Looks like a DNSSEC issue, not a nameserver outage. Validating resolvers SERVFAIL on every .de name with EDE:<p>RRSIG with malformed signature found for
a0d5d1p51kijsevll74k523htmq406bk.de/nsec3 (keytag=33834)
dig +cd amazon.de @8.8.8.8 works, dig amazon.de @a.nic.de works. Zone data is intact, DENIC just published an RRSIG over an NSEC3 record that doesn't validate against ZSK 33834. Every validating resolver therefore refuses to answer.<p>Intermittency fits anycast: some [a-n].nic.de instances still serve the previous (good) signatures, so retries occasionally land on a healthy auth. Per DENIC's FAQ the .de ZSK rotates every 5 weeks via pre-publish, so this smells like a botched rollover.
So a single configuration mistake in a single place wiped out external reachability of a major economy. It happened in the evening local time and should be fixable, modulo cache TTLs, by morning. This will limit the blast radius somewhat.<p>Still, at this level, brittle infrastructure is a political risk. The internet's famous "routing around damage" isn't quite working here. Should make for an interesting post mortem.
I am reminded of the warning that zonemaster gives about putting your domain name servers on a single AS, as is common practice for many larger providers. A lot of people do not want others to see this as a problem since a single AS is a convenient configuration for routing, but it has the downside of being a single point of failure.<p>Building redundant infrastructure that can withstand BGP and DNS configuration mistakes are not that simple but it can be done.
As the CPU/RAM resources to run an authoritative-only slave nameserver for a few domains are extremely minimal (mine run at a unix load of 0.01), it's a very wise idea to put your ns3 or something at a totally different service provider <i>on another continent</i>. It costs less than a cup of coffee per month.
This makes sense for larger providers but just for a small/personal website there is literally zero advantages to having distributed authoritative DNS servers when the webserver is on a single host.<p>Ironically, denic still requires you to have two separate name servers with different IPs for your domain (which can be worked around by changing the IP of the registered name server afterwards lol), a requirement that all other registries I use have dropped or never had because enforcing such a policy at the registry level makes zero sense.
For a very long time, the computer club I was in operated a DNS server on a Pentium 75MHz and after the last major hardware upgrade it had a total of 110MB RAM memory and 2G disk space. It worked great except that before the upgrade it tended to run out of ram whenever there was a Linux kernel update, a problem we solved forever by populating all the ram slots with the maximum that the motherboard could handle to that nice 110 MB.
On Google cloud it's always four nameservers like<p><pre><code> ns-cloud-c1.googledomains.com
ns-cloud-c2.googledomains.com
ns-cloud-c3.googledomains.com
ns-cloud-c4.googledomains.com
</code></pre>
Would not make any sense to do four of them if it's a single AZ. Also, they are geo-aware and routed to your nearest region.
DNS is a centralization risk, yes. Somehow we've decided this is fine. DNSSEC isn't the only issue - your TLD's nameservers could also be offline, or censored in your country.
DNS is barely centralized. Is there an alternative global name lookup system that is less centralized without even worse downsides?
GP said it was a risk (and it is), not that there are better alternatives. Not all risks can be eliminated easily but you should still be aware of them.
GNS is the obvious response here, in addition to the various blockchain based solutions. Nothing that enjoys widespread support or mindshare unfortunately.<p>Even the current centralized ICANN flavor could be substantially more resilient if it instead handed out key fingerprints and semi-permanent addresses when queried. That way it would only ever need to be used as a fallback when the previously queried information failed to resolve.
BGP, but the names in question are limited to 128 bits, of which at most 48 will be looked up, and you don't get to choose which 48 bits are assigned to you.
Normally it should not have been, with cache and all, but that was the past...<p>Think about what would happen the day that letsencrypt is borken for whatever reason technical or like having a retarded US leader and being located in the wrong country. Taken into account the push of letsencrypt with major web browsers to restrict certificate validities for short periods like only a few days...
Not really? .com and .net are still up<p>If Let's Encrypt goes down, half of the Internet will become inaccessible in a week.
Presumably if LetsEncrypt goes down and stays down for a week, the sites that go down are the ones that see that their CA went down and at no point in the week take the option to get certs from a different CA?
So it seems we need something like this [1] for IT infrastructure? ;)<p>[1] <a href="https://outerspaceinstitute.ca/crashclock/" rel="nofollow">https://outerspaceinstitute.ca/crashclock/</a>
"The internet's famous "routing around damage" isn't quite working here."<p>DNS is a look up service that runs on the internet.<p>Internet routing of IP packets is what the internet does and that is working fine (for a given value of fine).<p>You remind me of someone using the term "the internet is down" that really means: "I've forgotten my wifi password".
> So a single configuration mistake in a single place wiped out external reachability of a major economy.<p>Real world beats sci-fi :) And isn't it why we love IT ? And hate it too, because of "peoples in charge"...
fail-closed protocols have introduced some brittleness. A HTTP 1.0 server from 1999 probably still can service visitors today. A HTTPS/TLS 1.0 server from the same year wouldn't.
I think I see the point you're making here and I agree.<p>There is designing something to be fail-closed because it needs to be secure in a physical sense (actually secure, physically protected), and then there's designing something fail-closed because it needs to be secure from an intellectual sense (gatekept, intellectually protected). While most of the internet is "open source" by nature, the complexity has been increased to the point where significant financial and technical investment must be made to even just participate. We've let the gatekeepers raise the gates so high that nobody can reach them. AI will let the gatekeepers keep raising the gates, but then even they won't be able to reach the top. Then what?<p>I think the point you're trying to make, put another way is in the context of "availability" and "accessibility" we've compromised a lot of both availability and accessibility in the name of security since the dawn of the internet. How much of that security actually benefits the internet, and how much of that security hinders it? How much of it exists as a gatekeeping measure by those who can afford to write the rules?
Backwards compatibility is unfortunately not something security folk care about.
This is why I still run my blog on HTTP/1.1 only.
You're not wrong but objecting to fail-closed in a security sensitive context is entirely missing the point.
>So a single configuration mistake in a single place wiped out external reachability of a major economy.<p>And fuck nothing at all happened as a result.
I have a bad feeling, that the impact will be quite severe for some services, as monitoring, performance, and security services might get disrupted. and just cleaning up is a big mess.. Worst case, some ot will experience outage and / or damage. But maybe I am just overestimating the severity of this.
There is the kritis (critical infrastructure law) law, which trys to enforce some standards to make things not as brittle.
It looks like a failed key replacement during a scheduled maintenance event. Normally this sort of thing is thoroughly tested and has multiple eyes on for detailed review and planning before changes get committed, but obviously something got missed.
> The internet's famous "routing around damage"<p>...is only for Pentagon networks and military stuff. It's not for us normal people. (We get Cloudflare and FAANG bullshit instead.)
I love how I work with IT for 20 years and don't understand a single acronym here other than DNSSEC
I've been in IT 30+ years, been running DNS, web servers, etc. since at least 1994. I haven't bothered with DNSSEC due to perceived operational complexity. The penalty for a screw up, a total outage, just doesn't seem worth the security it provides.
That was my experience too until I decided that just running email systems for 30 odd years when HN says that is unnatural piqued my weird or something!<p>I ran up three new VMs on three different sites. I linked all three systems via a private Wireguard mesh. MariaDB on each VM bound to the wg IP and stock replication from the "primary". PowerDNS runs across that lot. One of the VMs is not available from the internet and has no identity within the DNS. The idea is that if the Eye of Sauron bears down on me, I can bring another DNS server online quite quickly and fiddle the records to bring it online. It also serves as a third authority for replication.<p>I also deployed <a href="https://github.com/PowerDNS-Admin/PowerDNS-Admin" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/PowerDNS-Admin/PowerDNS-Admin</a> which is getting on a bit and will be replaced eventually but works beautifully.<p>Now I have DNS with DNSSEC and dynamic DNS and all the rest. This is how you start signing a zone and PowerDNS will look after everything else:<p><pre><code> # pdnsutil secure-zone example.co.uk
# pdnsutil zone set-nsec3 example.co.uk
# pdnsutil zone rectify example.co.uk
</code></pre>
Grab a test zone and work it all out first, it will cost you not a lot and then go for "production".<p>My home systems are DNSSEC signed.
How simple sysadmin was in 1994 with no cryptography on any protocol. Everything could be easily MITM'd. Your credit card number would get jacked left and right in the 90s.
And your mailman can also just open your letters. So what, it mostly doesn't happen in developed countries. Not everything needs an airtight technical solution, we have way less costly ways to deal with unwanted behavior.
Nobody was taking credit cards online then. Your telnet sessions were easily sniffed, however.
Not in '94, sure. But a couple of years later it was common and SSL was still uncommon, for a bunch of reasons, and also everyone was storing the card numbers in plaintext on their servers too.<p>Telnet was sniffed. IRC was being sniffed and logged.
Cool. Feel free to explain how to tighten things up.<p>I've just given them part of a recipe for using DNSSEC. I suspect you are not actually human .. qingcharles.
To be fair, advanced real world knowledge of public/private key PKIs (x.509 or other), things like root CAs, are a fairly esoteric and very specialized field of study. There's people whose regular day jobs are nothing but doing stuff with PKI infrastructure and their depth of knowledge on many other non-PKI subjects is probably surface level only.
I know quite a bit about PKI and X.509, and I can tell you that much: the overlap with how DNSSEC works is limited.
As is the overlap between DNSSEC and DNS itself, to be honest.<p>I once worked at the level of administering DNSSEC for 300+ TLDs. It's its own world. When that company was winding down, I tried to continue in the field but the most common response (outside of no response, of course), was 'we already have a DNS team/vendor/guy.'
And well, then things like this happen. I won't throw stones though, it's a lot to learn and can be incredibly brittle.
Is that actually true, though? Even though it's not really my job, I find myself debugging certificates and keys at least once a month, and that's after automating as much as possible with certbot and cloud certificates. PKI always seems to demand attention.
In my initial comment, I meant more in terms of complexity and planning from the perspective of the people who are running the public/private key infrastructure on the other side/upstream of what you're doing as a letsencrypt end user.<p>Broadly similar general concept to the team responsible for the DNSSSEC signing keys for an entire ccTLD.<p>Yeah a x509 PKI / root CA is a very different thing than DNSSSEC but they have a number of general logical similarities in that the chain of trust ultimately comes down to a "do not fuck this up" single point of failure.
It's not made easier by the fact that <i>a lot</i> of cryptography is either very old and arcane or it's one hell of a mess of code that doesn't make sense without reading standards.<p>I had the misfortune of having to dig deep into constructing ASN.1 payloads by hand [1] because that's the only thing Java speaks, and oh holy hell is this A MESS because OF COURSE there's two ways to encode a bunch of bytes (BIT STRING vs OCTET STRING) and encoding ed25519 keys uses BOTH [2].<p>And ed25519 is a mess in itself. The more-or-less standard implementation by orlp [3] is almost completely lacking any comments explaining what is going on where and reading the relevant RFCs alone doesn't help, it's probably only understandable by reading a 500 pages math paper.<p>It's almost as if cryptographers have zero interest in interested random people to join the field.<p>End of rant.<p>[1] <a href="https://github.com/msmuenchen/meshcore-packets-java/blob/main/src/main/java/de/afa_amateurfunk/meshcore_packets/crypto/PublicKey.java#L57" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/msmuenchen/meshcore-packets-java/blob/mai...</a><p>[2] <a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8410#appendix-A" rel="nofollow">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8410#appendix-A</a><p>[3] <a href="https://github.com/orlp/ed25519/tree/master" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/orlp/ed25519/tree/master</a>
The trick to asn.1 is to generate both parser and serializer from the spec. Elliptic curve math on the other hand is ... yeah, you need to know the math and also know the tricks to code that implements it. Both of those have steep learning curve, but it's hardly because it's a mess or it's old.
The problem with ASN.1 is that it is big and complicated, and you only need a fraction of it for cryptography, and it isn't really used for anything outside of pki anymore.<p>It wouldn't be as bad if asn.1 had cought on more as a general purpose serialization format and there were ubiquitous decent libraries for dealing with it. But that didn't happen. Probably partly because there are so many different representations of asn.1.<p>A bespoke serialization specifically for certificates might actually have aged better, if it was well designed.
Assuming there are some libraries for it, would this make a pretty good case for LLM-generated ports of these existing libraries into other languages or onto other OSs/platforms?
One implementation could be treated as "the spect".
ASN.1 is protobufs designed by committee. It <i>is</i> a general-purpose serialization format, but there's no good reason to choose it instead of protobufs.
The trick to ASN.1 is to serialize/unserialize it backwards.
> Both of those have steep learning curve, but it's hardly because it's a mess or it's old.<p>Bitpacking structures used to be important in the 60s. That time has <i>passed</i>, unless you're dealing with LoRa, NFC or other cases of highly constrained bandwidth there are way better options to serialize and deserialize information. It's time to move on, and the complexity of all the legacy garbage in crypto has been the case of many a security vulnerability in the past.<p>As for the code, it might be personal preference but I'd love to have at least some comments referring back to a specification or original research paper in the code.
I think you misunderstand the problem asn.1 solves and constrains it works within (both 30 years ago and now). We sure can have a better one now once we learned all the lessons and know what good parts to keep, but this critique of bitpacking is misplaced.
ASN.1 is not used because of just bitpacking. There are other benefits to ASN.1 and it's probably one of the least problematic parts there.<p>People who have thought they can do better have made things like PGP. It's one of the worst cryptographic solutions out there. You're free to try as well though.
The typical vector for entering cryptography as a professional is called "grad school".
X.509 is a deep legacy, but at least at this point it's well tested.<p>> because that's the only thing Java speaks<p>No, it most definitely is not. You can just construct a private key directly in BouncyCastle: <a href="https://downloads.bouncycastle.org/java/docs/bcprov-jdk18on-javadoc/org/bouncycastle/crypto/params/X25519PrivateKeyParameters.html" rel="nofollow">https://downloads.bouncycastle.org/java/docs/bcprov-jdk18on-...</a><p>I'm 100% certain that you also can do that with raw java.security. I did that about 15 years ago with raw RSA/EC keys. You can just directly specify the private exponent for RSA (as a bigint!) or the curve point for EC.<p>Ditto for ed25519, you can just take the canonical implementation from DJB. And you really really shouldn't do that anyway, please just use OpenSSL or another similar major crypto library.
I wouldn't recommend touching openssl (the library, command line tools are okay-ish) with anything that breaths life.
> I'm 100% certain that you also can do that with raw java.security.<p>I tried that, the problem is Meshcore specific - they do their own weird shit with private and public keys [1]. Haven't figured out how to do the private key import either, because in the C source code (or in python re-implementations) Meshcore just calls directly into the raw ed25519 library to do their custom math... it's a mess.<p>[1] <a href="https://jacksbrain.com/2026/01/a-hitchhiker-s-guide-to-meshcore-cryptography/" rel="nofollow">https://jacksbrain.com/2026/01/a-hitchhiker-s-guide-to-meshc...</a>
Don't worry, that's by design ;)
Apparently the DENIC team was on a party this evening! Party hard, but not too hard.
<a href="https://bsky.app/profile/denic.de/post/3ml4r2lvcjg2h" rel="nofollow">https://bsky.app/profile/denic.de/post/3ml4r2lvcjg2h</a>
A real party killer if I have ever seen one.
Interesting "bus problem" to have in a scenario where everyone who is qualified, experienced and trusted enough to commit lives changes (or perform a revert, undo results of a botched maintenance, etc) in an emergency situation is not completely sober.
Sobriety is just factor to be weighed in an emergency situation. 30 years ago I was at a ski resort with about 50 friends having a drinking competition in the resort's main bar. Late that night two ski lodges collapsed, trapping people inside. Around midnight, soon after the winner was announced, the police entered and asked "who's able to drive a crane truck?" The winner of the competition put his hand up and informed them of how much he had had to drink. Don't care they said, so he drove a crane big enough to lift a building up a single lane 35km mountain road in nighttime ice conditions. (The crane made it, but sadly most of the people in the ski lodges didn't. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1997_Thredbo_landslide" rel="nofollow">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1997_Thredbo_landslide</a> )
Sounds like Europe, yes.
Cloudflare has now disabled DNSSEC validation on their 1.1.1.1 resolver: <a href="https://www.cloudflarestatus.com/incidents/vjrk8c8w37lz" rel="nofollow">https://www.cloudflarestatus.com/incidents/vjrk8c8w37lz</a>
Welp. I think can call it on DNSSEC now.
OTOH there was recently a DNSSEC-saved-the-day piece of news: <a href="https://incrypted.com/en/dns-attack-on-eth-limo-was-stopped/" rel="nofollow">https://incrypted.com/en/dns-attack-on-eth-limo-was-stopped/</a>
Probably the most common reason to use DNSSEC is to check a box on a list of compliance rules. And I don't think this will change anything for people who need DNSSEC for compliance.
There's no commercial compliance regime that requires DNSSEC (FedRAMP might be the only exception --- I'm uncertain about the current state of FedRAMP DNSSEC rules --- but that makes sense given that DNSSEC is a giant key escrow scheme.)
FedRAMP requires it, although like many requirements, you may be able to get out of it if you have a good reason and/or your sponsoring agency doesn't care about it.<p>There are also some large businesses that require, or strongly pressure SaaS providers to use DNSSEC. You can often contest that, but if you have DNSSEC, that's one less thing to argue about in the contract.
Which businesses are those? (I ask because if they're North American, I have a pretty good sense of which large North American businesses even have DNSSEC signatures set up, and it's not many; small enough that you can easily memorize the list.)
I found another reason... MS365 require DNSSEC to be enabled if you want DANE for TLS-enforced SMTP. You could also use MTA-STS.
Probably the most common reason to use TLS is to check a box on a list of compliance rules. Is that bad?
Do browsers even load non-HTTPS sites anymore without a massive warning?
neverssl.com works fine for me, only a small warning in the place where the padlock usually is, that no-one checks anyway.<p>The browser would be very unhappy with an <input type="password"/> on a non-TLS site (localhost excepted). HSTS would trigger the "massive" warning and refuse to load the site, however.
Yes, they do.
browsers pushed it, not compliance
I doubt it. The root cause of this was a root server misconfiguration or bug. It happened to DNSSEC records this time, which is a pain, but next time it might as well flip bits or point to wrong IP addresses instead.<p>Paradoxically, resolvers wouldn't have noticed the misconfiguration if it weren't for DNSSEC.
Hahaha. You wish :-p
If it turns out the DNSSEC issue was caused by threat actors, this downstream effect could very well have been the reason to do it.
<i>Temporarily</i> is a fairly important word to include with that link
This seems like it should be the bigger news here. Disappointing knee jerk reaction from Cloudflare.
We only disabled SSL on all the websites in one country for a little bit.. I'm sure those credit card numbers were perfectly safe over the wire
That comparison really makes the contrast clear: losing TLS would’ve put millions of people either into full downtime or immediately at significant risk (you can’t uncapture data). Losing DNSSEC, however, placed no one at risk and improved uptime.<p>There’s a reason why one of the two has roughly 10% adoption after three decades and the other is high 90-something percent.
They didn't disable SSL you dingus.
I must be early. There's not a single tptacek DNSSEC rant in this thread yet.
What would I need to rant about? Sometimes the world does my ranting for me.
Perhaps its more fair to call it 'passionate'.<p>That said, the last few dnssec posts that got traction, tptacek tends to be at least 20% of the comments alone (ex, 55/259), ignoring word count. Today seems calm
doesn't this <i>event</i> speak for itself though?
Kind-of. But there are worse things than outages when it's PKIs we're talking about. DNSSEC is also extremely opaque and unmonitored. Any compromise will not be noticed. Nor will anyone have any recourse against misbehaving roots.<p>Fun fact, CloudFlare has used the same KSK for zones it serves more than a decade now.
Which is fine. Not because KSK rollover is supposedly complicated, but if you can't manage to keep your private keys and PKI safe in the first place then key rotation is just a security circus trick. But if you do know how to keep them safe, then...
It is not fine. Keeping key material safe is not a boolean between "permanently safe" and "leaks immediately".<p>Keeping key material secure for more than a decade while it's in active use is vastly more complex than keeping it secure for a month, until it rotates.<p>For all we know, some ex-employee might be walking around with that KSK, theoretically being able to use it for god knows what for an another decade.
> Keeping key material secure for more than a decade while it's in active use is vastly more complex than keeping it secure for a month, until it rotates.<p>Nope. Key material rotation is just circus when it's done for the sake of rotation.<p>> For all we know, some ex-employee might be walking around with that KSK, theoretically being able to use it for god knows what for an another decade.<p>Or maybe an employee has compromised the new key that is going to be rotated in, while the old key is securely rooted in an HSM?
The point of rotation for these kinds of keys is that it limits the blast radius of what happens if an employee compromises such a key. This is sort of like how there are one or two die-hard PGP advocates who have come up with a whole Cinematic Universe where authenticated encryption is problematic ("it breaks error recovery! it's usually not what you want!") because mainstream PGP doesn't do it. Except here, it's that key rotation is bad, because of how often DNSSEC has failed to successfully pull off coordinated key rotations.
I can see the periodic rotations used as a way to keep up the operational experience. This is indeed a valid reason, although it needs to be weighted against the increased risk of compromise due to the rotation procedure itself.<p>I'm just saying that rotating the key just in case someone compromised it is not a great idea. Doubly so if it's done infrequently enough for the operational experience to atrophy between rotations.<p>And yeah, I fully agree that anything surrounding the DNSSEC operations is a burning trash fire. It doesn't have to be this way, but it is.
> Nope. Key material rotation is just circus when it's done for the sake of rotation.<p>I'm a mere sysadmin and <i>not</i> a cybersecurity expert. But this is always something that leaves me torn.<p>On the one hand, yes, rotation periods for many/most credentials are long enough that you're not really de-risking yourself all that much.<p>On the other hand, doing regular rotations allows you to tighten up your threat model. A regularly-rotated credential allows you to say "I implicitly trust that this credential has not been compromised <i>prior to the previous rotation</i>."[0] Whereas, without credential rotation, you're saying "I implicitly trust that this credential has not been compromised <i>ever</i>."<p>The latter to me seems clearly like the inferior model. The question is just whether the cost-benefit pencils out. And that is obviously very situationally dependent. That calculus doesn't pencil out when dealing with user-owned passwords for instance (i.e. the costs of regular password rotation dominate the benefits of the improved threat model). Human limitations with memory and such are the main issue there. However, that doesn't apply to e.g. hypothetical sufficiently developed DNSSEC infrastructure. Does that calculus pencil out there? I don't know. But it seems plausible at least.<p>[0] Modulo attackers having been able to pivot into a persistent threat with a previously-compromised credential.
> Or maybe an employee has compromised the new key that is going to be rotated in, while the old key is securely rooted in an HSM?<p>Also possible, but that'd be an active threat that has some probability of being caught.<p>Never replacing keys allows permanent compromise that can only be caught if someone directly observes misuse.<p>Though nobody monitors DNSSEC like that, nor uses it, so it's fine from that aspect I guess.
No?
Let's Encrypt going down isn't equivalent to a rant about how encryption was a terrible idea from the very beginning and we should all just use unencrypted traffic.
He’s busy with MathAcademy earning XP-SEC
Maybe he drank a little too much Malört with the DENIC team last night?
Perhaps he's moribund
Yes, all .de domains down because of DNSSEC failure at Denic
<a href="https://dnsviz.net/d/de/dnssec/" rel="nofollow">https://dnsviz.net/d/de/dnssec/</a>
<a href="https://i.imgur.com/eAwdKEC.png" rel="nofollow">https://i.imgur.com/eAwdKEC.png</a><p>Edit: Alternative link:
<a href="https://www.cyberciti.biz/media/new/cms/2017/04/dns.jpg" rel="nofollow">https://www.cyberciti.biz/media/new/cms/2017/04/dns.jpg</a>
<a href="https://dns.kitchen/dns.mp4" rel="nofollow">https://dns.kitchen/dns.mp4</a><p>Or: <a href="https://dns.kitchen/jingle" rel="nofollow">https://dns.kitchen/jingle</a>
<p><pre><code> {"data":{"error":"Imgur is temporarily over capacity. Please try again later."},"success":false,"status":403}
</code></pre>
There is some strange irony to this, I suppose.
In my experience, that error is a lie and is what you get if they've IP blocked you. (Easy to hit on a VPN, in particular)
I get "content not viewable in your region", from the UK. Not an ideal image sharing website nowadays.
Other countries are available. With a UK passport you can move to Ireland, Thailand, or Australia fairly easily, amongst others.
Rather, not an ideal legislation nowadays…
A protection against bad networks, including VPN.<p>It's been like that for over two years now.
We should frame it as "all .de domains are ready to be impersonated because everyone will disable DNSSEC".
Crazy. I can't remember an incident like this ever happened before and it's still not fixed? .de is probably the most important unrestricted domain after .com from an economical perspective. Millions of businesses are "down".
I remember when .com went down, in July 1997.<p><a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/071797dns.html" rel="nofollow">https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/we...</a>
> For instance, the name "www.nytimes.com" corresponds to nine different computers that answer requests for The New York Times on the Web, one of which is 199.181.172.242<p><pre><code> $ dig -x 199.181.172.242 +short
www2.nytimes.com.
</code></pre>
Neat.
DENIC apparently resolved all .de domains to NXDOMAIN in 2010: <a href="https://www.theregister.com/2010/05/12/germany_top_level_domain_glitch/" rel="nofollow">https://www.theregister.com/2010/05/12/germany_top_level_dom...</a>
It's Germany, pessimistic time estimation + 1/3 and you are in a realistic time frame for the issue being resolved.
It's night. Somebody has to fill a form to approve night work first.
And then <i>fax</i> the form to the correct authority, so that the request is Official(tm).
I know that people are joking, but of course we also have (extra paid) on call shifts.
And send it by post for approval, which will take 5-30 business days.
Fax, actually! Will still take 5–30 business days for approval, for some reasons
Oh come on, that’s not true. You could also fax it. That might come with an additional processing fee though.
I many days would an email take?
Dont be ridiculous, thats what FAX is for.
Luckily it's not Sunday. Everyone would be out in the country hiking.
In addition: it's Germany, pessimistic cost estimation + 2000%, and you are in a realistic budget for the issue being resolved.
Must have been mid 2000s. Root dns servers were down. Super hard to diagnose the issues it causes on your side because it "never happens".
There's a good index of major DNSSEC outages here, <a href="https://ianix.com/pub/dnssec-outages.html" rel="nofollow">https://ianix.com/pub/dnssec-outages.html</a>
Germany isn't as big as you think.
Well it was already very late in the day (21-22?) so the impact was not big I would say
I was STRESSING tf out because I wasn't able to connect to my services & apps through my domains like at all .. they only work when using my phone data ? .. thank god it's not my fault this time
I have never used DNSSEC and never really bothered implementing it, but do I understand it correctly that we took the decentralized platform DNS was and added a single-point-of-failure certificate layer on top of it which now breaks because the central organisation managing this certificate has an outage taking basically all domains with them?
> which now breaks because the central organisation managing this certificate has an outage<p>The ".de" TLD is inherently managed by a single organization, and things wouldn't be much better if its nameservers went down. Some of the records would be cached by downstream resolvers, but not all of them, and not for very long.<p>> we took the decentralized platform DNS was and added a single-point-of-failure certificate layer on top of it<p>DNSSEC actually makes DNS <i>more</i> decentralized: without DNSSEC, the only way to guarantee a trustworthy response is to directly ask the authoritative nameservers. But with DNSSEC, you can query third-party caching resolvers and still be able to trust the response because only a legitimate answer will have a valid signature.<p>Similarly, without DNSSEC, a domain owner needs to absolutely trust its authoritative nameservers, since they can trivially forge trusted results. But with DNSSEC, you don't need to trust your authoritative nameservers nearly as much [0], meaning that you can safely host some of them with third-parties.<p>[0]: <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47409728">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47409728</a>
> DNSSEC actually makes DNS more decentralized: without DNSSEC, the only way to guarantee a trustworthy response is to directly ask the authoritative nameservers. But with DNSSEC, you can query third-party caching resolvers and still be able to trust the response because only a legitimate answer will have a valid signature.<p>but how would one verify the signature if the DNSKEY expired and you cannot fetch a fresh one because the organisation providing those keys is down? As far as I understood the TTL for those keys is different and for DENIC it seems to be 1h [0]. So if they are down for more than an hour and all RRSIG caches expire, DNS zones which have a higher TTL than 1h but use DNSSEC would also be down?<p>[0]
dig RRSIG de. @8.8.8.8<p>de. 3600 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 8 1 3600 20260519214514 20260505201514 26755 de. [...]
> but how would one verify the signature if the DNSKEY expired and you cannot fetch a fresh one because the organisation providing those keys is down?<p>In theory, this shouldn't happen, because <i>if</i> you use the same TTLs for your DNSSEC records and your "regular" records, then if the regular records are present in the cache, the DNSSEC records will be too.<p>> So if they are down for more than an hour and all RRSIG caches expire, DNS zones which have a higher TTL than 1h but use DNSSEC would also be down?<p>Yes, but I'd argue that the DNSSEC records should have the same TTLs for exactly this reason. That's how my domain is set up at least:<p><pre><code> $ dig +nocmd +nocomments +nostats +dnssec @any.ca-servers.ca. maxchernoff.ca. DS
;maxchernoff.ca. IN DS
maxchernoff.ca. 86400 IN DS 62673 15 2 487B95FEFF04265826F037C9DB2E1F14FF9ADBF2C7BE246A2B9F9BFD 481BE928
maxchernoff.ca. 86400 IN RRSIG DS 13 2 86400 20260512131336 20260505104433 46762 ca. ppc9LrWniPWdAI2Xq1g3FrYJGQVYayA5TtgFRkJfqOqNfe6zu/n0gwti IO3c9pOoUpIum5gPB6GLOGbGU+sfhg==
$ dig +nocmd +nocomments +nostats +dnssec @ns.maxchernoff.ca. maxchernoff.ca. DNSKEY
;maxchernoff.ca. IN DNSKEY
maxchernoff.ca. 86400 IN DNSKEY 257 3 15 DYs9mPDMRx/hQ9R9iGLi1Ysx1eFdhlXeCujY6PqJWeU=
maxchernoff.ca. 86400 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 15 2 86400 20260518072823 20260504055823 62673 maxchernoff.ca. RgPyEvB/kjXIvoidRNF/hfm7utzDs0kxXn4qJL17TUAVYOdbLl0Vd8zt E52bGBBFv2TNEnf9O9LkiT2GBH0jAA==
$ dig +nocmd +nocomments +nostats +dnssec @ns.maxchernoff.ca. maxchernoff.ca. A
;maxchernoff.ca. IN A
maxchernoff.ca. 86400 IN A 152.53.36.213
maxchernoff.ca. 86400 IN RRSIG A 15 2 86400 20260518072823 20260504055823 62673 maxchernoff.ca. bRfTVHnMjCFRaIh5uc0aT1vD4yh1UZrqOZDRunLbxFI1eth6nNlTiOOC xti7axVoXwB6VAoHOAnW0nL0eeJNDQ==</code></pre>
DNSSEC doesn't change the degree to which DNS is decentralized. It's always been hierarchical. In the absence of caching, every DNS query starts with a request to the root DNS servers. For foo.com or foo.de, you first need to query the root servers to determine the nameservers responsible for .com and .de. Then you contact the .com or .de servers to ask for the foo.com and foo.de nameservers. All DNSSEC does is add signatures to these responses, and adds public keys so you can authenticate responses the next level down.<p>A list of root nameserver IP addresses is included with every local recursive DNS resolver. The list changes, albeit slowly, over the years. With DNSSEC, this list also includes public keys of those root servers, which also rotate, slowly.
What you see here is decentralisation working. The issue is with the operator of the de TLD, and as such only that TLD is affected.
DNS is not decentralised in such a way, that multiple organisations run the infrastructure of a TLD, those are always run by a single entity.(.com and .net are operated by Verisign)<p>So what the issue is, that the operator has, does not change the impact.
<a href="https://status.denic.de/" rel="nofollow">https://status.denic.de/</a> says "Partial Service Disruption" for DNS Nameservice now.<p>EDIT: it says "Service Disruption" now
Even when every site in the world’s 3rd biggest economy goes down it’s still just a ‘Partial’ service disruption :D
Whole Germany is offline. DENIC: "Partial Service Disruption". That's one way to phrase it.
At least they have some humor left.<p>Edit: Now even the humor is gone.
It says "Server Not Found" now
"All Systems Operational"
I just spent the better half of an hour to debug unbound and the pihole because I thought it's a me problem...<p>Good news though, if you add domain-insecure: "de" to your unbound config everything works fine
I don't even enable DNSSEC in Unbound. There just isn't enough adoption yet for me to feel like I am missing out on something, <i>yet</i>.<p><i>"Cloudflare Radar data shows 8.11% of domains are signed with DNSSEC, but only 0.47% of queries are validated end-to-end."</i> [1]<p>Zones I may care about:<p>- Amazon.com: unsigned<p>- My banks: unsigned<p>- Hacker News: unsigned<p>- Email that I do not host: unsigned<p>- My power companies billing: unsigned<p>- I found some! id.me and irs.gov are signed.<p>[1] - <a href="https://technologychecker.io/blog/dnssec-adoption" rel="nofollow">https://technologychecker.io/blog/dnssec-adoption</a>
Just before the outage happened I updated multiple client servers. That was a very stressfull hour trying to figure out why nothing works.
SAMEEEEE !!!
Same haha
DNSSEC operations feels like one of those problems that should be tackled with formal methods, like how some subway controllers are.<p>But I expect it's treated like "very serious and scary ops", which isn't wrong, but isn't enough.
Finally establishing the concept of Feiertag on the internet. Come back tomorrow.
Internetfreie Dienstage, 21st century variant of Autofreie Sonntage.
Using this newfangled thingamabob on a silent holiday will result in the police kicking in your door the next morning.
.de TLD is online. DNS working fine<p>DNSSEC not working<p>If using an open resolver, i.e., a shared DNS cache, e.g., third party DNS service such as Google, Cloudflare, etc., then it might fail, or it might not. It depends on the third party DNS provider<p><a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/118/materials/slides-118-maprg-unresolved-issues-characterizing-open-dns-resolver-misbehavior-for-dnssec-queries-00" rel="nofollow">https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/118/materials/slides-11...</a>
To me, "root DNS servers" means 198.41.0.4, etc.<p>The names and IP addresses in the responses from those servers were not "wrong"
DNS worked fine. The responses that the root DNS servers were sending were wrong.<p>It's the cryptographic version of that one time the same TLD told the world domains starting with certain letters didn't exist: <a href="https://www.theregister.com/2010/05/12/germany_top_level_domain_glitch/" rel="nofollow">https://www.theregister.com/2010/05/12/germany_top_level_dom...</a>
This is the kind of system failure that we need really good and well tested disaster recovery plans for. While not necessary this time, DENIC and any critical infrastructure provider should be able to rebuild their entire infrastructure from scratch in a tolerable amount of time (Rather days than hours in the case of a full rebuild). Importantly the disaster recovery plan has to work without reliance on either the system that is failing, but also on adjacent systems that might have hidden dependencies on the failing system.<p>I'm really not too close to Denic and know nothing about their internals, but just close enough to have experienced the stress of someone working for DENIC second hand during the outage. From the very limited information I happened to gather DENIC had some trouble in addressing the issue because, surprise, infrastructure that they need to do so runs on de domains. [1]<p>I'm convinced there are all kinds of extended cyclic decencies between different centralization points in the net.<p>If some important backbone of the internet is down for an extended time, this will absolutely cause cascading failures. And thesw central points of failure are only getting worse. I love Let's Encrypt, but if something causes them to hard fail things will go really bad once certificates start to expire.<p>We need concrete plans to cold start extended parts of the internet. If things go really bad once and communication lines start to fail, we're in for a bad time.<p>Maybe governments have redundant, ultra resistant, low tech communication lines, war rooms and a list of important people in the industry who they can find and put in these war rooms so they can coordinate the rebuild of infrastructure. But I doubt it.<p>[^1] I don't know if there is some kind of disaster plan in the drawer at DENIC that would address this. I don't mean to allege anything against DENIC specifically, but broadly speaking about companies and infrastructure providers, I would not be surprised if there was absolutely no plan on what to do if things really go down and how to cold start cyclic dependencies or where they even are.
Just gonna leave this absolute gem from Thomas Ptacek on DNSSEC here:<p><a href="https://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/01/15/against-dnssec/" rel="nofollow">https://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/01/15/against-dnssec/</a>
Kurzgesagt predicted this, Germany is OVER
Denic will be added to the "Major DNSSEC Outages and Validation Failures" list:
<a href="https://ianix.com/pub/dnssec-outages.html" rel="nofollow">https://ianix.com/pub/dnssec-outages.html</a>
Shops open normally from 8am to 8pm in Germany. Today we decided to pilot opening hours for .de domains as well
<a href="https://ianix.com/pub/dnssec-outages.html" rel="nofollow">https://ianix.com/pub/dnssec-outages.html</a>
Things seem to be on their way up now, and <a href="https://status.denic.de/" rel="nofollow">https://status.denic.de/</a> is working again, at least from here.<p>DENIC's status page currently says "Frankfurt am Main, 5 May 2026 – DENIC eG is currently experiencing a disruption in its DNS service for .de domains. As a result, all DNSSEC-signed .de domains are currently affected in their reachability.
The root cause of the disruption has not yet been fully identified. DENIC’s technical teams are working intensively on analysis and on restoring stable operations as quickly as possible.
They can join the (rather long) list of TLD DNSSEC outages
<a href="https://ianix.com/pub/dnssec-outages.html" rel="nofollow">https://ianix.com/pub/dnssec-outages.html</a>
I've considered hard-coding some addresses into firmware as a fallback for a DNS outtage (which is more likely than not just misconfigured local DNS.) Events like this help justify this approach to the unconcerned.
So glad I found someone mention this. Amazon.de, SPIEGEL.de is down. Highly prominent sites unreachable. I wonder how long this will last and how big of a thing this ends up being once people talk about it :o Feels big to me
Both examples open for me
amazon.de, spiegel.de are down for me, too. heise.de works, but that might've been cached somewhere on my side.
dig manages to dig out ips for heise.de and tagesschau.de but not spiegel.de amazon.de and google.de However, dig @8.8.8.8 has still amazon.de cached, unlike 1.1.1.1 so perhaps Google to the rescue?<p>[Edit] After playing around with it, google seems to have at least some pages cached. After setting dns to 8.8.8.8 amazon.de and spiegel.de work again, my blog does not.
idealo.de, ebay.de, and spiegel.de are down, but amazon.de opens for me.
The same day Kurzgesagt posted their video “Germany is over”. Huh. <a href="https://youtu.be/n-gYFcVx-8Y" rel="nofollow">https://youtu.be/n-gYFcVx-8Y</a>
That postmortem should be a fun read, can't wait.
We shall transmit the postmortem to you via fax within 25 business days, ja.
Ok children, sit down and listen, uncle Culonavirus will tell you a story:<p>"It all began with the decommissioning of the last nuclear power plant, ..."
Given how amateurish German IT operations is, there is no guarantee whatsoever there will be a post-mortem nor whether it then will make it out under 3-6 months with all the necessary approvals.
Bla bla, always easy to rant...<p><a href="https://blog.denic.de/denic-informiert-uber-die-behebung-der-dnssec-storung-fur-de-domains/" rel="nofollow">https://blog.denic.de/denic-informiert-uber-die-behebung-der...</a><p>"Die Störung ist inzwischen behoben und alle Systeme laufen wieder stabil. Die genaue Ursache wird derzeit noch analysiert. Sobald belastbare Erkenntnisse vorliegen, wird DENIC diese transparent zur Verfügung stellen."<p>translation:<p>‘The disruption has now been resolved and all systems are running smoothly again. The exact cause is currently being investigated. As soon as reliable findings are available, DENIC will make them publicly available.’
<a href="https://dnsviz.net/d/spiegel.de/dnssec/" rel="nofollow">https://dnsviz.net/d/spiegel.de/dnssec/</a><p>yes indeed
Well at least it’s night time which means it’s hopefully resolved in the morning.<p>Looks like it failed after a maintenance: <a href="https://www.namecheap.com/status-updates/planned-denic-de-registry-scheduled-maintenance-may-5-2026/" rel="nofollow">https://www.namecheap.com/status-updates/planned-denic-de-re...</a><p><a href="https://status.denic.de/" rel="nofollow">https://status.denic.de/</a>
ok i picked a bad day to move from one register to another... i just spent the last hour frantically trying to figure out why the new register screwed us or the old register was screwing us...
On a slightly unrelated note, I was setting nameservers for two .de domains a few weeks ago and thought my provider was being crazily strict because they kept getting rejected. Turns out you can't point to a nameserver until that nameserver has a zone for the domain, and you can't use nameservers from two providers unless those two providers are both in the NS records at both ends
I'd expect political escalation for something like this but given that this is Germany, who knows.
<a href="https://pastebin.com/2mQUB8xX" rel="nofollow">https://pastebin.com/2mQUB8xX</a> seems like someone's going to have a lot of fun tonight
Looks Like a DNSSEC error:<p><a href="https://dnssec-analyzer.verisignlabs.com/nic.de" rel="nofollow">https://dnssec-analyzer.verisignlabs.com/nic.de</a>
Denic should work out a desaster recovery test - like:
<a href="https://blog.apnic.net/2022/02/14/disaster-recovery-with-dnssec/" rel="nofollow">https://blog.apnic.net/2022/02/14/disaster-recovery-with-dns...</a>
Am I reading this correctly? All .de domains are down? Looking forward to reading the postmortem.
I wasn't even aware that was possible..?
funfact: enabling DNS sec NOW will fix your domain instantly if dnssec was disabled before<p>-> no idea if that also "heals" anyone who had dnssec on before.<p>-> no idea if maybe they need to roll back something and then rebreak the new dnssec i made a minute later lol...
<a href="https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/issues-getting-certificates-for-de-zone/247023/3" rel="nofollow">https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/issues-getting-certifica...</a>
I can't wait for the .com TLD outage. Ya'll thought Cloudflare down was bad? Lol
Should I do my usual rent about how the web PKI refuses to move to a consensus protocol
Whole .de TLD seems to go offline right now due to dnssec or missing nic.de nameservers?
This works:<p><pre><code> $ unbound-host -t A www.denic.de
www.denic.de has address 81.91.170.12
</code></pre>
This does not:<p><pre><code> $ unbound-host -D -t A www.denic.de
www.denic.de has address 81.91.170.12
validation failure <www.denic.de. A IN>: signature crypto failed from 194.246.96.1 for DS denic.de. while building chain of trust
</code></pre>
So it does seem DNSSEC-related.<p>EDIT My explanation was wrong, this is not how keytags work. The published keytag data is consistent:<p><pre><code> de. 3600 IN DNSKEY 256 3 8 AwEAAfRLmzuIXVf7x5A0+U7hke0dS+GEJG0EdPhnOthCCLhy0t0WqLyoXJOhnfsTJ8vQX5fd9qOJc9gyr3SWJZkXAhPm3yPSC7FWWHF70WZTKKM9CekmKdqwMwq6ZCjMSUcecCuSF4Sbt1MRszV7rFmfGVklA1l5UzNbqwD+Dr5vfcLn ;{id = 33834 (zsk), size = 1024b}
de. 3600 IN DNSKEY 257 3 8 AwEAAbWUSd/QN9Ae543xzdiacY6qbjwtZ21QfmdgxRdm4Z7bjjHWy249uqxCyjjjoS4LDoRDKmj7ElffMKvTWKE1qFKu0p8TUy4wyhX0M+m5FUjvQ3CiZMi+qY7GSHA5B+Zd73cidmnTeb3e8lso6jEsXg05/VZ2AyAqWF6FexEIFxIqiwwLk4UP0BwZ17Ur3q1qx9VSbPMyHgQ9d6nHUN1EEJsTDA2v0vKumsUyp74ZanRZ/bB/6IzpaaZyr5BLF5pSCNdbRNjVmkwYD0993vm79LueyOeibsoHRc16jhALrIJou1PFjdq7YQsYN0KtqRiJtaAfPprDBREpeamPuW/MnW0= ;{id = 26755 (ksk), size = 2048b}
de. 3600 IN DNSKEY 256 3 8 AwEAAbTe1PJi8EgIudNGb+KRTxBL2aCu5rXkZ+aIe/TC88pwRdrXYeXODp1ihZWFop5CrbWRBLrk/YUPBE8aBc6oJP+58dSkdMLYkjSkmvdvYx+zXnRLWlF2bapxvZxshATJDfGjGbCiWxKEOoyRx3UhICtHC+cUSddsEvzfacUcBb6n ;{id = 32911 (zsk), size = 1024b}
de. 3600 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 8 1 3600 20260519030655 20260505013655 26755 de. ke56T5GZt/X6zMBAF+ouyCTnAd7RY7MsnDcfa9jyyOwSouRXhvzim/V13JDTMBAnpAHxWQXoruXrAZ6A6re5N+8Pp2utVkAEKTWs0r4UOLNKoZ2+zMwNplKjNNnY5PJIbHfa5myyziLiIsi//qDIgQEACFk+pZcHXrRdqRoXPCL3UtfaXjk3+duDQdlPnYsJys5UshjVpkALSMChW7J0anzr0sG+f9ytstBneymMwFYOUC3NqbejbLPZsXGPZBQKPAoVJuV5q3znopbcqrDFfjI7bmX3QPYNvOaiT1ElBfi2piJVpDzMaMAmm2jCmvrf5VeTOBccMroh8sBtDPsaEg== ;{id = 26755}
</code></pre>
The signature on the SOA record still does not verify:<p><pre><code> de. 86400 IN SOA f.nic.de. dns-operations.denic.de. 1778014672 7200 7200 3600000 7200
de. 86400 IN RRSIG SOA 8 1 86400 20260519205754 20260505192754 33834 de. aZoiAJ+PaHUDVSHNXfV/R26ZK3GpFB7ek2Z46VnZdmPEDaTww+a7PkiQ98W83xohUunXYSvQCMeGYfUre5UT76eBKThdxW2a6ImX9/x/oEzQ9x/69Y/NSeTckOv9m3HCLBOug01op1koiHOIAVEvonOmXEHHqo1P4sR/fNbcVg4= ;{id = 33834}</code></pre>
not all:
<a href="https://www.heise.de/" rel="nofollow">https://www.heise.de/</a> works
Doesn't work here, at least not anymore. Every single .de domain I have tried doesn't resolve.
Probably just a high TTL.
The last time .de I remember .de had a major outage like this was 2010. I would cite some sources but... you know. That was a fun afternoon, though.<p>I am very happy that it doesn't happen more often.
Germany has fallen.
Was wondering why a few of my sites aren't CSSing, as they use <a href="https://classless.de" rel="nofollow">https://classless.de</a>
I was just wondering what was up with our .de site.
even their own status page is not reachable:
<a href="https://status.denic.de/" rel="nofollow">https://status.denic.de/</a><p>As fallback they should use their X account: <a href="https://x.com/denic_de" rel="nofollow">https://x.com/denic_de</a>
Seems to be up now?<p>May 5, 2026 23:28 CEST<p>May 5, 2026 21:28 UTC<p>INVESTIGATING<p>Frankfurt am Main, 5 May 2026 – DENIC eG is currently experiencing a disruption in its DNS service for .de domains. As a result, all DNSSEC-signed .de domains are currently affected in their reachability.
The root cause of the disruption has not yet been fully identified. DENIC’s technical teams are working intensively on analysis and on restoring stable operations as quickly as possible.
Based on current information, users and operators of .de domains may experience impairments in domain resolution. Further updates will be provided as soon as reliable findings on the cause and recovery are available.
DENIC asks all affected parties for their understanding.
For further enquiries, DENIC can be contacted via the usual channels.
They did now! <a href="https://x.com/denic_de/status/2051779175908774148" rel="nofollow">https://x.com/denic_de/status/2051779175908774148</a>
Wow, I thought I was somehow unaffected but my resolver must just have cached the sites I'd tried.
from my analysis DENIC resigned the .de zone today (May 5, 2026, ~17:49 UTC). The DNSSEC signature (RRSIG) for the NSEC3 record covering the hash range of nearly all .de TLD is cryptographically broken (malformed).
Wow… it’s definitely not all .de TLDs, but a lot of prominent ones definitely.
its gonna be all .de domains once caches dry out, anything that still works right now is bound to eventually fail until the underlying issue is resolved
Amazon is completely down in Germany. Not only on amazon.de, even in the app.
Mailbox.org (also from Germany) seems to be experiencing issues too.
Seems up again. How briefly did the outage last?
It’s not DNS<p>There’s no way it’s DNS<p>It was DNSSEC
On Monday there was a huge outage affecting several cities quite close to Frankfurt because someone cut major fiber line; today DENIC is having a party and right when everyone is drunk this happens because some post-rotation task cannot be completed.<p>There are too many coincidences happening.
With chrome it works again
You can visually see this anomaly in many of CF Radar's charts: <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/dns/de?dateRange=1d" rel="nofollow">https://radar.cloudflare.com/dns/de?dateRange=1d</a>
quad9 seems to be having problems with DNSSEC as well
Seems to be fixed now.
How come I have zero problems with any .de domain I tried accessing in the last half hour?
I work with a few people specialised in IT security, and some of them take their jobs too seriously and will "lock down" everything to the point that it becomes a very real risk that they <i>lock out</i> everyone including themselves.<p>Fundamentally, security is a solution to an <i>availability</i> problem: The desire of the users is for a system to remain available despite external attack.<p>Systems that become unavailable to everyone fail this requirement.<p>A door with its keyhole welded shut is not "secure", it's broken.
Security is not just a solution to availability. It is also to keep sensitive data (PII, or business secrets, or passwords, or cryptographic private keys, and so on) away from the hands of bad actors.<p>If I’m unable to use Amazon for 24 hours it doesn’t really matter. If a photo copy of my passport is leaked that’s worries and potential troubles for years.
Security = Confidentiality + Integrity + Availability<p>or alternatively,<p>Security = (exclude unauth'd reads) + (exclude unauth'd writes) + (include auth'd reads and auth'd writes)<p>Gotta satisfy all parts in order to have security.
If you squint at it, you can convert all three to just availability.<p><pre><code> Confidentiality = available to us, but nobody else.
Integrity = available to us in a pristine condition.
</code></pre>
It's a bit reductive, I'll admit, but it can be a useful exercise in the same way that everything in an economy can be reduce to units of either: "human time", "money" or "energy". Roughly speaking they're interchangeable.<p>E.g.: What's the benefit to you if your data is so confidential that you can't read it either? This is a real problem with some health information systems, where I can't access my own health records! Ditto with many government bureaucracies that keep <i>my</i> records safe and secure from <i>me</i>.
aiimageupscaler
how is that possible?
For me bmw.de works but www.bmw.de not
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Maybe related to this? Crazy idea, but nothing surprises me anymore.<p><a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2026/05/01/politics/us-troop-withdrawal-germany-trump-merz" rel="nofollow">https://edition.cnn.com/2026/05/01/politics/us-troop-withdra...</a>