is stored unencrypted somewhere?
Most setups only have the key stored in the TPM, so all you need to get it back is a signed/trusted bootloader.<p>Ideally you'd want that key to be further protected with a password or some other mechanism because it's not impossible to extract TPM keys.
Presumably the key is stored in the TPM
[dupe] <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48129789">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48129789</a><p>And earlier<p><a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48114997">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48114997</a>
For those who use password (not PIN) based pre-boot authentication with BitLocker... do we know if that setup is safe?<p>I can't imagine there would be a way to bypass that if a password is required, unless it was a situation where like, there was originally some secret secondary key made that needs no password... or the password was never tied to the key in the first place.
The exploit developer themselves say [1] TPM+PIN is vulnerable, though no public PoC.<p>[1]: <a href="https://deadeclipse666.blogspot.com/2026/05/were-doing-silent-patches-now-huh-also.html?m=1" rel="nofollow">https://deadeclipse666.blogspot.com/2026/05/were-doing-silen...</a>