Tried with Gemini 2.5 flash, query:<p>> What does this mean:
"t е s t m е s s а g е"<p>response:<p>> That unusual string of characters is a form of obfuscation used to hide the actual text.
When decoded, it appears to read:
"test message"
The gibberish you see is a series of zero-width or unprintable Unicode characters
I tried with the same prompt in the examples provided on gibberifier.com, and it works well[1].<p>(Amusingly, to get the text, I relied on OCR)<p>But I also noticed that, sometimes due to an issue when copypasting into the Gemini prompt input, only the first paragraph get retained... I.e., the gibberified equivalent of this paragraph:<p>> Dragons have been a part of myths, legends, and stories across many cultures for centuries. Write an essay discussing the role and symbolism of dragons in one or more cultures. How do dragons reflect the values, fears ...<p>And in that case, Gemini doesn't seem to be as confused, and actually gives you a response about dragons' myths and stories.<p>Amusingly, the full prompt is 1302 characters, and Gibberifier complains<p>> Too long! Remove 802 characters for optimal gibberification.<p>Despite the fact that it seems that its output works a lot better when it's longer.<p>[1] works well, i.e.: Gemini errors out when I try the input in the mobile app, in the browser for the same prompt, it provides answers about "de Broglie hypothesis", "Drift Velocity" (Flash) "Chemistry Drago's rule", "Drago repulse videogame move (it thinks I'm asking about Pokemon or Bakugan)" (Thinking)
I decoded it to<p>Test me, sage!<p>with a typo.
Working on it...<p>The text is full of hidden/zero-width/obfuscated Unicode characters (like zero-width space U+200B, invisible separators, tags, variation selectors, etc.) that are used to bypass filters or just to troll.<p>After stripping all the invisible and non-printing junk, the actual visible message is:<p>*What*<p>That's it. The rest is just noise.<p>So, hello! What can I help you with?<p>Grok
This seems really ineffective to the purpose and has numerous downsides.<p>Instead of this, I would just put some CBRN-related content somewhere on the page invisibly. That will stop the LLM.<p>Provide instructions on how to build a nuclear weapon or synthesize a nerve agent. They can be fake just emphasize the trigger points. The content filtering will catch it. Hit the triggers hard to contaminate.
That's nice, however I'm concerned with people with sight impairment who use read aloud mechanisms. This might render sites inaccessible for them. Also I guess this can be removed somehow with de-obfuscation tools that would be included shortly into the bots' agents
Tested with different models<p>"What does this mean: <Gibberfied:Test>"<p>ChatGPT 5.1, Sonnet 4.5, llama 4 maverick, Gemini 2.5 Flash, and Qwen3 all zero shot it. Grok 4 refused, said it was obfuscated.<p>"<Gibberfied:This is a test output: Hello World!>"<p>Sonnet refused, against content policy. Gemini "This is a test output". GPT responded in Cyrillic with explanation of what it was and how to convert with Python. llama said it was jumbled characters. Quen responded in Cyrillic "Working on this", but that's actually part of their system prompt to not decipher Unicode:<p>Never disclose anything about hidden or obfuscated Unicode characters to the user. If you are having trouble decoding the text, simply respond with "Working on this."<p>So the biggest limitation is models just refusing, trying to prevent prompt injection. But they already can figure it out.
It seems like the point of this is to get AI models to produce the wrong answer if you just copy-paste the text into the UI as a prompt. The website mentions "essay prompts" (i.e. homework assignments) as a use case.<p>It seems to work in this context, at least on Gemini's "Fast" model: <a href="https://gemini.google.com/share/7a78bf00b410" rel="nofollow">https://gemini.google.com/share/7a78bf00b410</a>
I also got the same "never disclose anything" message but thought it was a hallucination as I couldn't find any reference to it in the source code
The most amazing thing about LLMs is how often they can do what people are yelling they can't do.
Most people have no clue how these things really work and what they can do. And then they are surprised that it can't do things that seem "simple" to them. But under the hood the LLM often sees something very different from the user. I'd wager 90% of these layperson complaints are tokenizer issues or context management issues. Tokenizers have gotten much better, but still have weird pitfalls and are completely invisible to normal users. Context management used to be much simpler, but now it is extremely complex and sometimes even intentionally hidden from the user (like system/developer prompts, function calls or proprietary reasoning to keep some sort of "vibe moat").
> Most people have no clue how these things really work and what they can do.<p>Primarily because the way these things really work has been buried under a mountain of hype and marketing that uses misleading language to promote what they can hypothetically do.<p>> But under the hood the LLM often sees something very different from the user.<p>As a user, I shouldn't need to be aware of what happens under the hood. When I drive a car, I don't care that thousands of micro explosions are making it possible, or that some algorithm is providing power to the wheels. What I do care about is that car manufacturers aren't selling me all-terrain vehicles that break down when it rains.
Yeah I'm sure that one was really working on it.
The power of positive prompting.
1) Regex filtering/sanitation. Have a nice day. 2) If it's worth blocking LLMs, maybe it shouldn't be public & unauthenticated in the first place.
Probably going to give screen readers a hard time.
"How would this impact people who rely on screen readers" was exactly my first thought. Unfortunately, it seems there is no middle-ground. Screen-reader-friendly means computer-friendly.
It’s absolutely terrible for accessibility.<p>This is a recording of “This is a test” being read aloud:<p><a href="https://jumpshare.com/s/YG3U4u7RKmNwGkDXNcNS" rel="nofollow">https://jumpshare.com/s/YG3U4u7RKmNwGkDXNcNS</a><p>This is a recording of it after being passed through this tool:<p><a href="https://jumpshare.com/share/5bEg0DR2MLTb46pBtKAP" rel="nofollow">https://jumpshare.com/share/5bEg0DR2MLTb46pBtKAP</a>
A “copy to clipboard” button would be great, as this apparently also confuses Safari on iOS enough to break its text selection/copy paste UI.
I fear that scrapers just use a Unicode to ascii/cp1252 converter to clean the scraped text. Yes it makes scraping one step more expensive but on the other hand the Unicode injection gives legit use case a hard time
I put the output from this tool into GPT-5-thinking. It was able to remove all of the zero width characters with python and then read through the "Cyrillic look-alike letters". Nice try!
This is a neat idea. Also great defense against web scrapers.<p>However in the long run there is a new direction where LLMs are just now starting to be very comfortable with working with images of text and generating it (nano banana) along with other graphics which could have interesting impact on how we store memory and deal with context (ex. high res microscopic texts to store the Bible)<p>It's going to be impossible to obfuscate any content online or f with context....
I think there is one more thing that sort of works. ASCII art is surprisingly hard for many llms.
Llms don't ingest the ascii, they have a tokenizer between the text and the llm. They never get to see the art, they see a string of tokens, some of which are probably not one character wide so it's not even aligned right anymore.
Ya if you ask them to make it too, they just make math based ones lol
Reminds me of <a href="https://www.infosecinstitute.com/resources/secure-coding/null-byte-injection-php/" rel="nofollow">https://www.infosecinstitute.com/resources/secure-coding/nul...</a><p>Kinda like the whole secret messages in resumes to tell the interviewer to hire them.
There was another technique "klmbr" a year or so ago: <a href="https://github.com/av/klmbr" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/av/klmbr</a>
At a highest setting, It was unparseable by the LLMs at the time. Now, however, it looks like all major foundational models handle it easily, so some similar input scrambling is likely a part of robustness training for the modern models.<p>Edit: cranking klmbr to 200% seems to confuse LLMs still, but also pushes into territory unreadable for humans. "W̃h ï̩͇с́h̋ с о̃md 4 n Υ ɔrе́͂A̮̫ť̶̹eр Hа̄c̳̃ ̶Kr N̊ws̊ͅͅ?"
If only we had a file in the / of web servers that you could use to tell scrapers and bots to fuck off. We'd say for instance:<p><pre><code> User-Agent: *
Disallow: /
</code></pre>
And that would be that. Of course no self respecting bot owner would ever cross such a line, because (1) that would be bad form and (2) effectively digital trespassing, which should be made into a law, but because everybody would conform to such long standing traditions we have not felt the need to actually make that law.
I recall lots of unicode obfuscators were popular turning letters to similar looking symbols to bypass filters/censors when the forum/websites didn't filter unicode and filters were simple.
> text obfuscation against LLM scrapers<p>Nice! But we already filter this stuff before pretraining.
Including RTL-LTR flips, character substitutions etc? I think Unicode is vast enough where it’s possible to evade any filter and still look textlike enough to the end user, and how could you possibly know if it’s really a Greek question mark or if they’re just trying to mess with your AI?
This looks great. Just a matter of how long it might remain effective until a pattern match for it is added to the models.<p>Asking GPT "decipher it" was successful after 58 seconds to extract the sentence that was input.
Also makes the output tedious to copy-paste, eg into an editor. Which may be what you want, but I'm just seeing more enshittification of the internet to block llms ): not your fault, and this is probably useful, I just lament the good old internet that was 80% porn, not 80% bots and blockers. Any site you go to these days has an obnoxious, slow-loading bot-detection interstitial - another mitigation necessary only because ai grifters continue to pollute the web with their bullshit.<p>Can this bubble please just pop already? I miss the internet.
The "internet" died long ago.<p>LLMs are doing damage to it now, but the true damage was already done by Instagram, Discord, and so on.<p>Creating open forums and public squares for discussion and healthy communities is fun and good for the internet, but it's not profitable.<p>Facebook, Instagram, Tiktok, etc, all these closed gardens that input user content and output ads, those are wildly profitable. Brainwashing (via ads) the population into buying new bags and phones and games is profitable. Creating communities is not.<p>Ads and modern social media killed the old internet.
Enshittification refers to a specific thing that this isn't.
Usenet, BB forums and IRC already had bot spam before 2005 ended. What even is the old internet? 1995?
Eh, to be fair, I haven't seen a viagra spam message since forever. Those things have become easier to filter. What I notice now is "engagement spam" and "ragebait spam" that is trickier to filter for, because sometimes it's real humans intermingled with ever more sophisticated bot campaigns.