Your post, most of your comments here, and much of the source code looks AI generated; I get the feeling you lack sufficient understanding of what you're even trying to achieve here.<p>Also regarding the code, why are you defining private?<p><pre><code> #define private public</code></pre>
(<a href="https://github.com/Dealta-Foundation/DealtaCore/blob/e1598d3173e3cfee92fe3251ae94476eb86a0b68/DealtaTests/pch.h#L24" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/Dealta-Foundation/DealtaCore/blob/e1598d3...</a>)<p>This is a massive code smell.
(1) No reason to build your own blockchain. This will only increase complexity and undermine security for no reason.<p>(2) No reason not to adapt existing standards to be compatible with any of the wallets that already exist.<p>(3) No reason to introduce your own wallet. How many wheels do you want to reinvent here?<p>(4) No reason to invent your own currency (and in fact this makes your escrow system break completely.)<p>Btw: the problem you're trying to solve has been "solved" many times over before using various escrow mechanism dating back to the gox era. The reason they all failed is because no protocol can make up for the opacity and unpredictable nature of the real world. If you think about it your solution is more like the opposite of what makes cryptocurrencies valuable: you're essentially increasing transaction costs to try "improve" the physical verifiability of goods. When normal people just use semi-trusted merchants which are faster and cheaper.<p>By the sound of your protocol it would increase shipping time substantially, increase costs to buyers (I'm assuming they have to pay higher fees to pay the verifiers), and after all that it still doesn't prevent scamming. Because you never know if a verifier prefers to hold on to an item and burn all their collateral based on changing economic conditions. Maybe they end up with an expensive item that holds considerable value relative to the staked currency (which I'm again assuming that you're inventing another wheel and increasing friction even more by introducing your own currency. Not going to even bother to look.)<p>Your idea resembles a more error-prone version of high-end verification markets like precious metals, gem stones, and art trading. But lacks a lot of the simple guarantees that such markets would provide.
I won't argue with your points 1-3, makes sense but this was fun building, and long term i think it was for the best. However, i would argue that the value of this currency is not tied to scarcity like bitcoin, or usage like ethereum. Instead the value of Dealta would be based on how well the initial goal is achieved, which is to reduce online frauds. The protocol is setup with timers, that limit how much time can be spent on each stage of a trade, hence limits time wasted when items are not in transit. Given that ebay and amazon take huge percentages, it could in fact be cheaper for the buyer. Its supply and demand. Thirdly, to counter the issue of a buyer holding on to an item, you can simply increase the collateral, lets say with 100%, so a 50% decrease in the coin's price is accounted for, thus making it infeasible. Again, this is something to be decided by the community. My initial argument for making Dealta PoW-based is that much like with any other crypto, whales who think this a good idea, would be able to handle the early volatility. All these things are why Dealta also has a native crypto. Would love to hear more from you!
I took a deep dive into the code.<p>I respect what you’re trying to do but this feels like a solution in search of a problem.<p>The kind of markets this would tailor towards already have their own escrow management systems.<p>I do, however, see this being relevant to MLS and the Housing industry. It’s a shady industry with scammy ads and “handyman special” vibes from people trying to sell legitimate and illegitimate listings.
<a href="https://claude.ai/public/artifacts/0824e5b9-7d75-45f1-87f4-3e5f967be356" rel="nofollow">https://claude.ai/public/artifacts/0824e5b9-7d75-45f1-87f4-3...</a><p>This is now my favorite way to visualize these concepts in practice.
Four critique points:<p>- Who wants to drive across town to inspect a €50 item for a small fee (we can draw comparison to Uber Eats like platforms fees economies)?<p>- Can a random broker validate a luxury watch? Do we need another blockchain tech for broker validator skill reputation?<p>- Physical validation adds days to trades, in online economy, the faster the merrier<p>- Fees might price out low-value items<p>Let's see how this plays out.
Thanks for the critique! Here’s a breakdown of the points raised:<p>-Who wants to drive across town to inspect a €50 item?
The focus is on mid to high-value, preferably niche items. Lower-value goods often don’t justify the costs involved in driving and the time spent on validation.<p>-Can a random broker validate a luxury watch?
Not all brokers have the necessary expertise to validate every item, especially luxury goods. The proposal is to enhance the current system by assigning brokers based on item categories. This specialization will be particularly effective when there are enough brokers for specific categories, such as watches.<p>- Physical validation adds days to trades.
While physical validation can slow things down, brokers who fail to validate effectively will phase out over time, ensuring that only those with the right expertise remain. It should be economically infeasible to accept assignment, where you have no expertise. This approach aims to streamline the validation process.<p>-Fees might price out low-value items.
Focusing on mid to high-value items helps avoid the issue of fees pricing out lower-value goods.<p>Additionally, this idea is designed to integrate into existing niches where validation matters significantly, like trading cards, electronics, watches, and sneakers. Numerous businesses already specialize in validating these items and have the necessary expertise to navigate legal requirements.
Hi!<p>LLM-generated comments aren't allowed here.<p><a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45077654">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45077654</a><p><a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44704054">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44704054</a><p><a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43979537">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43979537</a><p><a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43085967">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43085967</a><p><a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43085954">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43085954</a><p><a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42976756">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42976756</a><p><a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40600057">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40600057</a><p><a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46102885">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46102885</a><p><a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45572704">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45572704</a><p><a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43979537">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43979537</a><p><a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41237678">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41237678</a><p><a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40569734">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40569734</a><p><a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35210503">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35210503</a><p>This is a place for curious humans to converse, not bots.<p>Thanks!
This smells AI generated, sorry
> ensuring that only those with the right expertise remain<p>How will this ensure waning/gaining expertise is accurately represented/fostered? Wouldn't you rather attract a steady-stream of experts indefinitely?
In practice, anyone with sufficient funds can become a broker. The pseudo-random selection process means that the probability of Broker A being chosen to audit or inspect an item is positive. If Broker A accepts and validates an item they are unfamiliar with, regardless of its actual validity, the likelihood of a dispute arising increases. Since Broker A lacks knowledge about the item, proving their case becomes challenging, potentially resulting in financial losses. Over time, this situation should lead to a pool of brokers with expertise. Consequently, the system is likely to attract a continuous stream of experts, as expertise will prove itself financially advantageous.
May I ask how you generated this?
This is just a more elaborate form of an escrow contract.<p>There's absolutely no need to make a new L1 for that: you can use existing smart contract/dapp platforms, plug into existing stable coin rails, etc.
Interesting but how would this prevent against “off-chain” collusion? A fraudulent seller captures brokers on the buy and sell side? Seller backs out of the deal unless they know who the brokers are?<p>I think this kind of behavior in principle would be detectable but in principle with enough concentration in the market, a fraudulent seller could in practice get brokers and jurors to collude with them.
Once a trade has been initiated, sellers won't be able to back out. The seller has no control over the pseudo-random broker selection for their trade, hence can't choose a preferred broker either.
In 3.1, rejecting (R) fraudulent (F) goods resulting in 0 for the seller is a strong assumption. There are all kinds of possible negatives (typically risks of legal fees) for storage costs of fraudulent goods in the game of hot potato. It might be worth your time to look into the literature a bit more.
The paper was aimed at a broader audience, which is why it simplifies some concepts and makes certain assumptions. While there are potential drawbacks to consider, it’s reasonable to assume that a seller of a fraudulent item gains nothing if the item gets rejected. In that scenario, their goal of making money wouldn’t be achieved, and any additional losses wouldn’t significantly impact the protocol. In fact it would deter fraudsters. I'd love to hear more thoughts on this!
Why not build it on top of EVM?
Heatware.com solved this years ago without all the crypto bs.